So here are my questions and possibly erroneous statements/assumptions. Answer what you know; lets find out what you don't. If they reveal a lack of understanding about FMD's business, please fix it .. lot to learn in a short amount of time.
1) FMD is the loan servicer and (proxy?) originator of student loans. Schools set up with them; financial institutions provide cash warehouse facilities, auction rate brokering services, etc.
2) FMD loans out few billion per year to students. Default assumptions are at around 14%.
3) FMD uses warehouse facilities to loan out against temporarily until it 'securitizes' the debt, turning it into a bond or auction rate note on the open market. Is this recorded as "structural advisory fees" in receivables / revenue type?
4) Even after FMD securitizes the debt, they remain the debt servicer and make a profit margin of some sort on servicing the debt to the auction rate notes or bonds they facilitated in the creation of. Maybe some sort of the spread over libor goes to create this margin? Is this recorded as "residuals" in service receivables / revenue type?
Besides lower residuals, are there any negative repercussions of defaults? I assume FMD is not exposed to principal losses on any of its past securitized products.
5) The near term woes of the auction rate note market is entirely responsible for FMD's lack of ability to sell new securitized debt. Since FMD's debt is floating to 1 month libor generally, they reprice yield to FMD debt buyers (bond buyers) on the Auction rate note market. But with TERI bankrupt, FMD can't get guarantees on short term cash flows to auction rate note buyers. This creates dilemma 6 and 7.
6) So new auction rate trades won't happen on FMD debt. Basically auction rate note holders on FMD are now incentivized to just hold the FMD debt, even if its cash flows are not insured anymore. This already existing FMD auction rate debt is probably trading at quite a substantial discount, probably at something like 500-700bp over libor ?? (junk)
7) Since the ARN market is trading at some large spread over libor for these notes, new securitizations that float would have to be trading at some comparable rate. That means student loans would only be available to end borrowers at rates of 700-900bp+ over libor using the current securitization method. But that means new student loan contracts. The past 350M of unsecuritized debt won't be able to conform to that deal. So that leaves FMD with the option of self financing their loans to students directly, tying up their warehouse or cash line.
8) But what is FMD doing with 2008 crop loans? Are they offering student loans as we speak? Whats to prevent them from offering fixed rate student loans instead of floating variable rate going forward? That way they can securitize the debt at market rates even without an insurer, albeit at higher rates.
Please fix all of this which is incorrect. Maybe I'll post it to the yahoo boards. I post this with intent to understand their business model.
1) FMD is the loan servicer and (proxy?) originator of student loans. Schools set up with them; financial institutions provide cash warehouse facilities, auction rate brokering services, etc.
2) FMD loans out few billion per year to students. Default assumptions are at around 14%.
3) FMD uses warehouse facilities to loan out against temporarily until it 'securitizes' the debt, turning it into a bond or auction rate note on the open market. Is this recorded as "structural advisory fees" in receivables / revenue type?
4) Even after FMD securitizes the debt, they remain the debt servicer and make a profit margin of some sort on servicing the debt to the auction rate notes or bonds they facilitated in the creation of. Maybe some sort of the spread over libor goes to create this margin? Is this recorded as "residuals" in service receivables / revenue type?
Besides lower residuals, are there any negative repercussions of defaults? I assume FMD is not exposed to principal losses on any of its past securitized products.
5) The near term woes of the auction rate note market is entirely responsible for FMD's lack of ability to sell new securitized debt. Since FMD's debt is floating to 1 month libor generally, they reprice yield to FMD debt buyers (bond buyers) on the Auction rate note market. But with TERI bankrupt, FMD can't get guarantees on short term cash flows to auction rate note buyers. This creates dilemma 6 and 7.
6) So new auction rate trades won't happen on FMD debt. Basically auction rate note holders on FMD are now incentivized to just hold the FMD debt, even if its cash flows are not insured anymore. This already existing FMD auction rate debt is probably trading at quite a substantial discount, probably at something like 500-700bp over libor ?? (junk)
7) Since the ARN market is trading at some large spread over libor for these notes, new securitizations that float would have to be trading at some comparable rate. That means student loans would only be available to end borrowers at rates of 700-900bp+ over libor using the current securitization method. But that means new student loan contracts. The past 350M of unsecuritized debt won't be able to conform to that deal. So that leaves FMD with the option of self financing their loans to students directly, tying up their warehouse or cash line.
8) But what is FMD doing with 2008 crop loans? Are they offering student loans as we speak? Whats to prevent them from offering fixed rate student loans instead of floating variable rate going forward? That way they can securitize the debt at market rates even without an insurer, albeit at higher rates.
Please fix all of this which is incorrect. Maybe I'll post it to the yahoo boards. I post this with intent to understand their business model.
