Quote from stock_trad3r:
cool aapl up 5% today
GS rebounding nicely as well
what happened to the subprime?
lol bearsterns? what happened to the two hedgefunds?
To be constructive here, you really need to read what the risk is with this subprime and Bear Stearns. It is not a benign event in the least. If anything, it is a major threat to the credit markets.
i will post the core of this and a link to the whole story. BUT YOU REALLY NEED TO READ THIS STOCKTRAD3R. It is a big deal indeed.
By John Mauldin
Is the subprime mortgage market collapsing before our eyes, or did we avoid a
disaster as Bear Stearns stepped up to the plate with $3.2 billion to help its ailing funds?
As we will see from the data, the problems in the subprime world are not over. The Fat
Lady has not sung. But will the problems in this market contaminate the rest of the
liquidity-driven markets? Is the party over? Not according to the high-yield markets. In
this weekâs letter, we look at what could be the real problem in the next half of the year.
This week Bear Stearns felt it necessary to inject $1.6 billion in loans into two of
its hedge funds that deal in the higher-risk portion of the subprime mortgage market.
These funds are down 23% at least. Merrill Lynch moved to seize some of the assets it
had as collateral for loans and put them to the market.
Prices offered on the better grades
were a shock, and there was no bid on most of the securities. Not low bids, but no bids.
Merrill decided to not press the sale.
Mark to Model or Mark to Market?
Hereâs the problem. There is not an active market in these securities, so the
various funds and banks use a âmodelâ to decide what price they should use when toting
up their assets.
But if these securities are actually sold, then now you have a market price,
and you have to mark to market rather than use the price based on your model.
As an illustration, letâs say an institution had to sell a $1 million chunk of a $20
million BBB tranche. Before that sale, other funds and institutions owning that same
tranche could price it at the model price, i.e., what their accountants or bankers said they
were worth. Nothing sinister here, just people making their best guesses. Typically, a
fund will take three such guesses from outside firms and go with the average, but each
fund or bank will have its own rules.
But if that institution sells their tranche for a 20% loss, then now there is a market
price established for everyone who owns that same tranche. Losses passed all around. As
an aside, a group of hedge funds has written the SEC asking the agency to be on the
lookout for investment banks who would buy bad loans in order to keep them from
defaulting and leading to losses in the banksâ derivative portfolios. As you might
imagine,
these funds are short these derivatives and want to see large losses at the banks.
The problem is that if these offerings lose their investment grades, many
institutions will be forced to sell, as they are limited by their charters to only invest in
rated paper. But who will buy until the smoke clears? It will get ugly. This will end in
tears.
âThe highest default rates on home loans in a decade have reduced prices of
some bonds backed by mortgages to people with poor or limited credit by more than 50
cents on the dollar and forced New York-based Bear Stearns Cos. to offer $3.2 billion to
bail out a money-losing hedge fund. Almost 65 percent of the bonds in indexes that track
subprime mortgage debt don't meet the ratings criteria in place when they were sold,
according to data compiled by Bloomberg.
âThat may just be the beginning. Downgrades by S&P, Moody's and Fitch would
force hundreds of investors to sell holdings, roiling the $800 billion market for securities
backed by subprime mortgages and $1 trillion of collateralized debt obligations, the
fastest growing part of the financial markets.â (Bloomberg)
http://www.frontlinethoughts.com/pdf/mwo062907.pdf