It's a good thing tho. Busting trades is retardedQuote from Bob111:
I take opposie side.they will do what they did in last crash-within 30%-trade stand. Nyse already said-all trades stand.
NASDAQ provided the following update on the preliminary findings of its internal review of the events leading to the August 22 temporary trading halt in trading of NASDAQ-listed securities. A preliminary internal review has identified a combined series of technology events that caused the initial market problems and extended the halt period. A number of these issues were clearly within the control of NASDAQ OMX. Co is currently identifying potential design changes to further strengthen the SIP's resiliency, including architectural improvements, information security, disaster recovery plans and capacity parameters. NASDAQ OMX will present our initial recommendations related to these changes to the SIP governing committee within 30 days. NASDAQ OMX is also undertaking a comprehensive review of the policies and procedures for communicating with customers, market participants and the broader public during market-wide events. We are committed to reviewing and improving our communications practices with all stakeholders.
NASDAQ OMX determined to halt trading on Aug 22 after the SIP could not process quotes thereby impacting the fair and orderly functioning of the public market. The catalyst for the SIP failure was a confluence of unprecedented events that overwhelmed the processing capacity of the SIP. Co's review indicates that high frequency trading played no role in the technology events of Aug 22. In Jan 2013, a regularly scheduled systems capacity test showed the SIP system was capable of handling ~ 500,000 messages per second across 50 of the SIP system's ports, for an average peak of approximately 10,000 messages per-port, per second. On the morning of Aug 22, however, a sequence of events combined to create an unprecedented volume of message traffic into the SIP; well beyond the system's tested capacity of 10,000 messages per-port, per second. On Aug 22, the SIP received more than 20 connect and disconnect sequences from NYSE Arca, each of which consumed significant resources. Available capacity was further eroded as the SIP received a stream of quotes for inaccurate symbols from NYSE Arca, and generated quote rejects. Both of these actions served to degrade the system below the tested capacity of 10,000 messages per per-port, per second. During this period, NYSE Arca sent multiple bursts with each connect and disconnect, topping more than 26,000 quote updates per-port, per second as it attempted to reconnect. The events of Aug 22 were 26 times greater than the average per-port, per-second activity. The confluence of these events vastly exceeded the SIP's planned capacity, which caused its failure and then revealed a latent flaw in the SIP's software code.
Quote from MoreLeverage:
NASDAQ provided the following update on the preliminary findings of its internal review of the events leading to the August 22 temporary trading halt in trading of NASDAQ-listed securities. A preliminary internal review has identified a combined series of technology events that caused the initial market problems and extended the halt period. A number of these issues were clearly within the control of NASDAQ OMX. Co is currently identifying potential design changes to further strengthen the SIP's resiliency, including architectural improvements, information security, disaster recovery plans and capacity parameters. NASDAQ OMX will present our initial recommendations related to these changes to the SIP governing committee within 30 days. NASDAQ OMX is also undertaking a comprehensive review of the policies and procedures for communicating with customers, market participants and the broader public during market-wide events. We are committed to reviewing and improving our communications practices with all stakeholders.
NASDAQ OMX determined to halt trading on Aug 22 after the SIP could not process quotes thereby impacting the fair and orderly functioning of the public market. The catalyst for the SIP failure was a confluence of unprecedented events that overwhelmed the processing capacity of the SIP. Co's review indicates that high frequency trading played no role in the technology events of Aug 22. In Jan 2013, a regularly scheduled systems capacity test showed the SIP system was capable of handling ~ 500,000 messages per second across 50 of the SIP system's ports, for an average peak of approximately 10,000 messages per-port, per second. On the morning of Aug 22, however, a sequence of events combined to create an unprecedented volume of message traffic into the SIP; well beyond the system's tested capacity of 10,000 messages per-port, per second. On Aug 22, the SIP received more than 20 connect and disconnect sequences from NYSE Arca, each of which consumed significant resources. Available capacity was further eroded as the SIP received a stream of quotes for inaccurate symbols from NYSE Arca, and generated quote rejects. Both of these actions served to degrade the system below the tested capacity of 10,000 messages per per-port, per second. During this period, NYSE Arca sent multiple bursts with each connect and disconnect, topping more than 26,000 quote updates per-port, per second as it attempted to reconnect. The events of Aug 22 were 26 times greater than the average per-port, per-second activity. The confluence of these events vastly exceeded the SIP's planned capacity, which caused its failure and then revealed a latent flaw in the SIP's software code.
Preliminary press release finds... NYSE Arca to blame, not HFT.