Quote from Cutten:
People used similar logic to short JGBs in the early to mid 90s, and got their asses handed to them. 10 years after, the yield was *lower* and eventually hit 0.5% in the early 2000s.
Ditto with US treasuries. If you shorted them in 1932 at the depths of the depression (compared to now, only 6 months or so into recession), you *lost money*. Treasury yields made their low in 1941-42, more than a decade after the start of the Great Depression.
The short treasuries trade is by no means the one-way bet that you seem to think. Not only might you not be right, you could be on the wrong end of a once in a generation bubble. Work out the implied futures price for a 30 year bond yield of 1% - that's how much you have at risk with this trade.
I agree with this. short treasuries makes sense on the level I point out, but following Japan's lead, there's no reason we've just not reset to a new price floor. Japan did not experience a capital flight, nor are we (at present). If we have enough savings internally to support our debt loads (which was Japan's situation), there is no reason treasury prices can't stay here and go higher. The whole capital flight + treasury crash theory is based on an assumption (possibly flawed) that we need foreign capital to sustain our debt needs. At present, this has been true, but elimination of our consumption imbalances (and export of dollars) while simultaneously printing more money could have the effect of basically redirecting that same capital to buy treasuries (versus foreign assets) with the correct set of government policies.
Regardless, now is not the time to short treasuries simply because we already know the Fed has announced they will be buying debt with printed money. Better idea to let the programs begin en masse and see where the market goes.
Interesting points about deflation in real terms against inflation in nominal terms concerning hyperinflation.