Quote from antitrust:
I wouldn't say falling prices is "tiny and minor"
Banks monetize assets when they make loans, Falling prices mean falling collateral
Fine. Touche. Sure. But that's not really what I was trying impress on readers here. You're citing the falling prices of assets and how that affects the supply of credit.
The point I'm making is that it is "supply of credit" that is the end issue. The distinction I'm drawing is between that concern and the other concern that lots of people seem to think is the problem with deflation, namely: that falling price trends cause people to think things will be cheaper in the future and therefore cause them to save, or hoard cash, as a strategic or behavioral response.
A lot of people seem to think that the Fed is afraid that deflation begets deflation by this 'savers instinct', a sort of learned frugality through trend observation.
My point is that the Fed is not being evil and deciding falling consumer prices are bad practice, and in response, trying to get inflation going to force money to burn holes in pockets.
Instead, they are concerned that the supply of credit will entirely disappear if banks suffer another spike in defaults. Since credit tightening is the response to default waves, and defaults are the response to tightened credit, there is a feedback loop that they want to avoid.
The 'savers instinct' is the 'tiny and minor' concern.
As an adjunct, to set the record:
I am not saying "there is deflation now". I actually believe inflation will certainly be the result, and it will be a big problem. I'm a Fleck fan, for crying out loud. And I do think the unintended consequences of this clearly short-sighted panic reaction will more than outweigh its benefits.
I was simply trying to make a point that seems very misunderstood about what the real problem with deflation is in a debt-laden economy. The problem is one side of the ledger goes poof. This is what happened in 1930-1932. Deflation hit and spiraled through this feedback loop as banks defended their solvency. When that happens, first the bad loans default, and then, through the jump in real rates, the good debts become bad and default.