We've been over this territory before, multiple times in fact. At some point between 1998 and March 2003, very probably much nearer the end of that period, SH appears to have reached the reasonable conclusion that use of WMDs would be of little practical value against the US military, but would lead to the collapse of his political strategy.
It's harder - in my opinion it's impossible - to answer the question of why SH did not extend full cooperation and offer evidence to the world, if he not only had destroyed his weapons but intended to allow the permanent eradication of his WMD programs. The reason answering this question is impossible appears rather obviously to be that SH never did intend to extend full cooperation and allow the permanent eradication of his WMD capacities.
The evidence of terrorist ties is actually rather open and shut - and includes the presence of AQ-linked groups and individuals in Baghdad and elsewhere in Iraq, open support for anti-Israel terrorist groups like Hamas, the captures and deaths of terrorists like Abu Nidal and leaders from the PFLP (one of whom was killed on the first-night attack on SH's leadership compound), the presence of large numbers of foreigners using terrorist tactics against the US military and Iraqi civilians, and the discovery of terrorist-training facilities with documentation, such as the large camp already described before the war at Salman Pak. During Gulf War I, the Iraqi regime also explicitly threatened to use terrorism internationally, a fact noted with "alarm" by the UNSC in its post-war resolutions. It also appears that exploratory discussions, including the exchange of visits, were held between Iraq and AQ. That those particular discussions may not have led to actual joint operations does not alter the fact that both the intention and the danger were established. The AQ testimony is that the alliances were rejected on OBL's side, but the decision could have been - or may even still be - revoked at any time.
As for the evidence of WMD programs, ambitions, and so on, it is plentiful and undeniable. In addition to the previously observed WMD stockpiles and WMD usage, after the war elements critical to WMD programs, including the nuclear program, have been uncovered - items and extensive documentation held in contravention of disarmament agreements and resolutions. The only things still lacking in the picture, and the subject of so much anti-Bush focus, are deliverable battlefield munitions and large quantities of precursor chemicals and toxins. These may have been destroyed or securely hidden: Even if held intact, the core elements would not take up much space, could be made very difficult to find, and could even have been transported outside the country.
Your analysis is based on misreading both of the evidence and of my statements. What may confuse you is that I also believe that, independently of such items as those outlined above, SH's refusal to remove any uncertainty about them and his flagrant violations of ceasefire agreements, related resolutions, and other norms of international conduct already provided more than adequate grounds for war at whatever time and under whatever circumstances we chose.
Uh... you're worried we might pre-emptively attack the remaining Cherokees?
Contrary to your assertions, the text you refer to, from the Congressional Authorization, does not even mention weapons of mass destruction. It does mention consistency with the war on terror and with combatting overall threats to national security, along with enforcement of all UN resolutions - which included issues relating to the liberation of the Iraqi people as well as diverse unfulfilled obligations of Iraq's.
There never can be inarguable "conclusions" on such matters. The decisions to go to war, and the precise means and timing, are always issues of judgment or "opinion." It was, for instance, FDR's opinion, after Pearl Harbor, that protection of US interests were better served by going on the offensive both in Europe and the Far East rather than by surrendering or retreating. It was Lincoln's opinion that going to war was preferable to allowing the Southern states to secede. It was Truman's opinion that the threat of Communist expansion warranted military action in Korea. If the other sides had been consulted, they might have urged different conclusions.
There is no doubt whatsoever that SH repeatedly violated virtually all elements of ceasefire agreements and related resolutions, not least by maintaining WMD programs and stockpiles thoughout the '90s, and by failing the critical requirement of removing any reasonable doubt as to his capacities and intentions.
No, a point you don't seem able to process: Trying to imagine whether Bush could have persuaded the country to go to war in the absence of post-9/11 fears and concerns over Iraq's WMD intentions and capacities is what makes no sense. The change in US policy and perceptions after 9/11 along with the long history of Iraq's WMD and other violations and aggressions were central to the decision, and could not be removed from the calculation, whether based on what was known then or what is suspected now.
After 9/11, Bush clearly enunciated an activist policy regarding terrorist threats and WMDs. It was made crystal clear to SH that if he did not come into full compliance with international inspections and monitoring, the standing policy of regime change would be effectuated.
No, you appear to demand a particular kind of WMD evidence (and now terrorism-related evidence as well, apparently) that I do not consider central to the case for war. (I have no idea what you expected to find in relation to terrorism - it's a theme you've only recently introduced.)
Many Americans apparently view reality differently than you do. It is presumptuous of you to attribute the difference to "denial" or "apathy."
You also didn't answer the question as to just how "urgent" and urgent in what way the threat would have had to have been to justify action, in your opinion. Apparently, you would only have been satisfied by the discovery by dangers so "imminent" that that they could be addressed only at an intolerable cost.
