Further, information to identify the large trader customer can provide valuable information to permit the Commission to track large trader activity across markets and through various broker-dealers. The ability to track and analyze this information would facilitate the Commissionâs efforts both to investigate potential manipulative activity and to reconstruct a more accurate market history and would be particularly useful when analyzing information on large traders, as some large traders may trade through multiple accounts at multiple broker-dealers and may trade using sponsored access.
In light of recent turbulent markets and the increasing sophistication and trading capacity of large traders, the Commission needs to enhance further its ability to collect and analyze trading information more efficiently, especially with respect to the most active market participants. In particular, the Commission needs a mechanism to reliably identify large traders, and promptly and efficiently obtain their trading information on a market-wide basis.
I see a lot of blabbering about how it needs to grow its tenticles, but no attempt at a justification, except some vague references to "market manipulation". Considering the effort that is gone into preparing this proposal, one would imagine they could have come up with a plausible, if not convincing, justification.
The intent of this proposed provision is to push the identification requirement up the corporate hierarchy to the parent entity to identify the primary institutions that conduct a large trading business.
Hmm. I wonder if there are easier ways to do this....
The Commission is concerned that excluding foreign large
traders from the proposed ruleâs requirements could create a competitive disparity between domestic markets and persons and foreign markets and persons. In particular, including foreign large traders within the scope of the proposed rule would provide the Commission with information on entities contemplated by the statute that trade substantial amounts of NMS securities regardless of their legal domicile and would subject all such entities equally to the self-identification and filing requirements that the Commission is proposing herein.
More of "tell Uncle Sam about who you are and what you own" directed at those wishing to invest in America. Make foreign investment too expensive (in terms of paperwork, effort, lawsuit risk, Madoff risk, etc) and watch the substaintial capital inflows reverse and go elsewhere. Win win!
They have a section soliciting comment, with some suggestions:
Should the LTID number be structured in any particular manner? For example, should the LTID number be structured so that it discloses both the identity of the parent company and the actual legal entity that effects the trade? Should the LTID number be designed to be âextensibleâ so that it could be expanded for use in recording aggregated equity and equity option position (as opposed to trade) information, OTC derivatives trades, OTC derivatives positions, and different categories of trader (e.g., hedge fund, insurance company, pension plan), if tracking this information becomes required under applicable law?
Ahh. Here is the real intent. Not recording large trader activity and analysing it later, but expanding the tenticles of the state to include publishing information on what large positions you hold. As if this information will not be sold to the highest bidder or otherwise abused.
I have this horrible sinking feeling. After years of work and finally achieving something, I won't have a trading business in a couple of years. If the Tobin tax doesn't get it, I will be regulated out of existence by some perverse attempt at making a real life "Equalization of Opportunity Bill".
The race is on...can I do this for long enough to shut up shop and retire when they finally make it impossible? (hopefully somewhere decent where I can live a reclusive, semi-anonymous life away from idiots, politicans, and looters).