this thread has the potential to change your life
- Thread starter Gordon Gekko
- Start date
i don't see it that way. you can say if we are ever going to stop the punishment stuff, it is already determined. however, discussions like this could be what actually led to things changing.Quote from TGregg:
But if there is no free will, then we cannot stop ourselves from punishing them.
say someone beats their dog. you could say they have no free will. they were determined to be someone who beats their dog UP TO THAT TIME. now say that person is exposed to someone who teaches why punishment is incorrect. they may not be so punishing now towards their dog.
Show us the free will for you to post something intelligent....for a change.
FREE WILL AND DETERMINISM
The idea of human freedom antedates philosophical
speculation on this idea. When philosophers began to
inquire into the nature and existence of freedom, they
did not initially think of freedom as an attribute of
a man's will. For example, no theoretical discussion
of the concept of will appears in the works of Plato,
and therefore, no talk about the freedom of the will.
Nonetheless, Plato had definite ideas regarding the
conditions under which a man is free. A man is free
when the rational part of his soul governs the other
parts, viz., the feelings and passions. A man may thus
be enslaved by his feelings or passions if they dominate
his being. Governance by reason produces harmony
and justice; in the individual, justice is conceived as
the state of the soul in which each part performs only
its proper function in harmony with all other functions.
A man is liable to sin if his soul is unjust; but the sin
is involuntary for no man would knowingly choose to
be in this state. Nor does a just man choose evil volun-
tarily for the explanation of this choice is always ig-
norance. Hence, according to Plato, a person in whom
reason reigns, and who possesses knowledge, can do
no evil.
Since a man incurs responsibility only for his volun-
tary actions, Aristotle undertakes an ethical and psy-
chological inquiry into the voluntary. An act is un-
willed if its moving principle is outside the person, i.e.,
the person is acting under compulsion, or if the act
can be explained by reference to the person's igno-
rance. Aristotle makes two qualifications regarding the
second way in which an act can be unwilled: (1) if
a man does not regret having performed the act once
his ignorance is removed, the act may be said to have
been involuntary rather than unwilled; (2) the igno-
rance must be about circumstances and consequences,
not moral principles. A man who acts contrary to a
moral principle whose truth he refuses to acknowledge
is acting willingly (assuming he is not acting under
compulsion or through ignorance of circumstances and
consequences) and wickedly (Wheelright, p. 203).
If a man chooses to do something out of some desire
or even a strong or sudden impulse, the moving princi-
ple is in the man and he is, therefore, acting willingly.
Aristotle does not require for voluntariness, therefore,
what libertarians will later require for freedom; to wit,
that the act be caused by the actor or agent rather
than some state of the agent, e.g., a desire.
Choice is not identical with desire (choice has to
do with matters in our power whereas desire is not
so restricted) or with any cognitive state like belief
or opinion (choices are good or bad whereas beliefs
are true or false). It is a voluntary act preceded by
deliberation in which a desire for some end is trans-
formed into a desire for the means deemed appropriate
to that end. Assuming that the chosen act is done
willingly, it may be a virtuous or a vicious act. Virtue
and vice, therefore, are voluntary. Moreover, a man
may be responsible for the ignorance that makes his
act unwilled and for the original choices that deter-
mined his present character, even if it is not now within
his power to act contrary to his character.
Neither Plato nor Aristotle philosophized about
man's freedom or responsibility in the light of problems
that are raised by a conception of the world as a
mechanism governed entirely by inviolable laws. The
Stoic philosophers confronted this issue, but failed to
provide a satisfactory account. They accepted a
thoroughgoing materialistic determinismâeverything
necessarily obeys the order of nature, which was also
conceived as Providence and thought of as a material
entity. But this determinism turns out not to be really
thoroughgoing, for, although man's actions are deter-
mined, his attitudes and impressions, particularly his
judgments about good and evil, are not. Since a man's
attitude or intention is the sole determinant of moral
good or evil, what happens to a man or what a man
does is morally neutral. Hence, Providence, who de-
termines what happens in the world rather than man's
reaction to it, is absolved from the responsibility for
moral evil.
The idea of human freedom antedates philosophical
speculation on this idea. When philosophers began to
inquire into the nature and existence of freedom, they
did not initially think of freedom as an attribute of
a man's will. For example, no theoretical discussion
of the concept of will appears in the works of Plato,
and therefore, no talk about the freedom of the will.
Nonetheless, Plato had definite ideas regarding the
conditions under which a man is free. A man is free
when the rational part of his soul governs the other
parts, viz., the feelings and passions. A man may thus
be enslaved by his feelings or passions if they dominate
his being. Governance by reason produces harmony
and justice; in the individual, justice is conceived as
the state of the soul in which each part performs only
its proper function in harmony with all other functions.
A man is liable to sin if his soul is unjust; but the sin
is involuntary for no man would knowingly choose to
be in this state. Nor does a just man choose evil volun-
tarily for the explanation of this choice is always ig-
norance. Hence, according to Plato, a person in whom
reason reigns, and who possesses knowledge, can do
no evil.
Since a man incurs responsibility only for his volun-
tary actions, Aristotle undertakes an ethical and psy-
chological inquiry into the voluntary. An act is un-
willed if its moving principle is outside the person, i.e.,
the person is acting under compulsion, or if the act
can be explained by reference to the person's igno-
rance. Aristotle makes two qualifications regarding the
second way in which an act can be unwilled: (1) if
a man does not regret having performed the act once
his ignorance is removed, the act may be said to have
been involuntary rather than unwilled; (2) the igno-
rance must be about circumstances and consequences,
not moral principles. A man who acts contrary to a
moral principle whose truth he refuses to acknowledge
is acting willingly (assuming he is not acting under
compulsion or through ignorance of circumstances and
consequences) and wickedly (Wheelright, p. 203).
If a man chooses to do something out of some desire
or even a strong or sudden impulse, the moving princi-
ple is in the man and he is, therefore, acting willingly.
Aristotle does not require for voluntariness, therefore,
what libertarians will later require for freedom; to wit,
that the act be caused by the actor or agent rather
than some state of the agent, e.g., a desire.
Choice is not identical with desire (choice has to
do with matters in our power whereas desire is not
so restricted) or with any cognitive state like belief
or opinion (choices are good or bad whereas beliefs
are true or false). It is a voluntary act preceded by
deliberation in which a desire for some end is trans-
formed into a desire for the means deemed appropriate
to that end. Assuming that the chosen act is done
willingly, it may be a virtuous or a vicious act. Virtue
and vice, therefore, are voluntary. Moreover, a man
may be responsible for the ignorance that makes his
act unwilled and for the original choices that deter-
mined his present character, even if it is not now within
his power to act contrary to his character.
Neither Plato nor Aristotle philosophized about
man's freedom or responsibility in the light of problems
that are raised by a conception of the world as a
mechanism governed entirely by inviolable laws. The
Stoic philosophers confronted this issue, but failed to
provide a satisfactory account. They accepted a
thoroughgoing materialistic determinismâeverything
necessarily obeys the order of nature, which was also
conceived as Providence and thought of as a material
entity. But this determinism turns out not to be really
thoroughgoing, for, although man's actions are deter-
mined, his attitudes and impressions, particularly his
judgments about good and evil, are not. Since a man's
attitude or intention is the sole determinant of moral
good or evil, what happens to a man or what a man
does is morally neutral. Hence, Providence, who de-
termines what happens in the world rather than man's
reaction to it, is absolved from the responsibility for
moral evil.
Since a man's attitude or intention determines moral
good or evil, i.e., virtue or vice, the only vice is the
wrong attitude, i.e., judging that things really are evil.
Hence, resignation or subordination to nature is the
correct attitude. It is the attitude demanded by man's
reason, which is an emanation of Providence. But, of
course, man has it within his power to accept or reject
the dictates of his own reason. (This conception of
freedom is similar to a conception that appears in
determinists at several points in the history of philoso-
phy, viz., the idea that freedom is the recognition of
necessity, i.e., the acceptance of the world as it has
to be. See the discussion below of Spinoza.) This atti-
tude of acceptance requires the suppression of passion
and emotion, for these involve mistaken judgments
about things, e.g., that some object is intrinsically
desirable. This consequence of Stoic doctrine seems to
imply a contradiction, however, for a part of nature,
man's passionate nature, is being morally condemned.
Some Stoics, grappling with the inconsistencies and
other problems of their doctrine, attempted solutions.
In the third century B.C. Cleanthes, for example, argued
that foreordination by Providence does not imply that
an action not performed is not possible.
Epicurus had previously believed, however, that the
validation of man's sense of freedom requires an in-
deterministic world. He introduced into the doctrine
of atomism, which he accepted, the idea that atoms
spontaneously swerve and saw this spontaneity as the
basis of a genuine control and direction by a person
over his own actions and destiny. As the Epicurean
Lucretius (first century B.C.) expressed it, we can act
freely because the atoms of which the mind is com-
posed can swerve minutely, transmitting their motion
to the body.
The first great Christian philosopher to grapple with
the problem of human freedom in the light of Christian
theology was Saint Augustine. Since Christianity im-
posed certain moral obligations on man, it appeared
to follow that man's will must be free. For if man's
will is under constraint, God cannot legitimately make
demands upon him and then punish him if the demands
are not satisfied. The fundamental obligation man is
under, according to Augustine, is the obligation to turn
to and love God. Hence, man's will is free to turn to
or turn away from God. The freedom of the will is
evident from the fact that man chooses one or the
other.
A will that freely turns from God lacks a certain
right order. The man himself, not God, is responsible
for this absence and God cannot, therefore, be blamed
for moral evil, i.e., for the lack in the man's will. But
Augustine also maintained that a will cannot have right
order without God's grace. A will is motivated by love;
hence a good will must be motivated by the love of
God. But it is God, through grace, that implants in
man the seeds of man's love of God. A creature without
grace will delight in the wrong objects. How free is
man's will, then, if man depends so completely on
God's grace?
Although it is not entirely clear how Augustine dealt
with this apparent conflict, he seems to have resolved
it in the following way. Since free will is the ability
to choose and since men do choose throughout their
lives, all men have free will regardless of their state
of grace. It is absurd to suggest that an act of will
may not be free if freedom is the ability to will. But
free will is not useful without grace. Once man is given
grace, he has the ability to use his free will to attain
union with God. Moreover, the fact that God knows
beforehand how man will choose does not negate the
freedom of will. To know what a man will do is not
to constrain him to do it. God knows how man will
freely choose.
good or evil, i.e., virtue or vice, the only vice is the
wrong attitude, i.e., judging that things really are evil.
Hence, resignation or subordination to nature is the
correct attitude. It is the attitude demanded by man's
reason, which is an emanation of Providence. But, of
course, man has it within his power to accept or reject
the dictates of his own reason. (This conception of
freedom is similar to a conception that appears in
determinists at several points in the history of philoso-
phy, viz., the idea that freedom is the recognition of
necessity, i.e., the acceptance of the world as it has
to be. See the discussion below of Spinoza.) This atti-
tude of acceptance requires the suppression of passion
and emotion, for these involve mistaken judgments
about things, e.g., that some object is intrinsically
desirable. This consequence of Stoic doctrine seems to
imply a contradiction, however, for a part of nature,
man's passionate nature, is being morally condemned.
Some Stoics, grappling with the inconsistencies and
other problems of their doctrine, attempted solutions.
In the third century B.C. Cleanthes, for example, argued
that foreordination by Providence does not imply that
an action not performed is not possible.
Epicurus had previously believed, however, that the
validation of man's sense of freedom requires an in-
deterministic world. He introduced into the doctrine
of atomism, which he accepted, the idea that atoms
spontaneously swerve and saw this spontaneity as the
basis of a genuine control and direction by a person
over his own actions and destiny. As the Epicurean
Lucretius (first century B.C.) expressed it, we can act
freely because the atoms of which the mind is com-
posed can swerve minutely, transmitting their motion
to the body.
The first great Christian philosopher to grapple with
the problem of human freedom in the light of Christian
theology was Saint Augustine. Since Christianity im-
posed certain moral obligations on man, it appeared
to follow that man's will must be free. For if man's
will is under constraint, God cannot legitimately make
demands upon him and then punish him if the demands
are not satisfied. The fundamental obligation man is
under, according to Augustine, is the obligation to turn
to and love God. Hence, man's will is free to turn to
or turn away from God. The freedom of the will is
evident from the fact that man chooses one or the
other.
A will that freely turns from God lacks a certain
right order. The man himself, not God, is responsible
for this absence and God cannot, therefore, be blamed
for moral evil, i.e., for the lack in the man's will. But
Augustine also maintained that a will cannot have right
order without God's grace. A will is motivated by love;
hence a good will must be motivated by the love of
God. But it is God, through grace, that implants in
man the seeds of man's love of God. A creature without
grace will delight in the wrong objects. How free is
man's will, then, if man depends so completely on
God's grace?
Although it is not entirely clear how Augustine dealt
with this apparent conflict, he seems to have resolved
it in the following way. Since free will is the ability
to choose and since men do choose throughout their
lives, all men have free will regardless of their state
of grace. It is absurd to suggest that an act of will
may not be free if freedom is the ability to will. But
free will is not useful without grace. Once man is given
grace, he has the ability to use his free will to attain
union with God. Moreover, the fact that God knows
beforehand how man will choose does not negate the
freedom of will. To know what a man will do is not
to constrain him to do it. God knows how man will
freely choose.
Saint Thomas Aquinas also accepted the reality of
free will. He believed, as did Augustine, that man's
ultimate happiness or fulfillment is found only in God.
If all men fully recognized this fact, they would choose
God because man's will necessarily chooses what it
conceives to be good or desirable. The will's being
under this necessity does not preclude its being free
for two reasons: (1) the necessity is not coercion since
no external agent imposes itself upon the will inde-
pendent of the will's inclinations. This distinction is
similar to a distinction that will become central to the
âreconciliationistâ approach to free will (the view that
there is no incompatibility between determinism and
free will) as presented in Hume. As we shall see, Hume
distinguishes coercion or compulsion from ordinary
causation which, he maintains, involves no objective
necessity. (2) Although a man must choose what he
deems to be good, his judgment that something is good
or bad is not necessitated. Hence the freedom of choice
is the freedom of judgment that guides the will.
A choice is free, therefore, if it is the product of
deliberation involving free judgments. An animal's
judgment is not free because it flows from a natural
instinct rather than rational deliberation. The factor
in rational deliberation that confers freedom upon the
resultant judgment is the lack of a necessary connection
between deliberation and judgment. Each potential act
may be viewed by the person under its good aspects
or under its bad aspects. Although the person must
choose the act he believes to be good, he is free to
confer this goodness on virtually any object because
he is free to view the object in different ways.
In the seventeenth century, the views of Benedict
Spinoza on freedom are strikingly similar, in tone and
content, to the ideas of the Stoics. Both accepted
determinism; but Spinoza, unlike the Stoics, was
unwavering in his application of determinism to the
psychological domain. The behavior and mental life
of human beings are completely determined and can-
not, therefore, be different from what they are. We
often think we are free or choose freely in a sense
implying the absence of causal determination; but this
belief is a consequence of our ignorance of the causes
that determined our action or choice. Because the term
âfree willâ was often used to explain behavior that was
believed to be immune to explanation by underlying
causes, Spinoza rejected this view of the concept.
Moreover, it is absurd to praise and blame people since
they are and do what they must be and do. We should
rather seek to understand the causes of their actions
and states of mind.
Like the Stoics, Spinoza felt that the wise man would
react to universal determinism in two ways: (1) he
would, of course, acquiesce; and (2) he would seek
knowledge of the causes of his own behavior in order
to understand his position in nature. The latter takes
on added significance in the light of Spinoza's meta-
physical system. He believed that âmindâ and âbodyâ
are not the names of distinct substances that jointly
comprise man, but are rather the names of two differ-
ent ways of conceiving the unitary man. Hence, every
bodily state can be conceived as a mental one, and
conversely. The ideas of an ignorant man will not be
connected logically because ignorance is the lack of
knowledge of causes, and causal knowledge, according
to Spinoza, is expressed in a deductive system where
ideas depend on one another logically. The bodily
aspect of ignorance is the predominance of passive
emotions, emotions like love and hate that reflect the
passive reaction to things that conduce to or detract
from pleasure or vitality. As a man's intelligence in-
creases and his ideas begin to succeed one another
logically, his emotions will become active, i.e., they
will be generated by mental activity itself. He will
pursue his own interests and seek the friendship of
others, guided by reason alone. He will be objective,
resolute, happy, and free of pettiness. This develop-
ment also represents an increase in perfection and
freedom. Spinoza speaks of freedom because, under
man's mental and physical aspects, man will be (rela-
tively) free of external influence, his states and activi-
ties resulting rather from his own causal activity. His
ideas will be the results of other ideas, and his emotions
free will. He believed, as did Augustine, that man's
ultimate happiness or fulfillment is found only in God.
If all men fully recognized this fact, they would choose
God because man's will necessarily chooses what it
conceives to be good or desirable. The will's being
under this necessity does not preclude its being free
for two reasons: (1) the necessity is not coercion since
no external agent imposes itself upon the will inde-
pendent of the will's inclinations. This distinction is
similar to a distinction that will become central to the
âreconciliationistâ approach to free will (the view that
there is no incompatibility between determinism and
free will) as presented in Hume. As we shall see, Hume
distinguishes coercion or compulsion from ordinary
causation which, he maintains, involves no objective
necessity. (2) Although a man must choose what he
deems to be good, his judgment that something is good
or bad is not necessitated. Hence the freedom of choice
is the freedom of judgment that guides the will.
A choice is free, therefore, if it is the product of
deliberation involving free judgments. An animal's
judgment is not free because it flows from a natural
instinct rather than rational deliberation. The factor
in rational deliberation that confers freedom upon the
resultant judgment is the lack of a necessary connection
between deliberation and judgment. Each potential act
may be viewed by the person under its good aspects
or under its bad aspects. Although the person must
choose the act he believes to be good, he is free to
confer this goodness on virtually any object because
he is free to view the object in different ways.
In the seventeenth century, the views of Benedict
Spinoza on freedom are strikingly similar, in tone and
content, to the ideas of the Stoics. Both accepted
determinism; but Spinoza, unlike the Stoics, was
unwavering in his application of determinism to the
psychological domain. The behavior and mental life
of human beings are completely determined and can-
not, therefore, be different from what they are. We
often think we are free or choose freely in a sense
implying the absence of causal determination; but this
belief is a consequence of our ignorance of the causes
that determined our action or choice. Because the term
âfree willâ was often used to explain behavior that was
believed to be immune to explanation by underlying
causes, Spinoza rejected this view of the concept.
Moreover, it is absurd to praise and blame people since
they are and do what they must be and do. We should
rather seek to understand the causes of their actions
and states of mind.
Like the Stoics, Spinoza felt that the wise man would
react to universal determinism in two ways: (1) he
would, of course, acquiesce; and (2) he would seek
knowledge of the causes of his own behavior in order
to understand his position in nature. The latter takes
on added significance in the light of Spinoza's meta-
physical system. He believed that âmindâ and âbodyâ
are not the names of distinct substances that jointly
comprise man, but are rather the names of two differ-
ent ways of conceiving the unitary man. Hence, every
bodily state can be conceived as a mental one, and
conversely. The ideas of an ignorant man will not be
connected logically because ignorance is the lack of
knowledge of causes, and causal knowledge, according
to Spinoza, is expressed in a deductive system where
ideas depend on one another logically. The bodily
aspect of ignorance is the predominance of passive
emotions, emotions like love and hate that reflect the
passive reaction to things that conduce to or detract
from pleasure or vitality. As a man's intelligence in-
creases and his ideas begin to succeed one another
logically, his emotions will become active, i.e., they
will be generated by mental activity itself. He will
pursue his own interests and seek the friendship of
others, guided by reason alone. He will be objective,
resolute, happy, and free of pettiness. This develop-
ment also represents an increase in perfection and
freedom. Spinoza speaks of freedom because, under
man's mental and physical aspects, man will be (rela-
tively) free of external influence, his states and activi-
ties resulting rather from his own causal activity. His
ideas will be the results of other ideas, and his emotions
and actions will be determined by his own mental
activity. In general terms, therefore, Spinoza conceived
of freedom as self-determinism, not indeterminism.
The views of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz on freedom
are also intimately bound up with his metaphysical
outlook. Like Spinoza, he rejected any conception of
freedom based on the assumption that a choice is
undetermined (philosophers often call this conception
of freedom the âliberty of indifferenceâ). Any choice
is determined by a combination of nonrational factors,
i.e., feelings, together with a rational appraisal whose
purpose is the selection of the act that appears to be
for the best. An act is free if the predominant compo-
nent in its determination is the man's reason or intelli-
gence. But, according to Leibniz' metaphysical system,
each individual person's life is the necessary unravel-
ling of his given nature. Thus, all acts are necessary,
including, therefore, free acts. Leibniz may be classified
as a âreconciliationistâ because he tried to reconcile
this metaphysical theory of necessity with his belief
in freedom. His task was more difficult than the analo-
gous task for reconciliationists like David Hume and
Moritz Schlick because the latter two denied the exist-
ence of objective necessity. In this regard, Leibniz
distinguished necessity from compulsion, the latter, of
course, being incompatible with freedom, and made
distinctions among different types of necessity (meta-
physical, moral, and physical).
John Locke defined freedom as the power a person
has to act in accordance with his will. Sense experience
does not provide man with a clear idea of any power.
So reflection, or the mind's experience of its own
activities, is the source of all knowledge of power,
including, of course, the knowledge of freedom. Free-
dom is the opposite of necessity; but Locke defines a
voluntary act as one that is preferred by the agent even
if the act is not free, i.e., even if the act is performed
necessarily. Will, like freedom, is defined as a power
of a person, to wit, the power to will or to perform
that act of preference or thought that sometimes gives
rise to the preferred act. Since freedom and will are
powers of persons, freedom cannot meaningfully be
predicated of the will; hence, there is no genuine
concept of free will.
Locke is forced to concede, however, that the con-
cern about free will is genuine because it is the concern
about the freedom to will rather than the freedom of
will. Locke initially denies this freedom on the ground
that a man must choose some alternative in a decision-
making situation. Realizing that the question does not
concern the freedom to make some choice, but rather
the freedom to make a specific choice, Locke examines
the status of the question, âIs he free to will A?â He
concludes that the question is absurd because the an-
swer is a tautology. A man cannot but have it in his
power to will what he in fact wills. Locke fails to see
that the concern here is not with whether or not a
man can will what he does will (since he does will
A, he can will A), but whether or not he can will what
he does not will. For if willing A is the only act of
will in his power, it looks as if the act is not free in
some important sense of âfree.â
Locke added a section on the determination of the
will to the second edition of his Essay Concerning
Human Understanding (1694). His psychology is
hedonisticâman's will is always determined by a state
of uneasiness and, given that he believes this state can
be removed, he will act accordingly, priorities being
determined by the relative urgencies of the uneasy
states. Into this mechanistic picture, Locke introduced
âfree-willâ as the power to prevent desire or uneasiness
from determining the will. But this turns out not to
be a concession to indeterminism, but rather to those
who identify freedom with rational action, e.g.,
Leibniz. For the interruption of the mechanical work-
ings of the will is due to a judgment formed as the
result of deliberation and consideration of alternative
courses of action. Thus, a man may foresee that an
act he would perform has an undesirable consequence
and this judgment, rather than the uneasiness that
would lead to the act, determines the will to refrain
from that act. In reply to the charge that a âfree-willâ
is incompatible with a determined will, even if reason
determines the will, Locke presents his case against
the advocates of the liberty of indifference, arguing
that freedom cannot be conceived as the irrelevance
of our judgments to our will. A conception of freedom
similar to Locke's âfree-willâ was also advanced by
René Descartes.
Although the view that determinism is true and
compatible with the existence of free will has been
held by a number of philosophers, contemporary
thinkers associate Hume's name, more than any other,
with this doctrine.
The belief that all physical events have causes such
that a given physical event must occur if the event
that always caused it in the past recurs is a belief that
has equal validity in the psychological sphere. We can
predict how any human being will behave if we have
a complete knowledge of his motives, circumstances,
background, etc. Since determinism is true even in
psychology, there is no liberty of indifference. But
Hume agreed with Locke that the existence of such
liberty would not be worthwhile anyway. A man who
had this sort of liberty would not be a genuinely re-
sponsible agent. It would be pointless, for example, to
activity. In general terms, therefore, Spinoza conceived
of freedom as self-determinism, not indeterminism.
The views of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz on freedom
are also intimately bound up with his metaphysical
outlook. Like Spinoza, he rejected any conception of
freedom based on the assumption that a choice is
undetermined (philosophers often call this conception
of freedom the âliberty of indifferenceâ). Any choice
is determined by a combination of nonrational factors,
i.e., feelings, together with a rational appraisal whose
purpose is the selection of the act that appears to be
for the best. An act is free if the predominant compo-
nent in its determination is the man's reason or intelli-
gence. But, according to Leibniz' metaphysical system,
each individual person's life is the necessary unravel-
ling of his given nature. Thus, all acts are necessary,
including, therefore, free acts. Leibniz may be classified
as a âreconciliationistâ because he tried to reconcile
this metaphysical theory of necessity with his belief
in freedom. His task was more difficult than the analo-
gous task for reconciliationists like David Hume and
Moritz Schlick because the latter two denied the exist-
ence of objective necessity. In this regard, Leibniz
distinguished necessity from compulsion, the latter, of
course, being incompatible with freedom, and made
distinctions among different types of necessity (meta-
physical, moral, and physical).
John Locke defined freedom as the power a person
has to act in accordance with his will. Sense experience
does not provide man with a clear idea of any power.
So reflection, or the mind's experience of its own
activities, is the source of all knowledge of power,
including, of course, the knowledge of freedom. Free-
dom is the opposite of necessity; but Locke defines a
voluntary act as one that is preferred by the agent even
if the act is not free, i.e., even if the act is performed
necessarily. Will, like freedom, is defined as a power
of a person, to wit, the power to will or to perform
that act of preference or thought that sometimes gives
rise to the preferred act. Since freedom and will are
powers of persons, freedom cannot meaningfully be
predicated of the will; hence, there is no genuine
concept of free will.
Locke is forced to concede, however, that the con-
cern about free will is genuine because it is the concern
about the freedom to will rather than the freedom of
will. Locke initially denies this freedom on the ground
that a man must choose some alternative in a decision-
making situation. Realizing that the question does not
concern the freedom to make some choice, but rather
the freedom to make a specific choice, Locke examines
the status of the question, âIs he free to will A?â He
concludes that the question is absurd because the an-
swer is a tautology. A man cannot but have it in his
power to will what he in fact wills. Locke fails to see
that the concern here is not with whether or not a
man can will what he does will (since he does will
A, he can will A), but whether or not he can will what
he does not will. For if willing A is the only act of
will in his power, it looks as if the act is not free in
some important sense of âfree.â
Locke added a section on the determination of the
will to the second edition of his Essay Concerning
Human Understanding (1694). His psychology is
hedonisticâman's will is always determined by a state
of uneasiness and, given that he believes this state can
be removed, he will act accordingly, priorities being
determined by the relative urgencies of the uneasy
states. Into this mechanistic picture, Locke introduced
âfree-willâ as the power to prevent desire or uneasiness
from determining the will. But this turns out not to
be a concession to indeterminism, but rather to those
who identify freedom with rational action, e.g.,
Leibniz. For the interruption of the mechanical work-
ings of the will is due to a judgment formed as the
result of deliberation and consideration of alternative
courses of action. Thus, a man may foresee that an
act he would perform has an undesirable consequence
and this judgment, rather than the uneasiness that
would lead to the act, determines the will to refrain
from that act. In reply to the charge that a âfree-willâ
is incompatible with a determined will, even if reason
determines the will, Locke presents his case against
the advocates of the liberty of indifference, arguing
that freedom cannot be conceived as the irrelevance
of our judgments to our will. A conception of freedom
similar to Locke's âfree-willâ was also advanced by
René Descartes.
Although the view that determinism is true and
compatible with the existence of free will has been
held by a number of philosophers, contemporary
thinkers associate Hume's name, more than any other,
with this doctrine.
The belief that all physical events have causes such
that a given physical event must occur if the event
that always caused it in the past recurs is a belief that
has equal validity in the psychological sphere. We can
predict how any human being will behave if we have
a complete knowledge of his motives, circumstances,
background, etc. Since determinism is true even in
psychology, there is no liberty of indifference. But
Hume agreed with Locke that the existence of such
liberty would not be worthwhile anyway. A man who
had this sort of liberty would not be a genuinely re-
sponsible agent. It would be pointless, for example, to