Nice quotes, thanks, however there are a few bones of contention.
Buffett was investing in 1969, a serious bear market, and 1973-74, a very large bear market. Each time he actually made a profit each year during the bear. Buffett was investing from 1969-1982, the worst period for stocks since the 1930s. So Tudor Jones is talking utter nonsense here.
Obviously a 1929-32 scenario would be a very tough test of the Buffett style of investing. I for one would love to see that happen, just to see how Buffett handles the ultimate test. However, it could actually work out quite well for him as he will be able to scoop up businesses at historic bargain prices. Also, most of his owned businesses have dominant market positions and balance sheet strength - the potential for profitable M&A or expansion against weak & failing competition would be enormous. Buffett is a businessman not a trader.
Fading extremes is a reliable and profitable strategy. There is a huge difference between fading a massively oversold panic market with limited risk and a contingency plan in case it turns into a true crash; versus averaging down with unlimited risk and if it's a true crash you get taken out.
Most long-term trends have retracements more than 20% of the ultimate move, thus making it impossible to stay on board if you require a 5:1 risk/reward ratio. For example oil went from $49 to 147, however it had a move from 77 to 49 before that. This retracement was more than 20% of the subsequent $100 per barrel price advance thus 5:1 was impossible if you were staying in long-term. Equally, owning oil at $120 you had a $10 retracement and only $27 upside - another great trade that did not meet the 5:1 criteria. UK pound from 2.16 to 1.52 had several retracements of >10-12 points, again lowering the R/R below 5:1. Regardless of how many trades offer 5:1 R/R on *entry*, very few maintain that R/R throughout the lifetime of the trade.