Quote from asiaprop:
a lot of evidence points to the fact that lax lending and credit policies SET BY THE GOVERNMENT AND FEDERAL RESERVE bank lead to last year's disaster.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Look here at this asiaprop,
⢠Until very recently, the origination of mortgages and issuance of mortgage-backed
securities (MBS) was dominated by loans to prime borrowers conforming to underwriting
standards set by the Government Sponsored Agencies (GSEs) [2]
− By 2006, non-agency origination of $1.480 trillion was more than 45% larger than
agency origination, and non-agency issuance of $1.033 trillion was 14% larger than
agency issuance of $905 billion.
⢠The securitization process is subject to
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
asiaprop, it was not government policy that made the subprime loan, but the biggest loan came from (NON-AGENCY ORIGINATION)
1
1. Introduction
How does one securitize a pool of mortgages, especially subprime mortgages? What is the
process from origination of the loan or mortgage to the selling of debt instruments backed by a
pool of those mortgages? What problems creep up in this process, and what are the
mechanisms in place to mitigate those problems? This paper seeks to answer all of these
questions. Along the way we provide an overview of the market and some of the key players,
and provide an extensive discussion of the important role played by the credit rating agencies.
In Section 2, we provide a broad description of the securitization process and pay special
attention to seven key frictions that need to be resolved. Several of these frictions involve
moral hazard, adverse selection and principal-agent problems. We show how each of these
frictions is worked out, though as evidenced by the recent problems in the subprime mortgage
market, some of those solutions are imperfect. In Section 3, we provide an overview of
subprime mortgage credit; our focus here is on the subprime borrower and the subprime loan.
We offer, as an example a pool of subprime mortgages New Century securitized in June 2006.
We discuss how predatory lending and predatory borrowing (i.e. mortgage fraud) fit into the
picture. Moreover, we examine subprime loan performance within this pool and the industry,
speculate on the impact of payment reset, and explore the ABX and the role it plays. In Section
4, we examine subprime mortgage-backed securities, discuss the key structural features of a
typical securitization, and, once again illustrate how this works with reference to the New
Century securitization. We finish with an examination of the credit rating and rating
monitoring process in Section 5. Along the way we reflect on differences between corporate
and structured credit ratings, the potential for pro-cyclical credit enhancement to amplify the
housing cycle, and document the performance of subprime ratings. Finally, in Section 6, we
review the extent to which investors rely upon on credit rating agencies views, and take as a
typical example of an investor: the Ohio Police & Fire Pension Fund.
We reiterate that the views presented here are our own and not those of the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System. And, while the paper focuses on subprime
mortgage credit, note that there is little qualitative difference between the securitization and
ratings process for Alt-A and home equity loans. Clearly, recent problems in mortgage markets
are not confined to the subprime sector.
2
2. Overview of subprime mortgage credit securitization
Until very recently, the origination of mortgages and issuance of mortgage-backed securities
(MBS) was dominated by loans to prime borrowers conforming to underwriting standards set
by the Government Sponsored Agencies (GSEs). Outside of conforming loans are non-agency
asset classes that include Jumbo, Alt-A, and Subprime. Loosely speaking, the Jumbo asset
class includes loans to prime borrowers with an original principal balance larger than the
conforming limits imposed on the agencies by Congress;2 the Alt-A asset class involves loans
to borrowers with good credit but include more aggressive underwriting than the conforming or
Jumbo classes (i.e. no documentation of income, high leverage); and the Subprime asset class
involves loans to borrowers with poor credit history.
Table 1 documents origination and issuance since 2001 in each of four asset classes. In 2001,
banks originated $1.433 trillion in conforming mortgage loans and issued $1.087 trillion in
mortgage-backed securities secured by those mortgages, shown in the âAgencyâ columns of
Table 1. In contrast, the non-agency sector originated $680 billion ($190 billion subprime +
$60 billion Alt-A + $430 billion jumbo) and issued $240 billion ($87.1 billion subprime +
$11.4 Alt-A + $142.2 billion jumbo), and most of these were in the Jumbo sector. The Alt-A
and Subprime sectors were relatively small, together comprising $250 billion of $2.1 trillion
(12 percent) in total origination during 2001.
Table 1: Origination and Issue of Non-Agency Mortgage Loans
Year Origination Issuance Ratio Origination Issuance Ratio Origination Issuance Ratio Origination Issuance Ratio
2001 $ 1 90.00 $ 87.10 46% $ 60.00 $ 11.40 19% $ 4 30.00 $ 142.20 33% $ 1,433.00 $ 1,087.60 76%
2002 $ 2 31.00 $ 122.70 53% $ 68.00 $ 53.50 79% $ 5 76.00 $ 171.50 30% $ 1,898.00 $ 1,442.60 76%
2003 $ 3 35.00 $ 195.00 58% $ 85.00 $ 74.10 87% $ 6 55.00 $ 237.50 36% $ 2,690.00 $ 2,130.90 79%
2004 $ 5 40.00 $ 362.63 67% $ 2 00.00 $ 158.60 79% $ 5 15.00 $ 233.40 45% $ 1,345.00 $ 1,018.60 76%
2005 $ 6 25.00 $ 465.00 74% $ 3 80.00 $ 332.30 87% $ 5 70.00 $ 280.70 49% $ 1,180.00 $ 9 64.80 82%
2006 $ 6 00.00 $ 448.60 75% $ 4 00.00 $ 365.70 91% $ 4 80.00 $ 219.00 46% $ 1,040.00 $ 9 04.60 87%
Sub-prime Alt-A Jumbo Agency
Source: Inside Mortgage Finance (2007).
Notes: Jumbo origination includes non-agency prime. Agency origination includes conventional/conforming and FHA/VA loans. Agency
issuance GNMA, FHLMC, and FNMA. Figures are in billions of USD.
A reduction in long-term interest rates through the end of 2003 was associated with a sharp
increase in origination and issuance across all asset classes. While the conforming markets
peaked in 2003, the non-agency markets continued rapid growth through 2005, eventually
eclipsing activity in the conforming market. In 2006, non-agency production of $1.480 trillion
was more than 45 percent larger than agency production, and non-agency issuance of $1.033
trillion was larger than agency issuance of $905 billion.
Interestingly, the increase in Subprime and Alt-A origination was associated with a significant
increase in the ratio of issuance to origination, which is a reasonable proxy for the fraction of
loans sold. In particular, the ratio of subprime MBS issuance to subprime mortgage origination
was close to 75 percent in both 2005 and 2006. While there is typically a one-quarter lag
between origination and issuance, the data document that a large and increasing fraction of both
subprime and Alt-A loans are sold to investors, and very little is retained on the balance sheets
of the institutions who originate them.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
asiaprop, I am asking, "What is non-conforming agency?" That is (PRIVATE) dealer/broker who have NO regulation by government.
But I agree when you say Federal reserve low interest policy is to blame too.
Quote from risk1:
YARET? (Yet another raucous ET thread)
Just a point of view.
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6e2dfb82-c018-11de-aed2-00144feab49a.html
Excerpt:
And I think that right now, banks are actually getting hidden subsidies of very enormous amount because of their ability to borrow at effectively zero and buy 10-year government bonds at 3.5 per cent. So those earnings are not the achievement of risk takers. These are gifts, hidden gifts, from the government, so I donât think that those monies, for instance, should be used to pay bonuses. And so thereâs a resentment which I think is justified.
Quote from trendlover:
Quote from asiaprop:
a lot of evidence points to the fact that lax lending and credit policies SET BY THE GOVERNMENT AND FEDERAL RESERVE bank lead to last year's disaster.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Look here at this asiaprop,
⢠Until very recently, the origination of mortgages and issuance of mortgage-backed
securities (MBS) was dominated by loans to prime borrowers conforming to underwriting
standards set by the Government Sponsored Agencies (GSEs) [2]
− By 2006, non-agency origination of $1.480 trillion was more than 45% larger than
agency origination, and non-agency issuance of $1.033 trillion was 14% larger than
agency issuance of $905 billion.
⢠The securitization process is subject to
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
asiaprop, it was not government policy that made the subprime loan, but the biggest loan came from (NON-AGENCY ORIGINATION)
1
1. Introduction
How does one securitize a pool of mortgages, especially subprime mortgages? What is the
process from origination of the loan or mortgage to the selling of debt instruments backed by a
pool of those mortgages? What problems creep up in this process, and what are the
mechanisms in place to mitigate those problems? This paper seeks to answer all of these
questions. Along the way we provide an overview of the market and some of the key players,
and provide an extensive discussion of the important role played by the credit rating agencies.
In Section 2, we provide a broad description of the securitization process and pay special
attention to seven key frictions that need to be resolved. Several of these frictions involve
moral hazard, adverse selection and principal-agent problems. We show how each of these
frictions is worked out, though as evidenced by the recent problems in the subprime mortgage
market, some of those solutions are imperfect. In Section 3, we provide an overview of
subprime mortgage credit; our focus here is on the subprime borrower and the subprime loan.
We offer, as an example a pool of subprime mortgages New Century securitized in June 2006.
We discuss how predatory lending and predatory borrowing (i.e. mortgage fraud) fit into the
picture. Moreover, we examine subprime loan performance within this pool and the industry,
speculate on the impact of payment reset, and explore the ABX and the role it plays. In Section
4, we examine subprime mortgage-backed securities, discuss the key structural features of a
typical securitization, and, once again illustrate how this works with reference to the New
Century securitization. We finish with an examination of the credit rating and rating
monitoring process in Section 5. Along the way we reflect on differences between corporate
and structured credit ratings, the potential for pro-cyclical credit enhancement to amplify the
housing cycle, and document the performance of subprime ratings. Finally, in Section 6, we
review the extent to which investors rely upon on credit rating agencies views, and take as a
typical example of an investor: the Ohio Police & Fire Pension Fund.
We reiterate that the views presented here are our own and not those of the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System. And, while the paper focuses on subprime
mortgage credit, note that there is little qualitative difference between the securitization and
ratings process for Alt-A and home equity loans. Clearly, recent problems in mortgage markets
are not confined to the subprime sector.
2
2. Overview of subprime mortgage credit securitization
Until very recently, the origination of mortgages and issuance of mortgage-backed securities
(MBS) was dominated by loans to prime borrowers conforming to underwriting standards set
by the Government Sponsored Agencies (GSEs). Outside of conforming loans are non-agency
asset classes that include Jumbo, Alt-A, and Subprime. Loosely speaking, the Jumbo asset
class includes loans to prime borrowers with an original principal balance larger than the
conforming limits imposed on the agencies by Congress;2 the Alt-A asset class involves loans
to borrowers with good credit but include more aggressive underwriting than the conforming or
Jumbo classes (i.e. no documentation of income, high leverage); and the Subprime asset class
involves loans to borrowers with poor credit history.
Table 1 documents origination and issuance since 2001 in each of four asset classes. In 2001,
banks originated $1.433 trillion in conforming mortgage loans and issued $1.087 trillion in
mortgage-backed securities secured by those mortgages, shown in the âAgencyâ columns of
Table 1. In contrast, the non-agency sector originated $680 billion ($190 billion subprime +
$60 billion Alt-A + $430 billion jumbo) and issued $240 billion ($87.1 billion subprime +
$11.4 Alt-A + $142.2 billion jumbo), and most of these were in the Jumbo sector. The Alt-A
and Subprime sectors were relatively small, together comprising $250 billion of $2.1 trillion
(12 percent) in total origination during 2001.
Table 1: Origination and Issue of Non-Agency Mortgage Loans
Year Origination Issuance Ratio Origination Issuance Ratio Origination Issuance Ratio Origination Issuance Ratio
2001 $ 1 90.00 $ 87.10 46% $ 60.00 $ 11.40 19% $ 4 30.00 $ 142.20 33% $ 1,433.00 $ 1,087.60 76%
2002 $ 2 31.00 $ 122.70 53% $ 68.00 $ 53.50 79% $ 5 76.00 $ 171.50 30% $ 1,898.00 $ 1,442.60 76%
2003 $ 3 35.00 $ 195.00 58% $ 85.00 $ 74.10 87% $ 6 55.00 $ 237.50 36% $ 2,690.00 $ 2,130.90 79%
2004 $ 5 40.00 $ 362.63 67% $ 2 00.00 $ 158.60 79% $ 5 15.00 $ 233.40 45% $ 1,345.00 $ 1,018.60 76%
2005 $ 6 25.00 $ 465.00 74% $ 3 80.00 $ 332.30 87% $ 5 70.00 $ 280.70 49% $ 1,180.00 $ 9 64.80 82%
2006 $ 6 00.00 $ 448.60 75% $ 4 00.00 $ 365.70 91% $ 4 80.00 $ 219.00 46% $ 1,040.00 $ 9 04.60 87%
Sub-prime Alt-A Jumbo Agency
Source: Inside Mortgage Finance (2007).
Notes: Jumbo origination includes non-agency prime. Agency origination includes conventional/conforming and FHA/VA loans. Agency
issuance GNMA, FHLMC, and FNMA. Figures are in billions of USD.
A reduction in long-term interest rates through the end of 2003 was associated with a sharp
increase in origination and issuance across all asset classes. While the conforming markets
peaked in 2003, the non-agency markets continued rapid growth through 2005, eventually
eclipsing activity in the conforming market. In 2006, non-agency production of $1.480 trillion
was more than 45 percent larger than agency production, and non-agency issuance of $1.033
trillion was larger than agency issuance of $905 billion.
Interestingly, the increase in Subprime and Alt-A origination was associated with a significant
increase in the ratio of issuance to origination, which is a reasonable proxy for the fraction of
loans sold. In particular, the ratio of subprime MBS issuance to subprime mortgage origination
was close to 75 percent in both 2005 and 2006. While there is typically a one-quarter lag
between origination and issuance, the data document that a large and increasing fraction of both
subprime and Alt-A loans are sold to investors, and very little is retained on the balance sheets
of the institutions who originate them.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
asiaprop, I am asking, "What is non-conforming agency?" That is (PRIVATE) dealer/broker who have NO regulation by government.
But I agree when you say Federal reserve low interest policy is to blame too.
Quote from kashirin:
Don't pretend you don't understand
money paid from AIG are not contractual obligation. That was a gift
ANd to close this page goldman must pay it back even if they don't own those money legally
AIG was and is bankrupt. Government should ve given those money as a loan at a maximum
And as investment bank they should be suspended from discount window or any FDIC programs
add to this they don't add any wealth to the system - all their profit comes from trading - so their win means someone lose - which is bad too
Quote from asiaprop:
buddy its great you know some about mortgage origination but you fail to see the bigger picture. This crisis came upcon because of cheap liquidity. Everybody could borrow no matter his/her credit. This has nothing to do whatsoever with agency vs. non-agency type mortgages.
Quote from ASusilovic:
6 simple ways to reform Wall Street :
from Yahoo Tech Ticker:
⢠Reinstate Glass-Steagall Separating banks from brokerage firms guarantees that âwhen Wall Street hits the wall⦠it doesnât cause the banks to do the same,â says Ritholtz, who claims the Act was a major reason why the economy didnât come crashing down along with stocks in October 1987 ( supported by Volcker )
⢠Repeal the Commodity Futures Modernization Act This rule âallowed derivatives to be exempt from all the rules that affect every other traded financial instrument,â and was a root cause of AIGâs problems, he says.
⢠Overturning the so-called Bear Stearns rule allowing leverage beyond 12 to 1 The SECâs 2004 rule change, which eliminated some leverage restrictions on investment banks in favor of capital requirements by type of asset was a mistake, says Ritholtz. âWithout overturning that, give us 5-10 years, weâll be right back where we started.â
⢠Continuing to allow high-risk trades to be compensated regardless of profitability This issue is one already being addressed by the so-called Pay Czar Kenneth Feinberg.
⢠Regulating the non bank sub-prime lenders and mandating (and enforcing) lending standards This one is pretty self-explanatory and one few argue as a key reason for the subprime debacle.
http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2009/09/6-simple-ways-to-reform-wall-street/
Quote from Covert:
My goodness- I guess I don't blame you specifically, but this is a completely ignorant post. AIG was NOT allowed to go bankrupt...THAT'S why the counterparties were paid 100c on the dollar. I can't even read what comes after this. Please, read something besides Huffpo. Educate yourself