Quote from stu:
Which you obviously can't comprehend is infinitely more than can be done speculating about an imaginary deity.
you got that wrong, again. What is speculation is the multiverse... what is science is the tunings.
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"Bernard Carr is an astronomer at Queen Mary University, London. Unlike Martin Rees, he does not enjoy wooden-panelled rooms in his day job, but inhabits an office at the top of a concrete high-rise, the windows of which hang as if on the edge of the universe. He sums up the multiverse predicament: âEveryone has their own reason why theyâre keen on the multiverse. But what it comes down to is that there are these physical constants that canât be explained. It seems clear that there is fine tuning, and you either need a tuner, who chooses the constants so that we arise, or you need a multiverse, and then we have to be in one of the universes where the constants are right for life.â
But which comes first, tuner or tuned? Who or what is leading the dance? Isnât conjuring up a multiverse to explain already outlandish fine-tuning tantamount to leaping out of the physical frying pan and into the ****physical fire?
Unsurprisingly, the multiverse proposal has provoked ideological opposition. In 2005, the New York Times published an opinion piece by a Roman Catholic cardinal, Christoph Schönborn, in which he called it âan abdication of human intelligence.â That comment led to a slew of letters lambasting the claim that the multiverse is a hypothesis designed to avoid âthe overwhelming evidence for purpose and design found in modern science.â But even if you donât go along with the prince of the church on that, he had another point which does resonate with many physicists, regardless of their belief. The idea that the multiverse solves the fine-tuning of the universe by effectively declaring that everything is possible is in itself not a scientific explanation at all: if you allow yourself to hypothesize any number of worlds, you can account for anything but say very little about how or why."
http://www.philosophypress.co.uk/?p=137
