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March 25, 2008
SouthAmerica: It is interesting that other economists have started talking about this subject. Here is what I wrote about it on an article published in July 1999. (You can read the entire article in the beginning of this thread.)
âIt will not take twenty-five years this time around for this process to develop. This will occur at a very fast pace. It would be a smart move for Brazil to apply for membership in the European Union and to adopt the euro immediately as the new currency in Brazil. Today, countries around the world have official reserves as follows:
Percentage share by currency:
U.S. Dollar = 60 percent of market
Euro Group = 20 percent of market
Yen = 6 percent of market
Other = 14 percent of market
Most people should not be surprised if in ten years the breakdown of official reserves of the countries around the world will be as follows:
U.S. Dollar = 35 percent of market
Euro Group = 35 percent of market
New Asian Group = 25 percent of market
Other = 5 percent of market
**
My prediction will not come to past by July of 2009, but I have a very good chance that it will come through by 2014.
I expect that by that time the New Asian currency is being traded, and the Pound Sterling is finally part of the euro.
Brazil should adopt the New Asian Currency when that currency becomes reality.
The euro it will reach very easily the 35 percent market share (today the euro already account for 25 percent share, plus British Pound accounts to about 5 percent share).
The big shift in foreign currency reserves it will be a decline of the US dollar and a similar gain in the foreign currency reserves of the New Asian currency.
Brazil should adopt the New Asian Currency when that currency becomes reality.
*****
âThis crisis could bring the euro centre-stageâ
By Wolfgang Münchau
Published: March 24 2008
Financial Times - UK
We know the credit crisis is a clear and present threat to the global economy. But its most important long-run legacy may not be economic, but geopolitical.
I was reminded of that possibility when reading a recent analysis by Professors Menzie Chinn at the University of Wisconsin and Jeffrey Frankel of Harvard*. They ran a simulation showing that the euro would replace the dollar as the world's largest reserve currency within the next 10 or 15 years. Their analysis is not based on this crisis. But the crisis could easily accelerate the trends they have identified.
Do not dismiss this research as some anti-dollar propaganda. Professors Chinn and Frankel started with the opposite notion - that the euro would not overtake the dollar for a long time. After all, the world does not change reserve currencies very often.
Sterling held pole position until the second world war, but lost it because of the UK's imperial overreach. The US economy had already overtaken that of the UK in the 1870s. One of the factors that delayed the dollar's rise was lack of a sophisticated financial sector, which did not develop until the establishment of the Federal Reserve System in 1913. Global reserve currency status is due to many factors such as the size of the economy, the country's share in international trade and the depth of the financial markets. Inertia is another. If yours is a global reserve currency today, it is likely to be one tomorrow too. But this works only up to a point - a tipping point.
Professors Chinn and Frankel state two underlying reasons for the decline in the international role of the US dollar. The first is persistent current account deficits combined with a long-term decline in the dollar's exchange rate - and perhaps imperial overreach, too.
The second is the emergence of a genuine alternative to the dollar. Neither the yen nor the D-Mark had a realistic chance of replacing the greenback. But the euro is a real alternative. The eurozone economy is almost as large as that of the US and may surpass it as it continues to enlarge. London is the eurozone's de facto financial centre, even though the UK itself has not adopted the euro. Also, the eurozone bond markets are now almost as deep and liquid as their US counterparts.
The projected speed at which the dollar will lose its predominant position as a global reserve currency obviously depends on your assumptions. The work of Professors Chinn and Frankel shows that this could happen shockingly fast. Some of those trends are accelerating right this minute. The reckless monetary policy of the Federal Reserve has speeded up the dollar's decline and caused a rise in inflationary expectations. I would expect US inflation to pick up significantly once the present recession ends. Future inflation will weigh heavily on the global role of the US dollar.
An immediate consequence of high inflation is that many developing countries will find it harder to maintain their dollar pegs. They may be reluctant to drop them now but there will come a point when the rise in inflationary pressures becomes unbearable. If and when they drop their pegs, they will almost certainly rebalance their reserve portfolios as well.
Another factor that pushes in the same direction is the weakening of the US financial sector. This has been a crisis of Anglo-Saxon transaction-based capitalism. Not too long ago, it was considered to be vastly superior to the eurozone's old-fashioned relationship finance. I doubt that in a few years' time people will continue to assess the relative strengths of the Anglo-Saxon and continental European financial systems in quite the same way. I would also expect the eurozone economy to withstand the economic shocks of the credit crisis in relatively better shape.
Inertia means that the euro will not overtake the dollar any time soon. At present the euro only accounts for a little over a quarter of world reserves, against the dollar's share of two-thirds.
But to keep the euro down forever, you would need to rely on some rather far-fetched conspiracy theories. One such theory says that foreign central banks collude to hang on to dollars to protect the value of their holdings. It does not work that way. The network externalities that have favoured the dollar in the past could just as easily favour the euro in the future.
The potential geopolitical implications of such a projected shift are immense. For a start, the US will lose its exorbitant privilege - the ability to achieve permanently higher returns on foreign assets than the returns paid to foreigners who invest in the US. The dollar will suddenly cease to be "our currency, and your problem". Influence in international financial institutions will wane. Losing the dollar as the world's leading international currency not only leads to a loss of political power. It constitutes loss of power.
There is little politicians can do to prevent such a seismic shift. I suspect the US political establishment is not yet aware of what is going to hit it. Then again, the same can be said of European political leaders, who have not given us any hint yet that they are ready to deal with the responsibilities that come with running the world's leading currency.
Source: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/092dc918-f942-11dc-bcf3-000077b07658.html?nclick_check=1
.
March 25, 2008
SouthAmerica: It is interesting that other economists have started talking about this subject. Here is what I wrote about it on an article published in July 1999. (You can read the entire article in the beginning of this thread.)
âIt will not take twenty-five years this time around for this process to develop. This will occur at a very fast pace. It would be a smart move for Brazil to apply for membership in the European Union and to adopt the euro immediately as the new currency in Brazil. Today, countries around the world have official reserves as follows:
Percentage share by currency:
U.S. Dollar = 60 percent of market
Euro Group = 20 percent of market
Yen = 6 percent of market
Other = 14 percent of market
Most people should not be surprised if in ten years the breakdown of official reserves of the countries around the world will be as follows:
U.S. Dollar = 35 percent of market
Euro Group = 35 percent of market
New Asian Group = 25 percent of market
Other = 5 percent of market
**
My prediction will not come to past by July of 2009, but I have a very good chance that it will come through by 2014.
I expect that by that time the New Asian currency is being traded, and the Pound Sterling is finally part of the euro.
Brazil should adopt the New Asian Currency when that currency becomes reality.
The euro it will reach very easily the 35 percent market share (today the euro already account for 25 percent share, plus British Pound accounts to about 5 percent share).
The big shift in foreign currency reserves it will be a decline of the US dollar and a similar gain in the foreign currency reserves of the New Asian currency.
Brazil should adopt the New Asian Currency when that currency becomes reality.
*****
âThis crisis could bring the euro centre-stageâ
By Wolfgang Münchau
Published: March 24 2008
Financial Times - UK
We know the credit crisis is a clear and present threat to the global economy. But its most important long-run legacy may not be economic, but geopolitical.
I was reminded of that possibility when reading a recent analysis by Professors Menzie Chinn at the University of Wisconsin and Jeffrey Frankel of Harvard*. They ran a simulation showing that the euro would replace the dollar as the world's largest reserve currency within the next 10 or 15 years. Their analysis is not based on this crisis. But the crisis could easily accelerate the trends they have identified.
Do not dismiss this research as some anti-dollar propaganda. Professors Chinn and Frankel started with the opposite notion - that the euro would not overtake the dollar for a long time. After all, the world does not change reserve currencies very often.
Sterling held pole position until the second world war, but lost it because of the UK's imperial overreach. The US economy had already overtaken that of the UK in the 1870s. One of the factors that delayed the dollar's rise was lack of a sophisticated financial sector, which did not develop until the establishment of the Federal Reserve System in 1913. Global reserve currency status is due to many factors such as the size of the economy, the country's share in international trade and the depth of the financial markets. Inertia is another. If yours is a global reserve currency today, it is likely to be one tomorrow too. But this works only up to a point - a tipping point.
Professors Chinn and Frankel state two underlying reasons for the decline in the international role of the US dollar. The first is persistent current account deficits combined with a long-term decline in the dollar's exchange rate - and perhaps imperial overreach, too.
The second is the emergence of a genuine alternative to the dollar. Neither the yen nor the D-Mark had a realistic chance of replacing the greenback. But the euro is a real alternative. The eurozone economy is almost as large as that of the US and may surpass it as it continues to enlarge. London is the eurozone's de facto financial centre, even though the UK itself has not adopted the euro. Also, the eurozone bond markets are now almost as deep and liquid as their US counterparts.
The projected speed at which the dollar will lose its predominant position as a global reserve currency obviously depends on your assumptions. The work of Professors Chinn and Frankel shows that this could happen shockingly fast. Some of those trends are accelerating right this minute. The reckless monetary policy of the Federal Reserve has speeded up the dollar's decline and caused a rise in inflationary expectations. I would expect US inflation to pick up significantly once the present recession ends. Future inflation will weigh heavily on the global role of the US dollar.
An immediate consequence of high inflation is that many developing countries will find it harder to maintain their dollar pegs. They may be reluctant to drop them now but there will come a point when the rise in inflationary pressures becomes unbearable. If and when they drop their pegs, they will almost certainly rebalance their reserve portfolios as well.
Another factor that pushes in the same direction is the weakening of the US financial sector. This has been a crisis of Anglo-Saxon transaction-based capitalism. Not too long ago, it was considered to be vastly superior to the eurozone's old-fashioned relationship finance. I doubt that in a few years' time people will continue to assess the relative strengths of the Anglo-Saxon and continental European financial systems in quite the same way. I would also expect the eurozone economy to withstand the economic shocks of the credit crisis in relatively better shape.
Inertia means that the euro will not overtake the dollar any time soon. At present the euro only accounts for a little over a quarter of world reserves, against the dollar's share of two-thirds.
But to keep the euro down forever, you would need to rely on some rather far-fetched conspiracy theories. One such theory says that foreign central banks collude to hang on to dollars to protect the value of their holdings. It does not work that way. The network externalities that have favoured the dollar in the past could just as easily favour the euro in the future.
The potential geopolitical implications of such a projected shift are immense. For a start, the US will lose its exorbitant privilege - the ability to achieve permanently higher returns on foreign assets than the returns paid to foreigners who invest in the US. The dollar will suddenly cease to be "our currency, and your problem". Influence in international financial institutions will wane. Losing the dollar as the world's leading international currency not only leads to a loss of political power. It constitutes loss of power.
There is little politicians can do to prevent such a seismic shift. I suspect the US political establishment is not yet aware of what is going to hit it. Then again, the same can be said of European political leaders, who have not given us any hint yet that they are ready to deal with the responsibilities that come with running the world's leading currency.
Source: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/092dc918-f942-11dc-bcf3-000077b07658.html?nclick_check=1
.