Let's say you have a small biotech company XYZ trading at $50, expecting to report pivotal phase III results in September. The one month out ATM puts are selling for $10 with 300% IV. Seeing vol is ridiculously large, an option writer opens a new contract speculating vol will fall even if a massive move occurs after trial results are announced.
One month later, the trial fails, the stock plunges, and for the sake of argument, IVR turns out to be 110%. The option writer wins, right?
Here is the problem: Almost all of the small cap biotech companies are one trick ponies with negative cash flow, no revenues, but worth hundreds of millions of dollars as trial success is already baked into the price. Through backtesting, company such as XYZ were worth close to $2 if their trial failed. Hence, even if IVR was 110%, the puts sold by the option writer are now deep, deep in the money for a $48 loss per $10 received in premium.
Which brings back the question in the title. Who is the counterparty when one is buying these puts? Why would the option writer not account for directionality when demanding a premium?
One month later, the trial fails, the stock plunges, and for the sake of argument, IVR turns out to be 110%. The option writer wins, right?
Here is the problem: Almost all of the small cap biotech companies are one trick ponies with negative cash flow, no revenues, but worth hundreds of millions of dollars as trial success is already baked into the price. Through backtesting, company such as XYZ were worth close to $2 if their trial failed. Hence, even if IVR was 110%, the puts sold by the option writer are now deep, deep in the money for a $48 loss per $10 received in premium.
Which brings back the question in the title. Who is the counterparty when one is buying these puts? Why would the option writer not account for directionality when demanding a premium?
