http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/20/business/20nocera.html
"That crisis, however, was very different from this one. Most of the assets in the S.& L. crisis were real estate â which are always going to have value. And the government didnât have to acquire them; it simply took them over and, over time, sold them. This time, the assets are complex derivatives of uncertain value that the big firms will actually be selling to the government.
But how is the government going to assess these securities â and what price will it pay for them? In many cases, these securities arenât being sold because they are still overvalued on a firmsâ books. That is, their mark-to-market price is unrealistically high. Will the government buy it at the too-high price? If it does, the firms wonât have to take additional write-downs â but it will constitute a huge, unjustified bailout of Wall Street. (More moral hazard.)"
"That crisis, however, was very different from this one. Most of the assets in the S.& L. crisis were real estate â which are always going to have value. And the government didnât have to acquire them; it simply took them over and, over time, sold them. This time, the assets are complex derivatives of uncertain value that the big firms will actually be selling to the government.
But how is the government going to assess these securities â and what price will it pay for them? In many cases, these securities arenât being sold because they are still overvalued on a firmsâ books. That is, their mark-to-market price is unrealistically high. Will the government buy it at the too-high price? If it does, the firms wonât have to take additional write-downs â but it will constitute a huge, unjustified bailout of Wall Street. (More moral hazard.)"