... (cont.)
The reason behind the conflict seem impossibly to stem from within Georgia, as in any case, a strong military reaction from Russia was expected. Also, the sacrifice of the civilians likely from such a conflict seem utterly wasted on strategic rewards locally achievable for Georgia. They would further diminish chances for NATO membership in any case. Therefore it seems obvious that there were in fact strong external factors which decided the start of this conflict.
A country is not only made up by its politicians, but also other strong policy makers, organizations, corporations and individuals who act mostly in line with national mutual interests. It is unlikely that Saakashvili would have been told by Bush/Rice that an attack on South Ossetia and Bakhazia, provoking a russian response, was something they wanted. However, one could argue that the strong geopolitical rewards for the US and other interests like the defense industry of both the US and Israel, along with political gains for republican interests and military strategic interests like current NATO members consolidating support for US strategies, like the missile defense shield - these were truly things that could be considered as voicing support for a beneficial conflict with Russia. There are also long term economic benefits external to Georgia by weakening Russia's image, while these seem more unlikely to be wanting a military confrontation as carrying probable scenario outcomes that lie far into the future are extremely difficult to predict.
In principle, it's fairly easy to predict realistic outcomes from strategic choices of action carrying high probabilities, when these outcomes lie close in the future. It is very difficult to predict detailed outcomes for something that lies longer into the future. These are philosophical/scientific facts - inherent to nature and the universe itself.
Therefore it seems that the near term strategic goals were those who could influence with a great probability for a rewarding outcome of the conflict. These are as following: the US interests in the missile shield and Ukraine NATO membership referendum, the republican political campaign and defense industry interests. The rationale for Georgias leadership seem to be: closer western ties with guaranteed sympathy and support, and possible special economic interests in defense or energy transportation.
This is all based on analysis of what is realistic, because of near time restrictions on detailed possible outcomes - as well as broader strategic long term geopolitical benefits of the conflict. With other words, an analysis based on realistic restrictions as well as the broader benefits. It also seems logical that strong external influence was present to deciding and giving incentives to this conflict. One of these incentives are as a fact - the US and israeli supported build up of Georgia's military.
It is unlikely that we will ever know - who were the actually active external influences, but with both a defense minister and minister for "territorial integration" that both have a background from Israel - and the economic ties in the arms supplies and training by israeli companies, it is very, very likely that these commercial and military interests were well aware of what was going to happen. Furthermore, the early stumbling in Saakashvili's relations to the mass media clearly showed how dynamic the situation was - and the strategies he deploys in his arguments towards the press and the world, by bringing in whatever rumour and unsubstantiated grasp he can think of, is typical of the advice and support on media strategic relations that he seems to be enjoying.
By analyzing how Saakashvili and his advisers are reacting to the events unfolding and a thorough consideration of the rationale before the decisions being made, it is possible to understand more of the incentive and strategy behind this conflict and it's interests. The western media has at least become much more aware of how Saakashvili is employing his media strategy. Poland's leadership was quick to go for their decision, while the Czech republic is very balanced in it's view on the conflict. Balanced is also the trend in the european public opinion although extreme support for any of the sides and considerations is voiced, but this (on average) balanced view will surely be reflected in the diplomacy and policy for the time being from the european countries.
For the benefit of Georgia, it seems unlikely that Saakashvili will continue to be in power for the foreseeable future, when this conflict settles down sufficiently for Georgia's national political opposition to organize itself. Then we might see some internal political changes and hopefully a much more mature, stable and fruitful government of Georgia with its relations to the west and Russia. The reward opportunity for the political opposition is enormous right now, as both Russia and world public opinion have showed some restraint and foiled much of what "could have been".
If the opposition in Georgia can stay calm, and show an alternative that speaks stability and a more mature democratic rule, while emphasizing the recklessness of Saakashvili - perceived in Europe, the US and within the population of Georgia - then his days of rule is certainly over. The foremost argument to the demise of Saakashvili and his supporters, is that Condoleezza Rice actually told Saakashvili a few weeks before the attack - to not attack the breakaway regions. This clever argument undermines any support that the US government can show Saakashvili publicly, and is worth a lot of political support from the public.
This is an analysis, while trying to keep it as realistic as possible, the hard facts are unavailable, and will likely remain unavailable unless someone like Saakashvili would reveal them - seemingly extremely unlikely and he has clearly showed that he does not convey a trustworthy image - neither as a politician caring for the civilan population nor in speaking to the world from his new-found political center stage, which he seems to be enjoying fully at the moment.
