The following was published by Central Banking in its April 19 Newsmakers update:
PBOC governor Zhou Xiaochuan has insisted that the PBOCâs task in future is mainly to improve the mechanism in the shaping of the RMBâs exchange rate rather than simply adjusting the exchange rate itself.
That hard line will not please the US Congress or the US Administration which has demanded an "immediate" revaluation of the RMB.
Why China should change its domestic policies just to please the US Congress is a mystery. With its huge reserves financing unpopular US defence policies, China is rather in a position to tell Congress to cut the US budget deficit - or else!
Central Banking received the following dispatch the next day from St. Louis Fed Research Officer Christopher Neely:
Sir/Madam,
I take issue with your assertion (Newsmakers April 19) that Chinese official purchases of U.S. assets provide sufficient leverage for the People's Republic of China (PRC) to dictate U.S. budget policy. An informal analysis will show the thesis to be fallacious.
What happens if China dumps U.S. securities on the market in an effort to influence U.S. policy? U.S. long-term interest rates will rise and the dollar will fall. For argument's sake let's assume that the value of the dollar declines by 20-50%. (It could be more.) In that case, imports become more expensive to U.S. consumers and investors and U.S. goods become more competitive on world markets. U.S. consumption and investment fall and net exports rise commensurately. U.S. output and employment might actually rise from the net export effects but the net effect will probably be a wash.
But the value of Chinese foreign exchange reserves fall in value by 20-50%. As their present level of foreign exchange reserves is about $600 billion and their GDP is around $4.5 trillion in PPP-adjusted terms, the PRC loses $100-300 billion almost immediately, about 2 - 7 percent of their GDP. That is an enormous loss for any country, especially when it is the price paid for the bizarre goal of influencing another country's budget policy.
Reserves figures:
http://www.chinability.com/Reserves.htm
GDP figures:
http://english.people.com.cn/200408/05/eng20040805_151944.html
So, US takes a decent sized fall in consumption--nothing earth shaking--while the PRC loses 2-7% of their GDP in wealth. The last time the dollar lost half of its value on FX markets (1986-1987) hardly anyone in the United States noticed. A few tourists canceled their trips abroad.
Is this a credible threat on the part of the PRC?
I submit that if the PRC had anything like that sort of pull in Washington, Taiwan would already be governed by the PRC. Further, Tokyo has long had similar holdings of US assets and has never been able to dictate policy to Washington. Neither can Washington dictate to Beijing or Tokyo just because the US is an important trading partner. Nations are remarkably stubborn about those things.
There has been actual research on just such a possibility. Croke, Kamin and Leduc at the Board of Governors have written on the subject of sudden current account adjustments.
Blanchard, Giavazzi and Sa have written a related paper on the likely course of the dollar as the U.S. current account adjusts.
Croke, Kamin, Leduc:
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=678945
Blanchard, Giavazzi and Sa:
http://www.nber.org/papers/W11137
The whole idea that official asset purchases are important enough to dictate budget policy is silly. The PRC's stance on North Korea, for example, is far more important to Washington than the holding of a few hundred billion in Treasuries.
Further, how does the writer justify describing Chinese exchange rate policy as "domestic?" What economic policy is less domestic?
Central Banking Publications should aim to critically analyze conventional wisdom.
Sincerely,
Christopher J. Neely