The problem with deterrence â apparently sometimes forgotten by our former presidents â is that it is not static, but a creature of the moment, captive to impression, and nursed on action, not talk. It must be maintained hourly and can erode or be lost with a single act of failed nerve, despite all the braggadocio of threatened measures. And, once gone, the remedies needed for its restoration are always more expensive, deadly â and controversial â than would have been its simple maintenance.
Throughout this war there have been several occasions when the administration took on some pretty hard choices â in the face of predictably shrill outcries both here and abroad â to restore American deterrence and credibility. Had our leaders failed on a single occasion, we would be now facing disaster and another 9/11, rather than the rout of al Qaeda, the Taliban, and Saddam Hussein, together with the current sobering introspection in Europe, reappraisal in Korea, and new maturity with our other allies.
First, less than a month after September 11, the Bush administration went right into Afghanistan on October 7 â a vital response taken without much military aid from our allies and with plenty of criticism from elites both here and abroad.
Second, very soon afterward, there arose cries of "quagmire" over the purportedly slow progress of the Northern Alliance. In response, the administration simply pressed on, kept to the plan, and ignored crazy trial balloons such as U.N. ceasefires, coalition governments with the Taliban, and Islamic peacekeepers.
Third, the decision to ostracize Mr. Arafat was long overdue â how can a current terrorist habitually bunk at the White House? â but it took courage nonetheless.
Fourth, Mr. Rumsfeld's revolutionary reappraisal of bases in Europe was perhaps not pretty, but ultimately was beneficial for both them and us. When he says he is "contemplating" adjusting our "footprint," he really does mean redeploying or withdrawing troops, not polite chitchat at Euro-conferences. He is a different sort, in other words, than the last dozen or so defense secretaries.
Fifth, the reexamination of the Korean crisis caused allies, neutrals, and enemies to grasp that the old game of bribery and Sunshine silliness was at last ending.
Sixth, the decision to attack Saddam Hussein â in the face of hysterical threats of "tens of thousands" killed, "millions of refugees," and the Armageddon to come from the Arab Street â finally addressed the entire decade-long charade of broken agreements, no-fly zones, lying, aid to terrorists, and future security threats.
Seventh, in the face of further panic over the supposed "quagmire" and "too few troops on the ground," we nevertheless kept with the plan and had crushed our Baathist adversaries within three weeks.
Eighth, American determination in the mess of postwar Iraq has remained steady amid the shouting about the looting of archaeological treasures, giving way to missing weapons of mass destruction as the new Watergate, leading to the present sniping about a new Vietnam. If our past flight from Beirut, Haiti, and Mogadishu is any indication, even Mr. Reagan, and certainly Mr. Clinton, would have had all the troops home after the first murders, and Iraq would now be left to stew in its own terrorist juices.
Instead, in the upcoming months â given the fact the new liberators are offering the gift of democracy, while the old murderers are offering more of the same death and mayhem â the attacks will taper off, the story about the Husseins' whereabouts will unfold, the mystery of the missing WMD will be solved, we will navigate through the uncharted waters of Iraqi reconstruction â and, once more, the present peddlers of gloom will be refuted.
Thanks to these resolute policies, after a brief three-week war and a mere four months of occupation, the Baathists are deposed, an Iraq national council is meeting, and the Middle East is in the midst of a vast reappraisal â at the cost, so far, of 200 brave soldiers. Where critics see turmoil â chaos in Iraq, saber-rattling with Iran, and banditry in Afghanistan â there are in fact the hard birth-pangs of consensual government, and the dying of an old order of both fascism and theocracy.
Again, at any one of these junctures I think prior administrations might well have faltered, paused, or compromised â with lethal results, both for the present and future. So for all the present invective, we must keep a sense of balance about the past two years, when the tab for two decades' worth of unresponsiveness and frequent inaction finally came due on 9/11 and on this president's watch.
Mr. Bush is not a radical intent on creating an American Empire. Rather, he seems to me a conservative who seeks to end the radical and quite dangerous policies of the last few years that went so much against American values and responsibility, and indeed against human nature itself. In that sense, the success of this critical restoration can be monitored precisely by the angst that it now arouses from the beneficiaries of a past American gullibility.
That Mr. Bush has not always been liked through this difficult reestablishment of sanity about America's role around the globe is lamentable, but also to be expected. Yet if he is successful in this long-term endeavor, we will have then reestablished deterrence, and our next administration will have it a little easier in maintaining rather than creating ex nihilo American reliability and respect.
Over the past two years we have been trying to return from an out-of-kilter past to the mean: to a place where terrorists do not believe it is tolerable to poach some Americans, where nations do not unleash their stealthy killers loose against us, where we cease ignoring â or paying bribes â to murderers, and where our allies resemble friends rather than enemies.
