Why most pro traders are gamblers, and why risk control prevents success with OPM

I think the OP has hit on a dirty secret that many systematic money managers, even if they _believe_ they have some kind of magic or edge, truly are just taking an occult risk.

A simple example is selling option premium. You can trade a system that looks great but runs a small risk of big losses.

How about mean reversion trades? Same idea - works well until it doesn't. If you think about it, it has a similar risk/reward profile to selling premium..

However, there is something you can do if you are evaluating hedge funds. Run a regression on the hedge fund's returns with the Fama French factors. If VIX explains much of the returns, you can bet the hedge fund is taking option-like risks.
 
Quote from Ghost of Cutten:

Great great post

Agree agree. It's all a scam


I am curious about a common phenomenon - pro traders, especially fund managers, suffering large drawdowns.

Some basic assumptions, if recognised by a trader, should make this almost impossible unless the trader is stupid, incompetent, or taking way more risk than he should. Here they are:

1. Whatever approach you use, at some point you will run into a market environment that is very hostile to it.

2. When this happens, a large majority of your bets will hit their max possible loss (which, hopefully, is your stop-loss point on each trade, rather than a price of $0 or $margin-call).

3. You will thus earn your max expected drawdown under these conditions.

Therefore, under no circumstances should a competent trader with proper risk control ever lose more than their maximum expected drawdown.

Yet if you look at most pro traders and fund managers, almost all of them have had max drawdowns greater than they expected. But as I have shown above, this is virtually impossible if you stick to the simple and obvious assumptions above.

The logical conclusion is that most traders don't actually stick to one or more of these assumptions. We can therefore infer that they must be making one of the following errors:

1. They do not think a hostile market environment for their approach will occur
2. They are taking risk at a level high enough that a hostile market environment will cause losses way in excess of their maximum expected drawdown
3. They simply have no risk control

I'd say most pro traders have 1 and 3 covered. Therefore, the clear conclusion is that most pro traders take way too much risk.

If they take way too much risk, then we must reduce all reported returns to compensate. For example, take someone like Dan Loeb, who was down 29% in 2008, and whose peak/valley drawdown was presumably higher than that. Let's be generous and call it 35%. It is pretty obvious that no hedge fund manager plans for a 35% drawdown by choice. I'd say that 20% is about the maximum drawdown acceptable. Loeb lost 35% (probably a bit more) at the peak. That is what actually happened, therefore his true risk was higher (since market conditions worse than 2008 can and have occurred), let's say his true risk was 40% (again, generous assumption). This means that if he had been trading at proper size, his position size, and thus his returns, would be cut in half (actually slightly more than half, due to compounding effects). I don't have his precise return numbers but I think they are in the high teens. So his true return, adjusted to a sensible risk level, is actually in the high single digits. Would you pay 2 and 20 for an 8-9% gross return? If he had traded half size from the beginning, would he have attracted any assets with a return less than half of what he actually made before 2008?

This story is replicated across literally thousands of funds, most of which have returns and records worse than Loeb's (I am not picking on him, he was just the first suitable example I saw). As an example I could give the highly rated Citadel. Their flagship fund lost 50% at the worst point in 2008. This means they were taking about 3 times as much risk as they should. Their returns were in the 30% range. Thus their true returns, at a sensible level of risk (20% max drawdown) was below 10% per annum i.e. nothing special.

A further piece of evidence is that long/short equity funds have historically averaged exposure of 35-40%. Since the worst drawdown in US equity markets is 89% (1929-32) and 99-100% worldwide, their risk from market risk alone is 30-40%, double the 20% recommended limit. One can add on top the risk of shorts going up and longs falling at the same time etc.

One can conclude from this that without taking nutty levels of risk, almost all pro traders cannot make superior returns. The way to gather assets in the pro game is to take insane levels of risk (e.g. 2-3 times what is sensible), and hope that you last long enough to gather lots of money and get lots of management fees and traders' options before a hostile market environment comes along. Pro traders are effectively unethically exploiting clients' risk-blindness, or are simply risk-blind themselves (most likely the latter).

If all traders were forced to take sensible levels of risk with other people's money, i.e. max drawdowns that the clients can actually withstand (which IMO is 20% or less), arguably only about 2-3% of currently operating hedge funds and traders would still be able to make more than 10% per annum compound.

The inescapable realisation is that almost the entire hedge fund and trading industry is based on smoke and mirrors.
 
Quote from Ghost of Cutten:


The inescapable realisation is that almost the entire hedge fund and trading industry is based on smoke and mirrors.

Great analysis.

75% of fund managers can't beat the S&P. Moreover, >95% lose in bear markets.

Those figures suggest managers are doing one (or more) of three things:

1) indexing against the market
2) selling short premium
3) borrow short and lend long (Dollar/Yen/discount window carry trade)

This is no-brainer, retard-caliber strategies that work until they don't. Then they lose big. Which suggests nearly the entire industry can be chalked up to marketing magic and leverage. Which is true.

The only reliable means to assess competency in fund management is Track Record.

The only way to do that is to identify funds that return a ~profit every year, including 2 bear markets. A sufficient look back period should be roughly 12 years.

Next, I would invest with those funds. Or, if lacking minimum capital, I would email the managers of those funds and ask them to recommend a reading list.

The fact is most fund managers can't trade or invest profitably so they rely on slick marketing and quants to beef up their credibility with investors, who are just as clueless. Blind leading the blind.
 
Quote from Specterx:

I don't see how your conclusion follows. Maximum expected drawdown is just that - the actual peak to trough drawdown in any given case is known only in hindsight, and could be more, less, or exactly on target.

There's no iron law of the universe that the market can't take the best, most highly-skilled trader in the world and drain his account to zero, at whatever rate is permitted by maximum daily/weekly/monthly loss limits.
ghost naled it, whether you think day to day ,month to month,or annual,there is no way they are taking more than your profits if you respect a max drawdown or for a sca;per ,your daily limit,if that happens.you haven't learned to trade,making money is easy,hanging on to it as in the form of losses ,is on you,that's the hard part,thats trading 101
 
Quote from caementarius:

I think the OP has hit on a dirty secret that many systematic money managers, even if they _believe_ they have some kind of magic or edge, truly are just taking an occult risk.

A simple example is selling option premium. You can trade a system that looks great but runs a small risk of big losses.

How about mean reversion trades? Same idea - works well until it doesn't. If you think about it, it has a similar risk/reward profile to selling premium..

However, there is something you can do if you are evaluating hedge funds. Run a regression on the hedge fund's returns with the Fama French factors. If VIX explains much of the returns, you can bet the hedge fund is taking option-like risks.

An example (I think):

http://ljmfunds.com/english/history.php
 
Which fund do you prefer and why?

(1) +100% for the first year and - 50% for the second

(2) +15% for the first and +15% for the second

To give you a hint, you are totally neglecting something called "risk profile". Actually, there are many people with money looking for (1) despite the drawdown. They got a lot of money. Only poor people hate (1) because of the following:

50% of 10 million is 5 million, still a lot of money. You can buy that luxury house and maybe two sports cars.

50% of 5k is 2.5K, now you can't even buy that old used car.

This should be enough to understand why your thinking is wrong. You are thinking like a poor man.
 
Quote from intradaybill:

Which fund do you prefer and why?

(1) +100% for the first year and - 50% for the second

(2) +15% for the first and +15% for the second

To give you a hint, you are totally neglecting something called "risk profile". Actually, there are many people with money looking for (1) despite the drawdown. They got a lot of money. Only poor people hate (1) because of the following:

50% of 10 million is 5 million, still a lot of money. You can buy that luxury house and maybe two sports cars.

50% of 5k is 2.5K, now you can't even buy that old used car.

This should be enough to understand why your thinking is wrong. You are thinking like a poor man.

Since most people leave their money to compound, the annual return on (1) is effectively zero, so why the choice?
 
Do not mix up some fund managers, who are not good traders but very good salesmen and marketers, with genuinely talented traders.

There are many traders/fund managers who cannot beat the indices but retain a large client base due to their charisma, credentials etc. There are also the options 'gurus' who are mispricing their insurance and collect the tiny premiums for years before blowing the whole fund in one 'outlier' event that wasn't that unusual.

These guys are the gamblers you are talking about.

On the other hand, there are many traders who have real skill and a big edge who bet very aggressively- they make very good returns but always run the risk of large drawdowns.

Like any other business in life there is always some risk in trading- as someone has already said liquidity can occasionally dry up and leave you screwed if you are a big player.

If you want to push the envelope and make truly outsized returns you are going to have to tolerate some very large drawdowns over the course of your career. It's a double edged sword.
 
Quote from intradaybill:

Which fund do you prefer and why?

(1) +100% for the first year and - 50% for the second

(2) +15% for the first and +15% for the second

To give you a hint, you are totally neglecting something called "risk profile". Actually, there are many people with money looking for (1) despite the drawdown. They got a lot of money. Only poor people hate (1) because of the following:

50% of 10 million is 5 million, still a lot of money. You can buy that luxury house and maybe two sports cars.

50% of 5k is 2.5K, now you can't even buy that old used car.

This should be enough to understand why your thinking is wrong. You are thinking like a poor man.

Not at all. Take George Soros for instance, he decided to close his aggressive hedge fund in 2000 because the drawdowns were too painful to handle emotionally. He could have made more money by running his money that way(making a few huge selected bets every year) but instead choose an 'endowment' model where he is looking for more modest returns. He choose happiness instead of money, more money wont make much of a difference in his life anyway
 
Quote from intradaybill:

Which fund do you prefer and why?

(1) +100% for the first year and - 50% for the second

(2) +15% for the first and +15% for the second

To give you a hint, you are totally neglecting something called "risk profile". Actually, there are many people with money looking for (1) despite the drawdown. They got a lot of money. Only poor people hate (1) because of the following:

50% of 10 million is 5 million, still a lot of money. You can buy that luxury house and maybe two sports cars.

50% of 5k is 2.5K, now you can't even buy that old used car.

This should be enough to understand why your thinking is wrong. You are thinking like a poor man.


Well said.

Sacrificing the pawn for the rook.
 
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