Susannah
DeFazio's letter seems directly derived from this article:
http://www.taxhistory.org/thp/readings.nsf/ArtWeb/6062A8E3B6C9C7C585257480005BFEE6?OpenDocument
It's probably the points of that article we need to be combating, since I'm sure
he read that.
Here's where the $150 billion figure seems to come from (haven't read all the way
through this, it was link to in the article I posted above):
http://www.peri.umass.edu/fileadmin/pdf/working_papers/working_papers_1-50/WP20.pdf
I have scanned parts of the second paper. It does appear that the proposals for a
transaction tax that are currently floating around may have originated in part from
this paper. They use the acronym âSTETâ for âSecurity Transaction Excise Tax.â I do
not agree with the authors, but it might be best for all here to know what we are up
against. Here is some of what they say:
âGeneral arguments in behalf of STETs have been made before, initially by
Keynes in the General Theory [1936], and recently by, among others, Summers and
Summers [1989] and Stiglitz [1989].â
âOnce design problems are solved, we are then able to show that, for the U.S. case,
the revenue potential of a STET is formidable --on the order of $70 - 100 billion a
year, or about five percent of total federal government outlays--even if one allows
for declines in trading volume up to an implausible 50 percent of existing levels.
Of course, assuming the STET is designed well, such substantial increases in
government revenue will be accompanied by a decline in short-term speculative trading,
and thus an increase in the government's ability to handle macroeconomic problems
resulting from unstable financial markets.â
âAs a first principle, then, the case for a STET must flow out of a critique of the
efficient markets perspective. Critics of course still recognize the social benefits
of being able to easily trade in markets for existing assets. At the same time,
enhancing the liquidity of assets also creates problems for the functioning of the
economy. Fundamentally, these problems flow from the fact that highly liquid
financial markets promote speculative trading practices that distort pricing,
resource allocation and investment, creating imbalances between financial and real
activity, and thereby contributing to macroeconomic instability. As such, excessive
speculative financial trading is a form of unproductive activity in precisely the
sense of Bhagwatiâs [1982] notion of âdirectly unproductive profit seeking,â by which
he means activities that may be privately profitable but do not directly increase the
flow of goods and services.â
â... no statistical evidence at all exists to support the claim that countries will
enjoy faster economic growth through operating more liquid stock markets.â
âOverall then, according to these critical perspectives, thick but unregulated
financial markets operate inefficiently and irrationally.â
â... over the course of a business cycle, volatility is affected by three partially
independent influences: the underlying behavior of the nonfinancial economy; the herd
behavior of financial market participants; and the attempt to dig out of financial
crises once they have already occurred. The first two sources of volatility should
be moderated through a decline in the liquidity of financial markets, and thus by a
STET. However, the third source of volatility would be exacerbated by a decline in
market liquidity. This is because more liquidity in the short-term is precisely what
financial market participants need to prevent an interactive debt deflation. Thus,
in the midst of a crisis situation, the policy intervention needed is lender-of-last-
resort intervention, not a STET.â
âAt the same time, the ability of lender-of-last-resort interventions to neutralize
speculative financial herds is greater when the size of the herd is smaller. ⦠Thus,
when a currency market crisis breaks out, the fact that a STET has reduced the
market's liquidity may not directly reduce volatility. But it will have contributed
toward stabilizing the market if, over a longer time-framework, it reduced the size
of the market and thus enabled the market-maker to exert greater influence during a
crisis.â
âThe tax should apply to all trades and transfers. This would include trades by
specialty brokers and market makers.â
âTo maintain the principle of broadest possible applicability, we propose that the
U.S. STET apply to all traders in U.S. financial markets of both domestic and foreign
residents. ⦠Further, the tax would apply equally to foreign transactions of U.S.
nationals and corporations, ⦠Finally, the U.S. STET would apply to trades of U.S.
securities by foreigners in non U.S. markets. Even though such trades take place
outside U.S. jurisdiction, holding a legal claim on the asset and income stream
generated by it would still require legal endorsement within the U.S.â
âWe begin with a benchmark that the two-sided tax rate on trading equities will be
0.5 percent, so that each party to the trade pays 0.25 percent. ⦠The 0.5 percent
rate on equities then becomes our benchmark for establishing rates in other markets
in a way that minimizes distortions. Our proposal is to scale the two-sided tax rate
on other financial instruments as follows:
Bonds--0.01 percent per each year until bond's maturity
Futures--0.02 percent of the notional value of underlying asset
Options--0.5 percent of the premium paid for the option
Interest Rate Swaps--0.02 percent per each year until maturity of swap agreement.â
âOur proposed STET would tax all government debt--federal, state, municipal and
other--at a rate identical to that of private debt.â
âWorking from this Japanese model, we propose to operate from an initial rate of
0.002 percent of notional value.â [on futures transactions]
âTable 5 ⦠shows a range of estimates of transaction costs in 11 different futures
markets. ⦠the mean low figure, a one-way cost of 0.0184 [percent] of notional
value, is more than three times smaller than the mean one-way high of 0.0589
[percent]. ⦠But for our purposes, the main finding is that our proposed two-way tax
rate of 0.02 percent of notional value is well inside the existing transaction cost
structure of the futures market. Our proposed tax rate would amount to roughly
5 percent of the mean one-way low estimate for these 11 markets, and 1.5 percent of
the mean one-way high estimate.â
It is not clear what tax rate the authors are proposing for futures. They say 0.02%
of notional value, then they say 0.002%, then they say 0.02% again in a context where
it appears they mean 0.002% (since 5% of 0.0184 is approximately 0.001, and 1.5% of
0.0589 is approximately 0.001). I think they meant 0.002%. At todayâs close for the
December ES contract, which was 1168.50, the notional value would be $58425. At a
0.002% rate, the round-turn tax would be $1.1685.