with regard to the large-scale human experimentation charge,
motivated by the necessity in a time of war, of maintaining a strong & lasting strategic advantage over the Soviets viz the use and development of any effective countermeasures to the use of nuclear weapons / radiation poisoning:
. as you would be aware, there is a context, in terms of the status of our knowledge of radiation effects, pre-1945 and post-1945. this is not the place nor the right medium to 'build' that case, the ICC will, one day or the other, provide that forum, but just a few elements of context fyi:
http://www.eh.doe.gov/ohre/roadmap/achre/report.html Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments, Final Report. i particularly RECOMMEND a quick read of
http://www.eh.doe.gov/ohre/roadmap/achre/chap5.html chap 2: The Manhattan District Experiments in 1945 in the months leading up to Hiroshima
http://www.eh.doe.gov/ohre/roadmap/histories/0457/0457toc.html John Gofman's accounts, also in Nuclear Witnesses compiled by Leslie Freeman
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpa...8F932A05752C0A964948260&sec=&pagewanted=print along with other witnesses' key accounts
(and much more here fyi
http://www.doh.wa.gov/hanford/publications/other/selbib.html#VC5b1 on Hanford notably
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hanford_Site http://www.mbe.doe.gov/me70/manhattan/come_through.htm)
. as regards the relationship with the Soviets at this very point in time:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trinity_site#Test_results
http://www.milnet.com/nukeweap/hiroshima/hiroshima.htm
Thus the rationale for using the weapon was clearly decided before Potsdam and based upon the intelligence figures prior to the nearly 500,000 Japanese troop figure. The new intelligence received while at Potsdam only served to stiffen Truman's resolve. The advisors and Truman's stated rationale was:
"...in the hope of (1) avoiding the need for an invasion with resulting casualties that by any standard would be of intimidating proportions,
(2) minimizing the USSR's postwar leverage, and (3) not having to confront debate over concessions on the terms of unconditional surrender--was the driving force in the minds of the US leadership team before Potsdam, and before the acquisition of intelligence showing much-larger-than- expected Japanese forces on Kyushu."
The fact that Truman was looking ahead at postwar dealings with the Soviet Union was an intelligent and rational piece of reasoning, one that a wartime President should have made regardless of the type of weapon being used. And while there was no evidence that the Germans had given the Japanese enough information for their own nuclear program, it is clear that their desire for the newest and best weapons could put them on the track to nuclear weapons. A decade later, the ease in which U.S. security was breached by the Soviet Union made it clear the nuclear secrets would not remain secrets for long. Truman's choices were few and he clearly chose the quickest route to ending the war on basis of balancing U.S. and Japanese lives as well as the unknown conditions the next six to twelve months would bring.
that would form the basis, at a high level... i have little doubt that a non-American INDEPENDENT jury would find against the US in this instance, ie that the use of a second nuclear ordnance over Nagasaki, in full cognizance of the extraordinary lethal and poisonous after-effects to be expected over unknown number of civilians, only 3 days after Hiroshima, was RECKLESS at a minimum, and as amply documented by great Americans themselves, couldn't in the circumstances be expected to achieve any worthwhile military objective... and even less so where Hiroshima had failed...
but as i said above, the evidence implies that 'higher' worthwhile strategic objectives were indeed met, thanks to this unique plutonium experiment, complementing the unique Hiroshima uranium experiment...
see you at the ICC, or as i said in another thread
http://www.elitetrader.com/vb/showthread.php?s=&postid=1184719&highlight=buyin#post1184719