Quote from Trader666:
Speaking of childish responses, how about being an adult and getting your facts straight? I didn't call common dealer hedging practice a "conspiracy theory." I was referring to your implication that Goldman's position was offset yet still misrepresented as a total loss and covered up (as you put it) with "the slick GS PR hook, line & sinker." Do you have any proof? Do you really think Goldman would knowingly do that? This BS is not what the case is about anyway. Tell me how there was material misrepresentation when all participants were experienced institutional investors who knew exactly what was in the portfolio.
I apologize for trying to help you see how these Abacus transactions played out from a GS standpoint (there were 25 issued by GS). To the best of my knowledge, Gretchen Morgenson has dug deeper than any other finance journalist on these particular deals:
One ex:
Dec 2009 : http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/24/business/24trading.html?pagewanted=all
To quote:
"Goldmanâs bets against the performances of the Abacus C.D.O.âs were not worth much in 2005 and 2006, but they soared in value in 2007 and 2008 when the mortgage market collapsed. The trades gave Mr. Egol a higher profile at the bank, and he was among a group promoted to managing director on Oct. 24, 2007.
âEgol and Fabrice were way ahead of their time,â said one of the former Goldman workers. âThey saw the writing on the wall in this market as early as 2005.â By creating the Abacus C.D.O.âs, they helped protect Goldman against losses that others would suffer.
As early as the summer of 2006, Goldmanâs sales desk began marketing short bets using the ABX index to hedge funds like Paulson & Company, Magnetar and Soros Fund Management, which invests for the billionaire George Soros. John Paulson, the founder of Paulson & Company, also would later take some of the shorts from the Abacus deals, helping him profit when mortgage bonds collapsed. He declined to comment."
There are two other relevant articles from risk.net that discuss these transactions. Google them if interested. Of 500 CDO ratings, Abacus AC1 was rated 498 of 500 by UBS in Fall 2007/early 2008. When computing the aforementioned info from Morgenson, including an upper management that turned negative on these particular Abacus mezzanine tranches 12-18 months prior to AC-1, do you honestly believe GS did not offset the AC-1 0-9% ****equity**** tranche (=$90MM) with CDS/ABX when finalizing the structure with IBK/Amro & ACA/Paulson? All of a sudden, after being negative this tier for 12-18 months, a light bulb went off, and they were going position naked? Seriously, wake up. It is patently obvious you are treading into unknown territory.
Indeed, this "BS is not what the case about anyway." However, you did reference this "BS" as a GS defense, which I proceeded to respond to.
Stop trying to claw out of your own web of ignorance by attempting to spin back to "material misrepresentation." I WAS NOT TALKING ABOUT THIS!!! I have already stated my position earlier in this thread and suspect the SEC will not win this case, with damage stemming from "unethical" behavior superseding any illegality/fines/etc. Not that many here on ET will even notice your bologna, but you are embarrassing yourself.