If I told you that I've got a guy who is going to manage your hedge fund and there's two ways we can compensate him. Method one he only makes money if you make money and the more money he makes you the more money he makes and if he doesn't make you any money he gets nothing. The other method he gets paid the same no matter how much money he makes for you. After reading "Skin in the Game" (and before reading my post) pretty much everyone would say the first model is the epitome of "skin in the game". Only it turns out in some cases it doesn't actually produce the "skin in the game" benefits, there are big unintended consequences that Taleb ignores. Even if you required the hedge fund manager to tie the majority of their net worth into the fund, as @
Frederick Foresight suggested and as many funds have done, you still don't avoid the moral hazard because pursuing a high variance strategy when you're under water is still optimal given that most fund managers are never more than a tiny percentage of AUM. And prospect theory is a real thing, it's hardwired into the human psyche to be risk seeking in losses and a difficult thing to fight even when you're fully aware of it, let alone when you're ignorant and have perverse incentives pushing you in that direction.