Mobilization
>(page 61): As for secret mobilization, Soviet troops in the western border regions, in accordance with the new mobilization plan MP-1941 goda, received orders from the General Staff of the Red Army to prepare for full mobilization by June 1941.(n19) The date indicated for all troops and installations of the western special military districts was June 15, 1941; for that of the Baltic special military districts, June 20, 1941. The mobilization of the troops was to be prepared "down to the last detail" in accordance with the date established in the deployment scheme. The General Staff apparently wished "to take a resolute step forward" in June, and also to actually carry out a general mobilization. In the meantime, Stalin rejected a similar proposal by Timoshenko and Zhukov on June 14, 1941, since mobilization would automatically mean the opening of hostilities, which should, in the opinion at that time, begin with a surprise blow at a point in time chosen by the Soviets. The measures already taken, as Colonel Filippov recently showed, had been so effective that mobilization was not even necessary.(n20) In May 1941, Stalin ordered the call-up of a further 800,000 reservists, so that approximately 300 divisions were now ready.
>(page 62): As with the secret mobilization, the secret concentration of troops under cover of training camps was largely completed. Soviet historians, precisely to prove alleged Soviet peaceful intentions, have adduced a system of "decentralized camp exercises". In reality, however, the General Staff had, once again under the strictest secrecy, shifted four armies from the interior of the country to the border region as early as May 13, 1941, on Stalin's instructions. These armies were followed by others in June. The armies in question were the 16th, 19th, 20th, 21st, 22nd, 24th, and 28th, i.e. a total of seven armies, as well as the 21st and 23rd Mechanized Corps and the 41st Infantry Corps. These huge troop movements were conducted under the umbrella of denials inspired by Stalin....Otherwise, large units would hardly have appeared before the German army eastern front in numbers that, according to the enemy situation report of Panzer group 4 of August 10, 1941, amounted to 330 Soviet divisions, but, according to the intelligence report on the enemy of Panzer Group 3 of August 3 to 7, 1941, amounted to as many as 350 Soviet divisions.(n23)
>(pages 63-4): The secret concentration of the Soviet Air Forces, the development of the ground organization, and the organization of the rear support services were already almost entirely finished on June 22, 1941. The General Staff of the Red Army had concentrated "the most combat-ready aviation attack formations" in all previous air war history, in "the immediate vicinity of its national borders," and, to this end, had installed a dense network of operative airports in the area since early 1941....
Military Supply Build-up
>(page 64): Clear offensive intentions were also revealed by the transfer forward of all material resources of the armed forces that were stationed immediately adjacent to the western national borders. Gigantic depots of ammunition, weapons, equipment, fuel, provisions, and other stores and material, in fact all mobilization supplies, were, as Colonel Danilov has stated, installed practically in the effective range of enemy fire--even railway tracks were ready for use.(n29) For example, in Brest-Litovsk alone, the Germans captured ten million liters of fuel....
Operational Maps in hands of troops
>(page 65): The maps supplied to Red Army troops are another infallible indication of large-scale offensive plans. At various places near the border, as well as far behind the lines, the Germans captured maps extending far to the west and into German territory, as well as equally copious documentation providing other information on Germany. Such map discoveries were made at Kobryn, Dubno, Grodno, and many other places.(n33) In October 1941, the German XXIV Panzer Corps captured a map of Lithuania and East Prussia, as well as "an apparent operational study entitled 'Attack on East Prussia'"(n34) As the XXXXVIII Panzer Corps reported on July 1, 1941, the citadel of Dubno contained
"warlike-packed supplies of map materials drawn up for divisional tasks. These maps covered territory west of the border regions as far as the region of Cracow [in German occupied Poland]...large quantities of exercizes for general staff officers and lecture documentation on Germany were also found."(n35)
Wargames offensive, not defensive
>(page 66): Soviet aggressive intentions are also indicated by the fact that war-game map maneuvers, staff exercises, and the like were fundamentally offensive and aggressive in nature. Even at the division level, described by the First Ordinance Officer of the 87th Infantry Division, First Lieutenant Filipenko, "attack was practiced almost exclusively, with the support of artillery and combat vehicles"; "defense only rarely, up to company strength at most."(n44) On May 24, 1941, German radio reconnaissance in the border area near Grodek "with certainty" listened in on a Soviet exercise with the participation of tank units called "attack on land N," meaning Germany.(n45) Lieutenant Colonel Kovalev(n46), initially the commander of the 223rd Infantry Division, and, until May 1941 a student at the Military Academy of Moscow, and Captain Pugachev(n47), First Ordinance Officer on the Staff of the 11th Mechanized Corps, described the war games at the Army level, which exclusively involved the right wing (West Front) of the Soviet offensive front, but that already provide an introduction to the extent of the profound operations that were to be brought about according to the General Staff Plan of May 15, 1941...[Herefollows specific offensive plans.]
Preparation of Soviet troops
>(page 78): The "Plan for the Political Protection..." gave the political workers of the 5th Army exact instructions about their duties during the forthcoming offensive operations. The extensive propaganda preparations even included the publication of newspapers ("number of copies for the first few days, in Germany: 50,000") as well as leaflets for both German soldiers and the Polish population. Suitable leaflets for "enemy troops," "the content of which is to conceal our intentions while exposing the imperialistic plans of the enemy, and inciting German soldiers to disobediance," were already being prepared in large numbers even before the outbreak of the war. Thus it was not surprising that[ such leaflets were captured ] as early as the first day of the war--June 22, 1941.
>(pages 80-1): There are innumerable corresponding testimonies [of psychological preparation of troops for invasion] from the initial phase of the war. On June 30, 1941, the IV Army Corps, for example, reported:
"Prisoner of war interrogations repeatedly show that the political Commissars have spoken about forthcoming attacks on Germany. With the mention that Germany has been weakened by its struggle against England."(n85)
According to the testimony of an unnamed Air Force Lieutenant on July 17, 1941: "It was considered an open secret that the Red Army would attack Germany."(n86)...Dr. Kotliarevsky, a military officer called up for forty-five days service with the 151st Medical Battalion of the 147th Infantry Division beginning on May 30, 1941, stated on Sept. 24, 1941:
"On June 7, the medical personnel were assembled, and were told in confidence that there would be no more releases at the expiration of the forty-five days, since there would be war with Germany in the very near future."(n88)................