Resurgence of the Shias
Another reason for bringing in the UN
Thursday April 24, 2003
US and British politicians predicted before the war that indigenous Iraqi leaders would emerge to fill the post-Saddam, post-Ba'athist power vacuum. That process is now indeed gathering pace but with results both unanticipated and potentially inimical to coalition plans. All over non-Kurdish Iraq, Shia clerics and their followers are taking de facto charge of towns and neighbourhoods while well-meaning American consuls scratch their heads and debate democracy in Irbil. In Najaf and Kerbala, in Kut and Nassiriya, and in the suburbs of Baghdad and Basra, Shia civil control is becoming the new political reality, distinct from and largely independent of the occupation authority. On one level, this nascent, unfettered Shia bid for local self-determination after years of repression is a positive outcome of the war. But on the national level, it may yet come to present a serious challenge to US-British hopes of inclusive, integrated statehood.
The reviving power of the Shia was dramatically symbolised this week by the pilgrimage that drew hundreds of thousands of faithful to the Kerbala shrine of Imam Hussein. Shia leaders, nominally representative of 60% of the Iraqi population, deny that they seek to dominate Sunni and other minorities or create a theocracy on the Qom-Khomeini model. But nor do they speak with one voice. One emerging leader, Sayed Muqtada al-Sadr, son of a grand ayatollah murdered by Saddam, is said to want to use the supreme religious authority of the Hawza al-Ilmiya centre in Najaf to obtain greater political leverage. In this he and many in a younger, more militant generation are at odds with Grand Ayatollah Ali Hussein al-Sistani, the chief marja (religious authority) of Shia Islam. Al-Sadr's men are blamed for the recent murder of a leading clerical exile, Abdel Majid al-Khoei, favoured by Tony Blair and who like al-Sistani urged cooperation with the US. There are other powerful factions, too, such as Iran-backed Ayatollah Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim and the al-Badr brigade. And then there are interlopers such as Mohammed Mohsen al-Zubaidi who has disconcertingly (for the Americans at least) declared himself Baghdad's new political boss.
The Shia barely exist as yet as a coherent national political force; and like Iraq as a whole, they may yet fragment irretrievably. But even under the anti-clerical Saddam, religious devotion was already reviving, a trend now visibly accelerating. If broad, unifying points of agreement can be discerned at the present moment, they are that the Shia will not again allow themselves to be subjugated; they will uphold the tenets of their faith (strictly or loosely interpreted, according to their lights); they will oppose perceived collaborators and secularists such as Pentagon favourite Ahmad Chalabi; and most plainly of all, they will not submit for long to American rule.
The Shia have not turned hostile yet. But in time, if their aspirations are frustrated and they are denied a leading role in Iraq's future governance, they surely will. That breakdown may in turn suck in Iran and affect Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, too. Such destabilising scenarios are hardly new.
What is truly novel is the now freely admitted failure of the US to anticipate this Shia resurgence; its feeble efforts to scapegoat Tehran's mullahs; and the embarrassing cluelessness of Jay Garner, the ex-general currently puzzling, glue-pot in hand, over the myriad broken pieces of the Iraqi mosaic. Hamstrung by legal ambiguities and its own ideology, the US risks losing the political initiative. The case for the UN taking charge grows more urgent by the day.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763,942391,00.html