Recommend reading these three documents, KEEPING IN MIND THAT WE HAVE HINDSIGHT NOT AVAILABLE TO THE PARTICIPANTS AT THE TIME:
1) The SEC's complaint:
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2010/comp21489.pdf
2) Goldman's comments on it:
http://www2.goldmansachs.com/our-firm/press/press-releases/current/sec-response.html
3) The ABACUS 2007-AC1 Flipbook (attached).
A few quick points:
-- Paulson nailed this (para 25 of SEC complaint). But at the time, he wasn't regarded as the genius he is now. His views were no secret on the street and some even thought he was a kook. Still, the SEC complaint keeps referencing Goldman's lack of disclosure as if Paulson was God Almighty who could see the future and Goldman somehow knew it... even though Goldman lost $75 million on the deal ($90M minus their $15M fee).
-- At the time, ACA had huge experience and a perfect track record: "No rated notes in any of ACAâs CDOs have ever been downgraded" (slide 27 in flipbook). But in hindsight we see they had lousy due diligence and had been shooting themselves in the foot before this deal came along. For example, they'd previously bought 62 of the 123 RMBS on Paulsonâs list (para 27 of SEC complaint). Also see para 65 of the SEC complaint.
-- Now look at Goldman's disclaimer and risk factor warnings in the flipbook (slides 2 - 9), and their "conflicts of interest" warnings (slide 8) through two different lenses... hindsight and no hindsight.
-- I find it interesting that Paulson wouldn't bet against Wells Fargo's subprimes (para 34 of SEC complaint). What a coincidence that Berkshire held over 200 million shares of WFC back then. Not saying that Paulson didn't do his own due diligence... my point is that on one side we had intersecting market opinions of Warren Buffett and John Paulson and on the other side we had ACA, a company whose CEO had worked at Ambac and whose CFO had worked at MBIA (slide 25 in flipbook).