Quote from PHOENIX TRADING:
I understand the sentiment but just like liberal do gooders you can't suspend the laws of economics and unintended consequences.
So I'm quite skeptical.
Ok... how about one of the most succesful hedge fund guys ever... talking about structural change...
Paul Tudor Jones knows something about econ... he wrote
http://dealbreaker.com/2010/10/ten-...jones-had-an-acute-case-of-plantar-fasciitis/
...
Any serious attempt to address the structural imbalance is met with a chorus of boos from financial industry pundits who rail against âprotectionism.â In discussions involving the Ryan Bill, these pundits have few qualms with lobbing into the mix, like grenades, those most dangerous of words: âTrade War.â They often invoke the specter of Smoot-Hawley, the infamous US tariff act that triggered a trade war in which American exports and imports were slashed by half, leading a number of economists to argue that its passage contributed significantly to the Great Depression. But what they fail to see, or neglect to acknowledge, is that in modern times there never has been free trade with China; the US has already been in a trade war for nearly two decades; and it is the only time in this nationâs history it surrendered without ever firing a shot.
The United States lost six million jobs, indebted itself to China by $1.4 trillion, and received in return a host of consumer goods, many of which now reside in landfills across the country.
âTrade Warâ is a very dangerous phrase. Clearly, China and the US are commercial competitors and not enemies. There is no reason for âcombatâ in any sense of the term. The Chinese have set the RMB/USD peg artificially low
because they believed it was necessary in order to shift from an agrarian to an industrial-based economy. The United States also protected its nascent industrial sector when it did the same thing in the 19th century. Developing a significant export-oriented manufacturing base was part of an ambitious plan to relocate hundreds of millions of rural Chinese to cities where they could obtain manufacturing jobs and pursue a better life. It worked. Chinaâs coasts now burst with export-dependent factories and cities. But now and going forward, Chinaâs export strategy is completely unsustainable. In the intermediate term, much less the long term, it is becoming clear that the main buyer of Chinaâs exportsâthe United Statesâcan no longer foot the bill. A much better policy would be finding the right balance between domestic demand and exports through a stronger currency. Brazil did this brilliantly between 2005 and 2007. Their currency appreciated 34% against the dollar yet the economy grew 2% more than the prior
three years and above what was thought previously to be the speed limit. The incoming Chinese administration of 2012 will be forced to contend with a population that has been relocated and retrained for jobs that may one day
disappear, much as they did in the United States, all because China engaged in a futile attempt to avoid an inevitable re-equilibration of exchange rates. After all, one way or the other, the real US and Chinese exchange rate will find equilibriumâ either through nominal movement or through relative inflation rates.
Just as the Chinese elite have become dangerously wed to an unsustainable export-driven manufacturing model, the US elite have become indifferent to mercantilist assaults on the global trade framework. In mid-September, when the Bank of Japan intervened to suppress the value of the yen against the dollar, there was no response from Americaâs political, financial and media leaders. While these interventions might have been understandable six years ago, when Japanâs economy was relatively less well off than that of the United States, they are far from necessary today: Japan has an unemployment rate that is half that of the United States and it still runs a trade surplus. Nonetheless, Japan intervened to protect its export industry, and the United States, incomprehensibly, responded with not even a whimper, let alone a bang.