Quote from fhl:
no, they had models which were wrong
it is the millions of citizens who bought homes that can no longer pay their mortgages who completely ignored risk management
why is it that when a bank blows up everyone seems to think that they are idiots and rogues, but when a household blows up ( that is what you would call it when they can't pay their mortgage, isn't it?) they are a victim?
Before you let the bank's top mgt. off of the "idiot" hook because of their "models" - you may want to read ( or re-read ) the info re: the rating agencies.
1. the role the rating agencies played in continuing to rate this stuff AAA seeing how the loan approval environment was "radically changing" ( which means the models needed to be changed ) is critical. The street had tons of quants ( not MBAs - actually quantitative PhDs ) who should have known that once the environment changes, the model must change.
2. How could top mgt. not see the huge increase in subprime securitization and not ask "how is this happening?" Back to point one - realizing "no-doc" loans are playing a major part , is it "wise" to be levered 20 or 30 to 1 ?
3. Why can't some members of the bank's top mgt. AND certain members of the home buying bubble (like the flippers) both considered idiots?
This change in environment issue is potentially happening to us right now. Rumblings about changing the "uptick rule." If you have an automated model that assumes no uptick rule - you may have to change your model.