NASDAQ is broken

Quote from achilles28:

Flash crash redo. Lots of busted trades tomorrow = huge losses for some traders.

Losses can come via short squeeze as wel, not sure that can fall into the Flash Crash theory though. Flash rally maybe? :)
 
Quote from achilles28:

wow. guess i need to be more specific. yea, its not a crash. but theres gunna be busted trades and big losses for shure
I take opposie side.they will do what they did in last crash-within 30%-trade stand. Nyse already said-all trades stand.
 
Quote from Bob111:

I take opposie side.they will do what they did in last crash-within 30%-trade stand. Nyse already said-all trades stand.

there was a period,when nasdaq isn't working(see my typical whining in TWS bug thread),but NYSE and ARCA(trading same nasdaq stocks) was up. it was helluva opportunity to f** someone else up.
then -there is another shit storm after they re open. i was actually sitting on the loss of about -700$ or so on bunch of stocks and i was out right on the middle of this mess at re open with total loss around $50 after commish for about 100 executions. still holding few of them(ones that i can't close no matter what). so overall-it was a good day for me(assuming that there is will be no busts tomorrow)
but, i wouldn't touch this market till at leas next tuesday. everything is f** up big time on nasdaq..
 
NQ frothy. little gap up cooking.

A celebration of monumental f-ups yesterday. Thank you for your participation.




09:11:30 ET NASDAQ All NASDAQ systems are operating normally. If you have any questions please call the NASDAQ Trade Desk at (212) 231-5100.
 
Preliminary press release finds... NYSE Arca to blame, not HFT.

NASDAQ provided the following update on the preliminary findings of its internal review of the events leading to the August 22 temporary trading halt in trading of NASDAQ-listed securities. A preliminary internal review has identified a combined series of technology events that caused the initial market problems and extended the halt period. A number of these issues were clearly within the control of NASDAQ OMX. Co is currently identifying potential design changes to further strengthen the SIP's resiliency, including architectural improvements, information security, disaster recovery plans and capacity parameters. NASDAQ OMX will present our initial recommendations related to these changes to the SIP governing committee within 30 days. NASDAQ OMX is also undertaking a comprehensive review of the policies and procedures for communicating with customers, market participants and the broader public during market-wide events. We are committed to reviewing and improving our communications practices with all stakeholders.

NASDAQ OMX determined to halt trading on Aug 22 after the SIP could not process quotes thereby impacting the fair and orderly functioning of the public market. The catalyst for the SIP failure was a confluence of unprecedented events that overwhelmed the processing capacity of the SIP. Co's review indicates that high frequency trading played no role in the technology events of Aug 22. In Jan 2013, a regularly scheduled systems capacity test showed the SIP system was capable of handling ~ 500,000 messages per second across 50 of the SIP system's ports, for an average peak of approximately 10,000 messages per-port, per second. On the morning of Aug 22, however, a sequence of events combined to create an unprecedented volume of message traffic into the SIP; well beyond the system's tested capacity of 10,000 messages per-port, per second. On Aug 22, the SIP received more than 20 connect and disconnect sequences from NYSE Arca, each of which consumed significant resources. Available capacity was further eroded as the SIP received a stream of quotes for inaccurate symbols from NYSE Arca, and generated quote rejects. Both of these actions served to degrade the system below the tested capacity of 10,000 messages per per-port, per second. During this period, NYSE Arca sent multiple bursts with each connect and disconnect, topping more than 26,000 quote updates per-port, per second as it attempted to reconnect. The events of Aug 22 were 26 times greater than the average per-port, per-second activity. The confluence of these events vastly exceeded the SIP's planned capacity, which caused its failure and then revealed a latent flaw in the SIP's software code.
 
I think that the highlighted portion describes one type of event storm and there are other kinds as well. I recall identifying event storms as one issue in the past talking about why the HFT speed race was so dangerous.

Ethernet networks can also be susceptible to collisions that can paralyze high throughput applications, especially if remote database or remote applications need to process the messages in anyway. The incorrect symbol requests sounds a lot like one particular DNS Denial-of-service attack that causes them to thrash on non-acknowledged bad requests. There is no mention of a throttle mechanism, but perhaps that was designed in.

It's not just raw burst throughput but sustained throughput as well that is necessary since requests probably have some computer overhead associated with them. Hopefully the architects designed for a highly likely computer issue from outside. Perhaps this explains why my trading system orders (from a major bank) always stopped working properly when the sharp falls happened - like in the flash crash.

IMO a fair NBBO can't truly exist unless a minimum time (15 ns????) is set for trade orders. If they don't do this, it is just a matter of time before an intentional or unintentional external computer causes problems.

I haven't worked in these fields for years. I am sure they have some competent people working on the problem. Traders should just be very cautious until these problems are resolved for good.
 
Quote from MoreLeverage:
NASDAQ provided the following update on the preliminary findings of its internal review of the events leading to the August 22 temporary trading halt in trading of NASDAQ-listed securities. A preliminary internal review has identified a combined series of technology events that caused the initial market problems and extended the halt period. A number of these issues were clearly within the control of NASDAQ OMX. Co is currently identifying potential design changes to further strengthen the SIP's resiliency, including architectural improvements, information security, disaster recovery plans and capacity parameters. NASDAQ OMX will present our initial recommendations related to these changes to the SIP governing committee within 30 days. NASDAQ OMX is also undertaking a comprehensive review of the policies and procedures for communicating with customers, market participants and the broader public during market-wide events. We are committed to reviewing and improving our communications practices with all stakeholders.

NASDAQ OMX determined to halt trading on Aug 22 after the SIP could not process quotes thereby impacting the fair and orderly functioning of the public market. The catalyst for the SIP failure was a confluence of unprecedented events that overwhelmed the processing capacity of the SIP. Co's review indicates that high frequency trading played no role in the technology events of Aug 22. In Jan 2013, a regularly scheduled systems capacity test showed the SIP system was capable of handling ~ 500,000 messages per second across 50 of the SIP system's ports, for an average peak of approximately 10,000 messages per-port, per second. On the morning of Aug 22, however, a sequence of events combined to create an unprecedented volume of message traffic into the SIP; well beyond the system's tested capacity of 10,000 messages per-port, per second. On Aug 22, the SIP received more than 20 connect and disconnect sequences from NYSE Arca, each of which consumed significant resources. Available capacity was further eroded as the SIP received a stream of quotes for inaccurate symbols from NYSE Arca, and generated quote rejects. Both of these actions served to degrade the system below the tested capacity of 10,000 messages per per-port, per second. During this period, NYSE Arca sent multiple bursts with each connect and disconnect, topping more than 26,000 quote updates per-port, per second as it attempted to reconnect. The events of Aug 22 were 26 times greater than the average per-port, per-second activity. The confluence of these events vastly exceeded the SIP's planned capacity, which caused its failure and then revealed a latent flaw in the SIP's software code.

Preliminary press release finds... NYSE Arca to blame, not HFT.




they shouldn't make this type of info public. it's like they inform public, here's weakness in my system. go ahead exploit it for your own gain.
 
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