Quote from OPTIONAL777:
Sanctions were certainly controversial, so? There remains no evidence that they weren't working in the long run. It is common for a leadership to try to tighten their grip as they get closer and closer to the end.
If we apply the same time frame to the Soviet Union that we did to Iraq (who had not engaged any military conflict with their neighbors since 1990) 13 years, that would have put us in military conflict with the Soviet empire around the early 60's...hmm, Bay of Pigs anyone?
There remains no evidence that it was necessary to go to war when we did, without the support of the U.N.
Or am I missing some evidence?
As regards the differences between Iraq and the Soviet Union, you're neglecting several hundred divisions of the Red Army, and several thousand ICBMs, among other things.
As for the timing issue, your formulation again neglects the existence of a legal state of war between the US and Iraq prior to the pressing of the issue at the UN. You may also recall that some in the Administration wanted an ultimatum and a commitment to direct military action much earlier, but that timing naturally became a political and practical concern. One perceived risk in going to the UN, as was borne out, was that the discussion would be sidetracked and distorted, and that other actors - such as Saddam Hussein, Jacques Chirac, and Hans Blix - would attempt to seize control of the timetable, even while American resolve was tested and political passions on both sides were inflamed. Explaining the other factors that went into the issue of timing would require a recitation of the entire political, strategic, and tactical context.
Take out the WMD issue, are you telling me that Bush would have been successful in gaining sufficient support to launching an overthrow of a government who did not constitute an immediate threat to our national security?
You can't "take out the WMD issue," and not only because the issue even in the narrowest sense of "immediate threat" is far from settled. Prior to the armed "inspection" of the country that the US has initiated, no one outside Iraq knew all of the details regarding Iraq's WMDs, but all of the leading intelligence services in the world, including those of nations that opposed US action, agreed that Iraq did possess WMDs and agents in significant quantities when last inspected, and had given no serious evidence that it had disposed either of them or of the capability to produce more of them. For the Bush Administration to have argued the issue differently in any substantial way than it did would have required it to speak contrary to its own beliefs - whose fundamental precepts were shared even by the chief opponents of US policy.
The core argument regarding WMDs, and the basis for what was intended to be the "last chance" inspections, was stated explicitly and famously by Condoleeza Rice as "we can't wait for a smoking gun in the form of a mushroom cloud." After Gulf War I, the burden was on Hussein to remove any doubt. After 9/11, the US policy became that such doubt would no longer be tolerated.
At some time between 1998 and March 2003, Iraq
may have disposed of (or merely have securely hidden) the particular WMDs and agents catalogued when the last pre-Bush inspection regime was halted. Without certain knowledge that Iraq had done so, and of how it had done so, to treat the regime as presenting anything other than an "immediate threat" would have been foolhardy. Even if Iraq had secretly destroyed all of its WMDs, it retained a WMD capacity - as recent discoveries have begun to demonstrate - and it persisted in a clear pattern of deception and defiance.
It's impossible to argue about how things might have gone differently if the Bush Administration had possessed clear intelligence of no immediate WMD threat, because such a situation would have had to presume many different elements within the overall context - including a much more cooperative regime in Iraq.
This really is not complicated. I supported the effort as Bush & company lead us to believe Iraq had WMD and were funding and supporting terrorism that was a threat to our national interests.
Now lacking evidence to support those claims, I have my doubts that a war was necessary....and no, I don't justify it after the fact like some do. We have been over this before, you subscribe to an end justifies the means, I don't in matters of policy.
I submit that your characterization of my position as "end justifies the means" is totally inaccurate.
A valid comparison. Either a government represents a threat to our national security sufficient to engage military conflict or it doesn't it.
A simplistic and totally unrealistic view of the world, that, aside from ignoring the differences between threats of different typses, also ignores the different kinds of direct and indirect responses that may be available or preferable.
I continue to dismiss accusations of a "bait and switch" because I consider it to be a canard. I suggest that, in addition to refreshing your recollection of Powell's presentation, you also read the FrontPage symposium that I linked above.
Dismiss all you like, cogent factual arguments, or common sense discussions work better than blanket dismissals, don't they?
Just because you personally dismsiss it, doesn't mean that is not exactly what happened.
My bottom line point, is that if a war was necessary, a case could have been made on fact, not questionable intelligence.
There was no question in WWII when we entered the war who was the enemy.
That Hussein went from non factor to public enemy number one is what I question, and am still open to evidence to prove that he was in fact so threatening that it required immediate action, sending a quarter of a million troops to Iraq, risking the lives of soldiers then and now, spending over 70+ billion with no immediate end or resolution in sight, etc.
I had no problem with the efforts in Afghanistan, so please don't lump me with the Wild's or the MSFE's of the world.
I am just an American who believes I was fed a line of crap in order to sway my opinion pro war in Iraq, and now has doubts that the administration didn't know exactly what they were doing when they did just that.
Really, the bottom line is that war with Iraq was a non issue pre 9/11, and the only reason it happened was because you had a panicked electorate.
Take away the WMD, and terrorism, imagine Bush suggesting a war pre 9/11 with Iraq, and you can see clearly how important the WMD and terrorism angle was to his success in waging war.
It seems so simple and obvious to me, that a request after the fact for proof of the allegations is warranted, and when someone who is questioned for proof gets their back up so much, it really seems odd to me.
Isn't that our right to question, when evidence is lacking? Isn't it human nature to doubt when an emphasis is made of the nature of a problem, yet the problem can't be found?
Again, the thought experiment of removing WMDs, terrorism, and 9/11 from the equation is frivolous - they were all principle variables of the equation, and coud not be removed without imagining an entirely different world than the one in which we live.