1) IMHO, G-S might not have prevented a crash, but it would have prevented the crash. In my view, crashes are fine, as long as they don't spread to places where they don't belong.Quote from PiggyBank:
1) Which is what I was said. I don't see how GS being in place would have prevented the crash, unless you are telling me that these mortgage backed derivatives wouldn't have been created and the RE market wouldn't have gone on it's run.. i don't see how GS would have prevented either.
2) I'm aware, but the fact that deposits were being used for speculation/trade isn't solely what caused the crash, or even the primary reason. The i-banks like Lehman and Bear didn't have depositors, yet they were still heavily leveraged.
3) Agreed.
4) I thought you were but i could have you confused with like, tinfoil, or one of those guys. my apologies IF you aren't a 'fair share' obamanite.
5) edit: how do you figure AIG wouldn't have 'needed' to be bailed out?
2) I don't like "slippery slope" arguments normally, but, IMO, (and similar to what denner pointed out), once you allow the use of cheap and readily available funding (deposits) to a few large actors, it's almost inevitable that everyone else, including pure i-banks, finds a way to get in on the action. For example, I don't think it's a coincidence that prime money mkt funds (which provided funding to the banking system during the good times) experienced major inflows starting in 1998-99. Moreover, once you allow banks to use deposits, you inevitably create a fertile environment for someone like Fred the Shred or Sandy Weill to come along and start their empire-building. The end result is excessive concentration, no competition, etc etc. There's some really good stuff written on these subjects, if you have cares.
5) IMHO, the only reason AIG was bailed out was to avoid further stress for the rest of the banking system. Stress for the banking system wouldn't have been a problem, IMHO, if it didn't involve deposit-taking institutions.