Btw, there are many forces at work on the superpowers because of all the account deficits. This link documents and models some of them.
http://www.resourceinvestor.com/pebble.asp?relid=45716
Here is an excerpt:
Turning the implications for the change in real GDP (third column), we see that large changes in relative GDP translate into much more muted changes in real GDP. For instance, the real GDP of the U.S. falls by only 2%. The reason is that the more the U.S. relative wage (and hence relative GDP) needs to decline to make U.S. exports (e.g., tractors, wide-bodied aircraft) more competitive abroad, the lower the price of what Americans produce for themselves (e.g., medical services, personal training, auto repair), which comprise the lion's share of what Americans (and other people) spend money on.
The outcomes for the large surplus economies (Japan, Germany, and China) are the reverse image of those for the U.S. Note that in either scenario the U.S. pulls down the relative GDPs of Canada and Mexico, even though Canada starts out running a surplus and Mexico only a small deficit. The reason is that these countries' largest foreign customer shrinks substantially. Despite the decline in the size of the Canadian economy, Canadian GDP can buy more, since goods from its largest foreign supplier have gotten much cheaper still. Hence its real GDP rises.
To summarise, the realignment that is necessary depends on flexibility, with more flexibility requiring less adjustment. Even if movements in relative GDP's are substantial, however, once price changes are taken into account real effects are much more modest.
The adjustment in progress
In fact, there are signs that the correction has already begun. From 1 March 2007 to 1 March 2008 the value of the U.S. dollar declined by nearly 18% against the Canadian dollar, over 16% against the Mexican peso, by nearly 14% against the Euro, and by over 8% against the Chinese yuan. Various trade-weighted exchange rates reported by the IMF show a U.S. dollar decline of 10 to 13% from the first quarter of 2007 to the first quarter of 2008. During this same period U.S. merchandise exports grew 18.4% and merchandise imports grew 12.7%. Some of this growth is the consequence of the commodity boom. But even removing soybeans, corn, and wheat from exports leaves growth in the remaining categories of U.S. exports at a hefty 16.8%. Moreover, if imports of crude oil are taken out, U.S. spending on imports grew by only 5.9%.