Well, Pabst, it seems that you and JWS11 have a lot in common and so much to talk about. I see some serious male bonding potential here. 
Please screw up Obama
- Thread starter stock_trad3r
- Start date
Prescreening
If intelligence fails to interdict the terrorist threat, passenger prescreening is the next layer
of defense. Passenger prescreening encompasses measures applied prior to the
passengerâs arrival at the security checkpoint. Prescreening starts with the ticketing
process, and generally concludes with passenger check-in at the airport ticket counter.
The hijackers purchased their tickets for the 9/11 flights in a short period of time at the
end of August 2001, using credit cards, debit cards, or cash. The ticket record provides
the FAA and the air carrier with passenger information for the prescreening process.
The first major prescreening element in place on 9/11 was the FAA listing of individuals
known to pose a threat to commercial aviation. Based on information provided by the
Intelligence Community, the FAA required air carriers to prohibit listed individuals from
boarding aircraft or, in designated cases, to assure that the passenger received enhanced
screening before boarding. None of the names of the 9/11 hijackers were identified by
the FAA to the airlines in order to bar them from flying or subject them to extra security
measures. In fact, the number of individuals subject to such special security instructions
issued by the FAA was less than 20 compared to the tens of thousands of names
identified in the State Departmentâs TIPOFF watch list that we discussed yesterday.
The second component of prescreening was a program to identify those passengers on
each flight who may pose a threat to aviation. In 1998, the FAA required air carriers to
implement a FAA-approved computer-assisted passenger prescreening program (CAPPS)
designed to identify the pool of passengers most likely in need of additional security
scrutiny. The program employed customized, FAA-approved criteria derived from a
limited set of information about each ticketed passenger in order to identify âselectees.â
FAA rules required that the air carrier only screen each selecteeâs checked baggage for
explosives using various approved methods. However, under the system in place on
9/11, selecteesâthose who were regarded as a risk to the aircraftâwere not required to
undergo any additional screening of their person or carry-on baggage at the checkpoint.
The consequences of selection reflected FAAâs view that non-suicide bombing was the
most substantial risk to domestic aircraft. Since the system in place on 9/11 confined the
consequences of selection to the screening of checked bags for explosives, the application
of CAPPS did not provide any defense against the weapons and tactics employed by the
9/11 hijackers.
On American Airlines Flight 11, CAPPS chose three of the five hijackers as selectees.
Since Waleed al Shehri checked no bags, his selection had no consequences. Wail al
Shehri and Satam al Suqami had their checked bags scanned for explosives before they
were loaded onto the plane.
None of the Flight 175 hijackers were selected by CAPPS.
Staff Statement No. 3 7
All five of the American Airlines Flight 77 hijackers were selected for security scrutiny.
Hani Hanjour, Khalid al Mihdhar, and Majed Moqed were chosen via the CAPPS criteria,
while Nawaf al Hazmi and Salem al Hazmi were made selectees because they provided
inadequate identification information. Their bags were held until it was confirmed that
they had boarded the aircraft.
Thus, for hijacker selectees Hani Hanjour, Nawaf al Hazmi, and Khalid al Mihdhar, who
checked no bags on September 11, there were no consequences for their selection by the
CAPPS system. For Salem Al-Hazmi, who checked two bags, and Majed Moqed, who
checked one bag, the sole consequence was that their baggage was held until after their
boarding on Flight 77 was confirmed.
Ahmad al Haznawi was the sole CAPPS selectee among the Flight 93 hijackers. His
checked bag was screened for explosives and then loaded on the plane.
Checkpoint Screening
With respect to checkpoint screening, Federal rules required air carriers âto conduct
screeningâ¦to prevent or deter the carriage aboard airplanes of any explosive, incendiary,
or a deadly or dangerous weapon on or about each individualâs person or accessible
property, and the carriage of any explosive or incendiary in check baggage.â Passenger
checkpoint screening is the most obvious element of aviation security.
At the checkpoint, metal detectors were calibrated to detect guns and large knives.
Government-certified x-ray machines capable of imaging the shapes of items possessing
a particular level of acuity were used to screen carry-on items. In most instances, these
screening operations were conducted by security companies under contract with the
responsible air carrier.
As of 2001 any confidence that checkpoint screening was operating effectively was
belied by numerous publicized studies by the General Accounting Office and the
Department of Transportationâs Office of Inspector General. Over the previous twenty
years they had documented repeatedly serious, chronic weaknesses in the systems
deployed to screen passengers and baggage for weapons or bombs. Shortcomings with
the screening process had also been identified internally by the FAAâs assessment
process.
If intelligence fails to interdict the terrorist threat, passenger prescreening is the next layer
of defense. Passenger prescreening encompasses measures applied prior to the
passengerâs arrival at the security checkpoint. Prescreening starts with the ticketing
process, and generally concludes with passenger check-in at the airport ticket counter.
The hijackers purchased their tickets for the 9/11 flights in a short period of time at the
end of August 2001, using credit cards, debit cards, or cash. The ticket record provides
the FAA and the air carrier with passenger information for the prescreening process.
The first major prescreening element in place on 9/11 was the FAA listing of individuals
known to pose a threat to commercial aviation. Based on information provided by the
Intelligence Community, the FAA required air carriers to prohibit listed individuals from
boarding aircraft or, in designated cases, to assure that the passenger received enhanced
screening before boarding. None of the names of the 9/11 hijackers were identified by
the FAA to the airlines in order to bar them from flying or subject them to extra security
measures. In fact, the number of individuals subject to such special security instructions
issued by the FAA was less than 20 compared to the tens of thousands of names
identified in the State Departmentâs TIPOFF watch list that we discussed yesterday.
The second component of prescreening was a program to identify those passengers on
each flight who may pose a threat to aviation. In 1998, the FAA required air carriers to
implement a FAA-approved computer-assisted passenger prescreening program (CAPPS)
designed to identify the pool of passengers most likely in need of additional security
scrutiny. The program employed customized, FAA-approved criteria derived from a
limited set of information about each ticketed passenger in order to identify âselectees.â
FAA rules required that the air carrier only screen each selecteeâs checked baggage for
explosives using various approved methods. However, under the system in place on
9/11, selecteesâthose who were regarded as a risk to the aircraftâwere not required to
undergo any additional screening of their person or carry-on baggage at the checkpoint.
The consequences of selection reflected FAAâs view that non-suicide bombing was the
most substantial risk to domestic aircraft. Since the system in place on 9/11 confined the
consequences of selection to the screening of checked bags for explosives, the application
of CAPPS did not provide any defense against the weapons and tactics employed by the
9/11 hijackers.
On American Airlines Flight 11, CAPPS chose three of the five hijackers as selectees.
Since Waleed al Shehri checked no bags, his selection had no consequences. Wail al
Shehri and Satam al Suqami had their checked bags scanned for explosives before they
were loaded onto the plane.
None of the Flight 175 hijackers were selected by CAPPS.
Staff Statement No. 3 7
All five of the American Airlines Flight 77 hijackers were selected for security scrutiny.
Hani Hanjour, Khalid al Mihdhar, and Majed Moqed were chosen via the CAPPS criteria,
while Nawaf al Hazmi and Salem al Hazmi were made selectees because they provided
inadequate identification information. Their bags were held until it was confirmed that
they had boarded the aircraft.
Thus, for hijacker selectees Hani Hanjour, Nawaf al Hazmi, and Khalid al Mihdhar, who
checked no bags on September 11, there were no consequences for their selection by the
CAPPS system. For Salem Al-Hazmi, who checked two bags, and Majed Moqed, who
checked one bag, the sole consequence was that their baggage was held until after their
boarding on Flight 77 was confirmed.
Ahmad al Haznawi was the sole CAPPS selectee among the Flight 93 hijackers. His
checked bag was screened for explosives and then loaded on the plane.
Checkpoint Screening
With respect to checkpoint screening, Federal rules required air carriers âto conduct
screeningâ¦to prevent or deter the carriage aboard airplanes of any explosive, incendiary,
or a deadly or dangerous weapon on or about each individualâs person or accessible
property, and the carriage of any explosive or incendiary in check baggage.â Passenger
checkpoint screening is the most obvious element of aviation security.
At the checkpoint, metal detectors were calibrated to detect guns and large knives.
Government-certified x-ray machines capable of imaging the shapes of items possessing
a particular level of acuity were used to screen carry-on items. In most instances, these
screening operations were conducted by security companies under contract with the
responsible air carrier.
As of 2001 any confidence that checkpoint screening was operating effectively was
belied by numerous publicized studies by the General Accounting Office and the
Department of Transportationâs Office of Inspector General. Over the previous twenty
years they had documented repeatedly serious, chronic weaknesses in the systems
deployed to screen passengers and baggage for weapons or bombs. Shortcomings with
the screening process had also been identified internally by the FAAâs assessment
process.
Despite the documented shortcomings of the screening system, the fact that neither a
hijacking nor a bombing had occurred domestically in over a decade was perceived by
many within the system as confirmation that it was working. This explains, in part, the
view of one transportation security official who testified to the Commission that the
agency thought it had won the battle against hijacking. In fact, the Commission received
testimony that one of the primary reasons to restrict the consequences of CAPPS
âselectionâ was because officials thought that checkpoint screening was working.
Staff Statement No. 3 8
The evolution of checkpoint screening illustrates many of the systemic problems that
faced the civil aviation security system in place on 9/11. The executive and legislative
branches of government, and the civil aviation industry were highly reactive on aviation
security matters. Most of the aviation security systemâs features had developed in
response to specific incidents, rather than in anticipation. Civil aviation security was
primarily accomplished through a slow and cumbersome rulemaking processâa
reflection of the agencyâs conflicting missions of both regulating and promoting the
industry. A number of FAA witnesses said this process was the âbaneâ of civil aviation
security. For example, the FAA attempted to set a requirement that it would certify
screening contractors. The FAA Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996 directed the FAA
to take such action, which the 1997 Gore Commission endorsed. But the process of
implementing this action had still not been completed by September 11, 2001.
Those are systemic observations. But, to analyze the 9/11 attack, we had to focus on
which items were prohibited and which were allowed to be carried into the cabin of an
aircraft. FAA guidelines were used to determine what objects should not be allowed into
the cabin of an aircraft. Included in the listing were knives with blades 4 inches long or
longer and/or knives considered illegal by local law; and tear gas, mace, and similar
chemicals.
These guidelines were to be used by screeners, to make a reasonable determination of
what items in the possession of a person should be considered a deadly or dangerous
weapon. The FAA told the air carriers that common sense should prevail.
Hence the standards of what constituted a deadly or dangerous weapon were somewhat
vague. Other than for guns, large knives, explosives and incendiaries, determining what
was prohibited and what was allowable was up to the common sense of the carriers and
their screening contractors.
To write out what common sense meant to them, the air carriers developed, through their
trade associations, a Checkpoint Operations Guide. This document was approved by the
FAA. The edition of this guide in place on September 11, 2001, classified âbox cutters,â
for example as âRestrictedâ items that were not permitted in the passenger cabin of an
aircraft. The checkpoint supervisor was required to be notified if an item in this category
was encountered. Passengers would be given the option of having those items
transported as checked baggage. âMace,â âpepper spray,â as well as âtear gasâ were
categorized as hazardous materials and passengers could not take items in that category
on an airplane without the express permission of the airline.
On the other hand, pocket utility knives (less than 4 inch blade) were allowed. The
Checkpoint Operations Guide provided no further guidance on how to distinguish
between âbox cuttersâ and âpocket utility knives.â
One of the checkpoint supervisors working at Logan International Airport on September
11, 2001, recalled that as of that day, while box cutters were not permitted to pass
Staff Statement No. 3 9
through the checkpoint without the removal of the blade, any knife with a blade of less
than four inches was permitted to pass through security.
In practice, we believe the FAAâs approach of admonishing air carriers to use common
sense about what items should not be allowed on an aircraft, while also approving the air
carrierâs checkpoint operations guidelines that defined the industryâs âcommon sense,â in
practice, created an environment where both parties could deny responsibility for making
hard and most likely unpopular decisions.
What happened at the checkpoints? Of the checkpoints used to screen the passengers of
Flights 11, 77, 93 and 175 on 9/11, only Washington Dulles International Airport had
videotaping equipment in place. Therefore the most specific information that exists
about the processing of the 9/11 hijackers is information about American Airlines Flight
77, which crashed into the Pentagon. The staff has also reviewed testing results for all
the checkpoints in question, scores of interviews with checkpoint screeners and
supervisors who might have processed the hijackers, and FAA and FBI evaluations of the
available information. There is no reason to believe that the screening on 9/11 was
fundamentally different at any of the relevant airports.
Return again to the perspective of the enemy. The plan required all of the hijackers to
successfully board the assigned aircraft. If several of the ir number failed to board, the
operational plan might fall apart or their operational security might be breached. To have
this kind of confidence, they had to develop a plan they felt would work anywhere they
were screened, regardless of the quality of the screener. We believe they developed such
a plan and practiced it in the months before the attacks, including in test flights, to be sure
their tactics would work. In other words, we believe they did not count on a sloppy
screener. All 19 hijackers were able to pass successfully through checkpoint screening to
board their flights. They were 19 for 19. They counted on beating a weak system.
Turning to the specifics of Flight 77 checkpoint screening, at 7:18 a.m. Eastern Daylight
Time on the morning of September 11, 2001, Majed Moqed and Khalid al Mihdhar
entered one of the security screening checkpoints at Dulles International Airport. They
placed their carry-on bags on the x-ray machine belt and proceeded through the first
magnetometer. Both set off the alarm and were subsequently directed to a second
magnetometer. While al Mihdhar did not alarm the second magnetometer and was
permitted through the checkpoint, Moqed failed once more and was then subjected to a
personal screening with a metal detection hand wand. He passed this inspection and then
was permitted to pass through the checkpoint.
At 7:35 a.m. Hani Hanjour placed two carry-on bags on the x-ray belt in the Main
Terminal checkpoint, and proceeded, without alarm, through the magnetometer. He
picked up his carry-on bags and passed through the checkpoint. One minute later, Nawaf
and Salem al Hazmi entered the same checkpoint. Salem al Hazmi successfully cleared
the magnetometer and was permitted through the checkpoint. Nawaf al Hazmi set off the
alarms for both the first and second magnetometers and was then hand-wanded before
Staff Statement No. 3 10
being passed. In addition, his shoulder-strap carry-on bag was swiped by an explosive
trace detector and then passed.
Our best working hypothesis is that a number of the hijackers were carrying permissible
utility knives or pocket knives. One example of such a utility knife is this âLeathermanâ
item. We know that at least two knives like this were actually purchased by hijackers and
have not been found in the belongings the hijackers left behind. The staff will pass this
around. Please be careful. The blade is open. It locks into position. It is very sharp.
According to the guidelines on 9/11, if such a knife were discovered in the possession of
an individual who alarmed either the walk-through metal detector or the hand wand, the
item would be returned to the owner and permitted to be carried on the aircraft.
http://www.9-11commission.gov/staff_statements/staff_statement_3.pdf
hijacking nor a bombing had occurred domestically in over a decade was perceived by
many within the system as confirmation that it was working. This explains, in part, the
view of one transportation security official who testified to the Commission that the
agency thought it had won the battle against hijacking. In fact, the Commission received
testimony that one of the primary reasons to restrict the consequences of CAPPS
âselectionâ was because officials thought that checkpoint screening was working.
Staff Statement No. 3 8
The evolution of checkpoint screening illustrates many of the systemic problems that
faced the civil aviation security system in place on 9/11. The executive and legislative
branches of government, and the civil aviation industry were highly reactive on aviation
security matters. Most of the aviation security systemâs features had developed in
response to specific incidents, rather than in anticipation. Civil aviation security was
primarily accomplished through a slow and cumbersome rulemaking processâa
reflection of the agencyâs conflicting missions of both regulating and promoting the
industry. A number of FAA witnesses said this process was the âbaneâ of civil aviation
security. For example, the FAA attempted to set a requirement that it would certify
screening contractors. The FAA Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996 directed the FAA
to take such action, which the 1997 Gore Commission endorsed. But the process of
implementing this action had still not been completed by September 11, 2001.
Those are systemic observations. But, to analyze the 9/11 attack, we had to focus on
which items were prohibited and which were allowed to be carried into the cabin of an
aircraft. FAA guidelines were used to determine what objects should not be allowed into
the cabin of an aircraft. Included in the listing were knives with blades 4 inches long or
longer and/or knives considered illegal by local law; and tear gas, mace, and similar
chemicals.
These guidelines were to be used by screeners, to make a reasonable determination of
what items in the possession of a person should be considered a deadly or dangerous
weapon. The FAA told the air carriers that common sense should prevail.
Hence the standards of what constituted a deadly or dangerous weapon were somewhat
vague. Other than for guns, large knives, explosives and incendiaries, determining what
was prohibited and what was allowable was up to the common sense of the carriers and
their screening contractors.
To write out what common sense meant to them, the air carriers developed, through their
trade associations, a Checkpoint Operations Guide. This document was approved by the
FAA. The edition of this guide in place on September 11, 2001, classified âbox cutters,â
for example as âRestrictedâ items that were not permitted in the passenger cabin of an
aircraft. The checkpoint supervisor was required to be notified if an item in this category
was encountered. Passengers would be given the option of having those items
transported as checked baggage. âMace,â âpepper spray,â as well as âtear gasâ were
categorized as hazardous materials and passengers could not take items in that category
on an airplane without the express permission of the airline.
On the other hand, pocket utility knives (less than 4 inch blade) were allowed. The
Checkpoint Operations Guide provided no further guidance on how to distinguish
between âbox cuttersâ and âpocket utility knives.â
One of the checkpoint supervisors working at Logan International Airport on September
11, 2001, recalled that as of that day, while box cutters were not permitted to pass
Staff Statement No. 3 9
through the checkpoint without the removal of the blade, any knife with a blade of less
than four inches was permitted to pass through security.
In practice, we believe the FAAâs approach of admonishing air carriers to use common
sense about what items should not be allowed on an aircraft, while also approving the air
carrierâs checkpoint operations guidelines that defined the industryâs âcommon sense,â in
practice, created an environment where both parties could deny responsibility for making
hard and most likely unpopular decisions.
What happened at the checkpoints? Of the checkpoints used to screen the passengers of
Flights 11, 77, 93 and 175 on 9/11, only Washington Dulles International Airport had
videotaping equipment in place. Therefore the most specific information that exists
about the processing of the 9/11 hijackers is information about American Airlines Flight
77, which crashed into the Pentagon. The staff has also reviewed testing results for all
the checkpoints in question, scores of interviews with checkpoint screeners and
supervisors who might have processed the hijackers, and FAA and FBI evaluations of the
available information. There is no reason to believe that the screening on 9/11 was
fundamentally different at any of the relevant airports.
Return again to the perspective of the enemy. The plan required all of the hijackers to
successfully board the assigned aircraft. If several of the ir number failed to board, the
operational plan might fall apart or their operational security might be breached. To have
this kind of confidence, they had to develop a plan they felt would work anywhere they
were screened, regardless of the quality of the screener. We believe they developed such
a plan and practiced it in the months before the attacks, including in test flights, to be sure
their tactics would work. In other words, we believe they did not count on a sloppy
screener. All 19 hijackers were able to pass successfully through checkpoint screening to
board their flights. They were 19 for 19. They counted on beating a weak system.
Turning to the specifics of Flight 77 checkpoint screening, at 7:18 a.m. Eastern Daylight
Time on the morning of September 11, 2001, Majed Moqed and Khalid al Mihdhar
entered one of the security screening checkpoints at Dulles International Airport. They
placed their carry-on bags on the x-ray machine belt and proceeded through the first
magnetometer. Both set off the alarm and were subsequently directed to a second
magnetometer. While al Mihdhar did not alarm the second magnetometer and was
permitted through the checkpoint, Moqed failed once more and was then subjected to a
personal screening with a metal detection hand wand. He passed this inspection and then
was permitted to pass through the checkpoint.
At 7:35 a.m. Hani Hanjour placed two carry-on bags on the x-ray belt in the Main
Terminal checkpoint, and proceeded, without alarm, through the magnetometer. He
picked up his carry-on bags and passed through the checkpoint. One minute later, Nawaf
and Salem al Hazmi entered the same checkpoint. Salem al Hazmi successfully cleared
the magnetometer and was permitted through the checkpoint. Nawaf al Hazmi set off the
alarms for both the first and second magnetometers and was then hand-wanded before
Staff Statement No. 3 10
being passed. In addition, his shoulder-strap carry-on bag was swiped by an explosive
trace detector and then passed.
Our best working hypothesis is that a number of the hijackers were carrying permissible
utility knives or pocket knives. One example of such a utility knife is this âLeathermanâ
item. We know that at least two knives like this were actually purchased by hijackers and
have not been found in the belongings the hijackers left behind. The staff will pass this
around. Please be careful. The blade is open. It locks into position. It is very sharp.
According to the guidelines on 9/11, if such a knife were discovered in the possession of
an individual who alarmed either the walk-through metal detector or the hand wand, the
item would be returned to the owner and permitted to be carried on the aircraft.
http://www.9-11commission.gov/staff_statements/staff_statement_3.pdf
Would the terrorists have been boarded onto the flights if the airports had been on a higher alert?
We'll never know.
Because Bush didn't do his job.
We'll never know.
Because Bush didn't do his job.
Obama's $1 Trillion Deficit ...
"Bill Gross, the bond-fund-manager superstar, not only thinks Barack Obama will be elected president, but that the nationâs budget deficit, now nearly $500 billion, will explode to $1 trillion.
Gross, a registered Republican, wrote an open letter to Obama on the Web site of PIMCO, where Gross is co-chief investment officer. âYou have inherited a mess,â Gross writes.
âWhat do I think you should do as the new president to rectify this mess? All I know is that any solution will come with a high price tag.â
Higher taxes on the wealthy and oil companies wonât make up for the additional spending that Obama will have to approve to pull the economy out of recession, Gross argues.
âSo youâre gonna do the tax thing [relief for the middle/lower class], Mr. President, and throw in some form of universal healthcare to boot that your buddy Hillary will help spearhead,â Gross writes.
âIn addition, youâll need to provide some immediate relief to homeowners in the form of FHA subsidies and low mortgage rate loans⦠By January, home prices will be down another 10 percent or so and our Japanese-style property deflation will be in full stride.â
Put that all together, and you get a massive budget deficit, according to Gross. âYouâll have your tax bill and your healthcare bill and your housing fix, and somehow itâll all be paid for by wealthy hedge fund managers, oil companies or a robust economy,â he writes.
âUh, I donât think so, Mr. President. Thatâs where the âyes we canâ morphs into âno we canât.â Not that you wonât accomplish most of that. Itâs just that you wonât be able to pay for it, and itâs better to admit it now.â
To some extent, the next president will be helpless, Gross maintains. âWhile the Republicans will blame you for years and label you âTrillion Dollar Obamaâ in future campaigns, there is in fact not much that you or another president can do,â he writes.
âYouâve inherited an asset-based economy whose well has been pumped nearly dry with lower and lower interest rates and lender of last resort liquidity provisions that have managed to support Ponzi-style prosperity in recent years.â
As the economy needs $500 billion of stimulus, and the budget deficit already totals almost $500 billion, that leaves a deficit of $1 trillion, probably by 2011, Gross says.
To be sure, that still would leave us in better shape than Japan in the 1990s, he points out. The $1 trillion deficit would amount to about 6 percent of GDP, which pales next to the 10 percent figure in Japan in 1998.
But the result wonât be pretty for investors, Gross says. Once the economy recovers, inflation will rise, âas the government bonds acquired during the recession are transformed once again into risk bearing assets and high levels of investment,â he writes.
âThat suggests that intermediate and long-term yields on government bonds have already bottomed and will gradually rise throughout your first, and perhaps second, administration. Your term will not go down in history as investor friendly.â"
"Bill Gross, the bond-fund-manager superstar, not only thinks Barack Obama will be elected president, but that the nationâs budget deficit, now nearly $500 billion, will explode to $1 trillion.
Gross, a registered Republican, wrote an open letter to Obama on the Web site of PIMCO, where Gross is co-chief investment officer. âYou have inherited a mess,â Gross writes.
âWhat do I think you should do as the new president to rectify this mess? All I know is that any solution will come with a high price tag.â
Higher taxes on the wealthy and oil companies wonât make up for the additional spending that Obama will have to approve to pull the economy out of recession, Gross argues.
âSo youâre gonna do the tax thing [relief for the middle/lower class], Mr. President, and throw in some form of universal healthcare to boot that your buddy Hillary will help spearhead,â Gross writes.
âIn addition, youâll need to provide some immediate relief to homeowners in the form of FHA subsidies and low mortgage rate loans⦠By January, home prices will be down another 10 percent or so and our Japanese-style property deflation will be in full stride.â
Put that all together, and you get a massive budget deficit, according to Gross. âYouâll have your tax bill and your healthcare bill and your housing fix, and somehow itâll all be paid for by wealthy hedge fund managers, oil companies or a robust economy,â he writes.
âUh, I donât think so, Mr. President. Thatâs where the âyes we canâ morphs into âno we canât.â Not that you wonât accomplish most of that. Itâs just that you wonât be able to pay for it, and itâs better to admit it now.â
To some extent, the next president will be helpless, Gross maintains. âWhile the Republicans will blame you for years and label you âTrillion Dollar Obamaâ in future campaigns, there is in fact not much that you or another president can do,â he writes.
âYouâve inherited an asset-based economy whose well has been pumped nearly dry with lower and lower interest rates and lender of last resort liquidity provisions that have managed to support Ponzi-style prosperity in recent years.â
As the economy needs $500 billion of stimulus, and the budget deficit already totals almost $500 billion, that leaves a deficit of $1 trillion, probably by 2011, Gross says.
To be sure, that still would leave us in better shape than Japan in the 1990s, he points out. The $1 trillion deficit would amount to about 6 percent of GDP, which pales next to the 10 percent figure in Japan in 1998.
But the result wonât be pretty for investors, Gross says. Once the economy recovers, inflation will rise, âas the government bonds acquired during the recession are transformed once again into risk bearing assets and high levels of investment,â he writes.
âThat suggests that intermediate and long-term yields on government bonds have already bottomed and will gradually rise throughout your first, and perhaps second, administration. Your term will not go down in history as investor friendly.â"
Sure with the benefit of 20/20 hindsight one wouldn't let them board.
Hindsight is useless. I should have sold 100 ES this morning.
CW was Al Queda might bomb airliners not be suicide hijackers.
It's not like these guys had never flown before. They flew from Ft. Lauderdale the prior weekend. In fact it's quite possible that the "muscle" hijackers themselves weren't even aware it was a suicide mission.
As is they were flagged, baggage searched and persons searched.
The left as almost always are duplicitous Anti-Americans on this issue.
Case in point is liberal cause celebre' Jose Padilla. Already convicted in the murder of a Chicagoan and with ties to Al Queda just as provable and viable as any of the 9/11 hijackers his detention set off a firestorm of dissent.
March 2002: Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, purported mastermind of the Sept. 11 attacks and Al-Qaida's operational planner and organizer, allegedly suggests José Padilla target up to three high-rise buildings that use natural gas with a radiological "dirty bomb."
May 8, 2002: Padilla arrives at Chicago's O'Hare International Airport after an overseas trip, carrying $10,526, a cell phone and e-mail addresses for al-Qaida operatives. He is arrested on a material witness warrant
In libland âBushâ dropped the ball on 9/11 because hijackers with scant evidence of mischief were allowed to board airplanes but a convicted felon with proven intent to conspire with Al Queda in a terror plot is lionized.
I'll be blunt. Anyone who persists in bullshit armchair quarterbacking can go fuck themselves.
Hindsight is useless. I should have sold 100 ES this morning.
CW was Al Queda might bomb airliners not be suicide hijackers.
It's not like these guys had never flown before. They flew from Ft. Lauderdale the prior weekend. In fact it's quite possible that the "muscle" hijackers themselves weren't even aware it was a suicide mission.
As is they were flagged, baggage searched and persons searched.
The left as almost always are duplicitous Anti-Americans on this issue.
Case in point is liberal cause celebre' Jose Padilla. Already convicted in the murder of a Chicagoan and with ties to Al Queda just as provable and viable as any of the 9/11 hijackers his detention set off a firestorm of dissent.
March 2002: Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, purported mastermind of the Sept. 11 attacks and Al-Qaida's operational planner and organizer, allegedly suggests José Padilla target up to three high-rise buildings that use natural gas with a radiological "dirty bomb."
May 8, 2002: Padilla arrives at Chicago's O'Hare International Airport after an overseas trip, carrying $10,526, a cell phone and e-mail addresses for al-Qaida operatives. He is arrested on a material witness warrant
In libland âBushâ dropped the ball on 9/11 because hijackers with scant evidence of mischief were allowed to board airplanes but a convicted felon with proven intent to conspire with Al Queda in a terror plot is lionized.
I'll be blunt. Anyone who persists in bullshit armchair quarterbacking can go fuck themselves.
P, you struggle with your hatred of the left almost as much as you struggle with your hatred of Bush. Don't you?
I know I do.
I know I do.
We're in the same boat, bro.
Bush's political ineptness has made us conservatives an easy target but compared to the loons who criticize him for either a. the wrong reasons or b. for doing stuff that only other Democrats usually do, it makes me yearn for a Hitler to come along and take out around 20 million jaggoffs.
LOL!!
Population adjustment.
Population adjustment.
Quote from Pa(b)st Prime:
We're in the same boat, bro.
Bush's political ineptness has made us conservatives an easy target but compared to the loons who criticize him for either a. the wrong reasons or b. for doing stuff that only other Democrats usually do, it makes me yearn for a Hitler to come along and take out around 20 million jaggoffs.
Pabst:
"Sure with the benefit of 20/20 hindsight one wouldn't let them board. Hindsight is useless."
Receiving a brief stating that the airlines are at current risk of hijackings is not hindsight.
It requires the reader to do one thing: raise airport security.
"Sure with the benefit of 20/20 hindsight one wouldn't let them board. Hindsight is useless."
Receiving a brief stating that the airlines are at current risk of hijackings is not hindsight.
It requires the reader to do one thing: raise airport security.