Quote from nitro:
Also, there is evidence that all this behavior was pushed on Wall Street by the US government so that "everyone would own a home and live the American Dream". My God. [/B]
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Nitro, you believe that? Or your post is saying you do not believe that? The loans (origination) is from private brokers outside of the CRA rule. And who fund the brokers? Hmm? The investment banks.
Look here.
"These dangerous products and practices were
primarily, although not exclusively, concentrated
in the subprime and Alt-A markets, where
remarkably rapid growth was made possible by two major
changes in the structure of the mortgage market. First, lenders
began to rely heavily on mortgage brokers to originate their
loans, particularly in the subprime market. Second, Wall Street
became increasingly willing and able to create investment
products derived from riskier loan products, providing massive
amounts of capital for their origination.
These two factorsâreliance on mortgage brokers and private
securitizationâfundamentally changed the dynamic of the
mortgage market. Under the traditional lending model, where
lenders both originate and hold their mortgages, there is a
vested interest in making sure that borrowers can afford to
repay their loans. In this new system, however, brokers are
making loans on behalf of lenders who are then selling these
mortgages to investment banks, who ultimately pool and sell
complex securities backed by these loans to investors all over
the world. The quality of the loans and their ultimate sustainability
became far less important to those who were driving the
market, especially since their compensation was based on the volume of their transactions, not loan
performance. In other words, the interests of the various links in the mortgage origination chain
were far removed from the interests of the homebuyers.
Consequently, many lenders aggressively marketed and originated loans without due regard for
borrowersâ ability to repay them. As a result, the market became inundated with products that
had been uncommonâsuch as products with introductory âteaserâ rates that reset after a few years
to a much higher rate, loans that did not require income verification, and negatively-amortizing
payment-option products where the balance of the loan could grow over time. These loans were
often made on the basis of weak underwriting and distributed without regard to whether they were
suitable for their borrowers.
Finally, the regulatory system failed by not adapting to the changing structure of the mortgage
market and the increased complexity of mortgage products. Much has been written about the failure
of regulators to identify systemic risks to the safety and soundness of the financial sector. Less has
been written about how the consequences of this failure could have been blunted, at least somewhat,
had the regulators provided and enforced sufficient consumer protections. In fact, federal regulators
actively hindered consumer protection at the state level, ruling that strong state anti-predatory
lending laws could not be enforced on nationally-chartered banks or thrifts.36
Even when agencies focused limited attention on consumer protection, they tended to rely on
disclosure rules and the issuance of non-binding âguidanceâ over hard and fast rules. It was not until
July 2008, 14 years after Congress had authorized the Federal Reserve Board to prohibit mortgage
lending acts and practices for all originators that were abusive, unfair or deceptive, that the Fed
implemented any rules to ban some of the more abusive practices, despite the fact that borrowers,
state regulators and consumer advocates had repeatedly raised concerns about abuses in the subprime
market and pointed to evidence demonstrating the destructive consequences of such practices.
The foreclosure crisis is
âfundamentally the result of
rapid growth in loans with a
high risk of defaultâdue
both to the terms of these
loans and to loosening
underwriting controls and
standards.â
(snip)
The Red Herrings: Unemployment, the CRA and the GSEs
While the foreclosure crisis is clearly a complicated event with multiple causes, there are at least
three factors whose influence has been overstated: unemployment, the Community Reinvestment
Act (CRA), and the role of the Government-Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs).
Unemployment
In light of todayâs high unemployment rates, some observers have claimed that unemployment has
been to blame for the foreclosure crisis. To consider the validity of this claim, it is useful to examine
historical trends âthat is, to review how the housing market typically behaves during periods of
high job losses. The chart below shows that, over the past few decades, the connection between
unemployment and foreclosures has been weak. During previous periods of high unemployment,
while delinquency levels did rise, foreclosure numbers remained essentially flat. This strongly
suggests that unemployment, while certainly exacerbating the current foreclosure epidemic, is
not a necessary and sufficient causal factor.
Of course, even if the connection is not as simple as some may have suggested, the current foreclosure
crisis and unemployment are related. The large-scale failure of subprime loans and the financial
derivatives backed by them triggered turmoil in the housing and financial markets, contributing
significantly to the most recent recession and resulting high levels of unemployment. The increase
in unemployment, in turn, has exacerbated the foreclosure epidemic, as many people were losing
their jobs at the same time that they were also facing negative equity positions on their homes.37
In addition, long-term unemployment has grown to 6.7 million as of April 2010 compared to an
average of 700,000 in 2006.38 But even these families would most likely be able to avoid foreclosure
if they could sell their home for enough to pay off their mortgage balance.
The Community Reinvestment Act
There have been persistent attempts to pin the foreclosure crisis on the Community Reinvestment
Act (CRA), a law passed in 1977 designed to encourage depository institutions to increase lending
in lower-income communities. Critics of the CRA used the foreclosure crisis to suggest that lending
to âriskyâ borrowers who are the beneficiaries of the CRA is at the root of the problem. However,
this accusation is simply not backed by the facts, and banking and government leaders as diverse as
OCC head John Dugan, FDIC Chairman Sheila Bair, Federal Reserve Governor Randall Kroszner
and others have publicly and explicitly stated that CRA did not cause the financial crisis.39 Among
the empirical evidence that dispels the CRA myth are these items:
⢠CRA has been on the books for three decades, while the rapid growth of subprime and other
non-prime loan securitization and the pervasive marketing of risky loan products did not occur
until recent years.
⢠Studies have shown that loans made to low- and moderate-income borrowers under CRA perform
better than loans made by originators not covered by CRA or outside of CRA-assessment areas.40
⢠The Federal Reserve estimates that CRA lending accounted for a mere 6% of all subprime
lending.41 The predominant players in the subprime marketâmortgage brokers, mortgage
companies and the Wall Street investment banks that provided the financingâwere not covered
under CRA."
http://www.responsiblelending.org/m...alysis/foreclosures-by-race-and-ethnicity.pdf