Russia & Ukraine

https://oilprice.com/Geopolitics/In...hina-And-Russia-As-Ukraine-War-Continues.html

Relations Sour Between China And Russia As Ukraine War Continues

By The Jamestown Foundation - Mar 15, 2023, 11:00 AM CDT
  • China is actively monitoring the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, offering a plan of peaceful resolution.
  • Beijing is attempting to navigate a delicate balance between in its relationship with Moscow and respecting international law.
  • A Chinese diplomatic breakthrough in the Middle East between Saudi Arabia and Iran has put an additional strain on Russia's strategic interests.
The Russian army’s ongoing struggle to capture Bakhmut might appear to be primarily a tactical episode in the larger geo-strategic picture of Russia’s war against Ukraine. However, it also affects the key political interactions shaping this picture, including the formally cordial, but in fact rather uneasy, relations between Moscow and Beijing. Chinese President Xi Jinping, who these days is basking in the well-prepared triumph of securing a third presidential term, knows well the value of symbolism and comprehends the Kremlin’s frustrations with its inability to score even a minor victory (Nezavisimaya gazeta, March 9). Xi likely regrets the announcement of a “friendship without limits” with Russian President Vladimir Putin on the eve of the war; yet, that figure of speech grants the Chinese president useful opportunities to play with shifting the limits on supporting Russia in its increasingly desperate efforts to keep control over the course of its ill-conceived war.

This maneuvering has gained expanded space with the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s publication of a “peace plan” for the Russo-Ukrainian war, attributed to Wang Yi, the foreign policy supervisor in the Chinese Communist Party’s Politburo, who elaborated on its broadly formulated 12 points during his tour around Europe and in Moscow (Forbes.ru, February 27). Putin is certainly in no position to object to any initiative launched by Beijing, but the official promise to give the plan due attention was remarkably curt, and commentaries in the central media were strictly abbreviated (Rossiiskaya gazeta, February 27). Only a few pundits insinuated that China’s profile in the global arena had become so prominent that it felt compelled to formulate a position, which amounted to a list of general and well-known principles (Russiancouncil.ru, March 1).

Beijing is indeed treading far more carefully in the Ukrainian war zone than in the Middle East, where it has engaged in pro-active peacemaking. Starting with Xi’s visit to Saudi Arabia in December 2022 and continuing with Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi’s visit to Beijing in February 2023 (Izvestiya, February 24), Moscow had excelled at exploiting the traditional tensions in the Gulf region. Thus, the Kremlin was surprised to find its space for maneuvering start to contract due to the announcement on restoring official diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, as facilitated by China (Kommersant, March 10). Besides stabilizing oil prices, which is set to further curtail Russia’s petro revenues already undercut by Western sanctions, this rapprochement will make Iran a bit more circumspect in supplying those arms to Russia, including ballistic missiles, needed for sustaining the sequence of strikes on Ukrainian energy infrastructure (The Moscow Times, March 6).

The plain fact that China’s diplomatic success in the Middle East signifies a setback for the habitual Russian policy of conflict manipulation shows that the strategic partnership is far less harmonious than the two officialdoms are eager to claim (Rossiiskaya gazeta, March 7). Some “patriotic” experts in Moscow, taking a second look at the Chinese peace plan for Ukraine, dare to suggest that it goes directly against the Russian strategy for prevailing in the long war of attrition (Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, March 9). More moderate voices argue that Russia can pick those Chinese points that suit its interests while ignoring others and find political advantage in the resolute rejection of Beijing’s initiative by Washington (Russiancouncil.ru, March 6).

The first proposition in the Chinese initiative—the unequivocal respect of territorial integrity—is difficult for Russia to circumvent, but the imperative has strong support in the Global South (Carnegie Politika, February 27). One possible way around this principle is to claim that Russia’s territory now includes four regions that used to belong to Ukraine, as well as Crimea, and that peace talks can proceed if Kyiv acknowledges this “new reality” (Meduza, February 24). The problem with such self-serving misinterpretation of the offer is not only that Beijing firmly refuses to recognize Russia’s annexations (Novayagazeta.eu, February 28) but also that, by laying claim to the territories that it does not control and clearly cannot conquer, Moscow has severely compromised the foundation of Russia’s own territorial integrity. Furthermore, the retreat from Kherson has aggravated this chasm between the constitutionally legitimized fantasy and the reality of military setbacks, which are set to continue yet further.

An implicit but crucial message in the Chinese stance on Ukraine concerns Taiwan, and while any analogies between the two confrontations are resolutely denied in Beijing, warnings on external support for the island’s drift toward independence are being articulated with increasing menace (Izvestiya, March 10). Every contact between the United States and Taiwan is condemned fiercely, but the key issue is the export of US weapons, with the added disapproval of massive supplies of North Atlantic Treaty Organization offensive weapon systems to Ukraine (Kommersant, March 8). Beijing has issued a number of hints on a possible change in its position regarding the self-imposed ban on the export of lethal arms to Russia, at the same time scorning Western threats of severe consequences from such a blatant violation of the West’s sanctions regime (Novye izvestiya, March 6). The Russian military is keen to use every bit of dual-use exports coming from China, from quadcopters to boots. But what Russian forces need most are artillery shells and big gun barrels, and deliveries of such bulky goods are impossible to hide (Republic.ru, March 3).

The Chinese leadership clearly does not want Putin to lose his war, ill-conceived as it was. But General Li Shangfu, China’s newly appointed defense minister despite being under US sanctions, does not want to rush Xi, who usually prefers to prolong the decision-making process. The difference in dynamics of Western arms supply to Ukraine, which have massively increased since the start of 2023, and Chinese procrastinations has become seriously detrimental for Russia. The two strategic partners are operating on different timetables, with China’s focus on influencing the elections in Taiwan in early 2024 and Russia bracing for a Ukrainian spring offensive led by trained armored brigades and Western main battle tanks. Putin may have set his mind on the long war perspective and signaled his resolve to Xi, who finds this option quite agreeable as US attention and resource-allocation would remain centered on the European theater. Therefore, it is up to Ukraine to prove these two mutually mistrustful autocrats wrong again, and unwavering Western support is the key to making China contemplate the consequences of Russia’s defeat
 
Acknowledging in advance that Ukraine is in a very tough spot in Bakhmut, nevertheless, this Prigo scenario puts Vlad in a very tough spot.

If Putin loses Bakhmut , then that is bad enough just for military reasons, but Prigo is cranking up the rhetoric harder and harder and ready to stick it up Vlad's arse if Russia cannot prevail.

That's some kind of crazy operation the Ruskies are attempting Bakhmut. Russia cannot afford to lose but Putin is also intentionally depleting the Wagner fighters as a way of getting rid of their political threat. Not a trick the viewers should try at home.

Viewer warning. Prigo uses bad language. Because well, he is a peasant.



Prigozhin Says Jealous Kremlin Deliberately Stopped Wagner Taking Bakhmut

Prigozhin went on to say all of Russia “supported” Wagner after the fall of Soledar—a salt mining town near Bakhmut—a victory which he previously claimed was “solely” achieved by his mercenaries despite statements to the contrary by Russia’s Defense Ministry. After that success, Prigozhin claimed, the Kremlin’s attitude became: “Wagner should not be capturing Bakhmut under any circumstances.”

He said that his mercenaries have since been deprived of ammunition bringing “shell hunger” to the fight, but that “Wagner will take Bakhmut anyway.” He said this will be done “not because Prigozhin wants it,” but: “Bitch, we must prove to the whole world that the Russians can!”

After rattling off a string of other military targets in Ukraine, Prigozhin fumed: “No matter what it is, take fucking something!”

The mercenary chief also moaned about being deprived access to military phones. “Leave me the phone! Set wiretapping on it,” Prigozhin said. “Know what I’m talking about, and call me sometimes and say: ‘Prigozhin, you’re a cunt, go fuck yourself,’ and hang up. At least like this. What’s the point of cutting it?”

https://www.yahoo.com/news/prigozhin-says-jealous-kremlin-deliberately-103559088.html
 
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https://oilprice.com/Geopolitics/In...hina-And-Russia-As-Ukraine-War-Continues.html

Relations Sour Between China And Russia As Ukraine War Continues

By The Jamestown Foundation - Mar 15, 2023, 11:00 AM CDT
  • China is actively monitoring the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, offering a plan of peaceful resolution.
  • Beijing is attempting to navigate a delicate balance between in its relationship with Moscow and respecting international law.
  • A Chinese diplomatic breakthrough in the Middle East between Saudi Arabia and Iran has put an additional strain on Russia's strategic interests.
The Russian army’s ongoing struggle to capture Bakhmut might appear to be primarily a tactical episode in the larger geo-strategic picture of Russia’s war against Ukraine. However, it also affects the key political interactions shaping this picture, including the formally cordial, but in fact rather uneasy, relations between Moscow and Beijing. Chinese President Xi Jinping, who these days is basking in the well-prepared triumph of securing a third presidential term, knows well the value of symbolism and comprehends the Kremlin’s frustrations with its inability to score even a minor victory (Nezavisimaya gazeta, March 9). Xi likely regrets the announcement of a “friendship without limits” with Russian President Vladimir Putin on the eve of the war; yet, that figure of speech grants the Chinese president useful opportunities to play with shifting the limits on supporting Russia in its increasingly desperate efforts to keep control over the course of its ill-conceived war.

This maneuvering has gained expanded space with the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s publication of a “peace plan” for the Russo-Ukrainian war, attributed to Wang Yi, the foreign policy supervisor in the Chinese Communist Party’s Politburo, who elaborated on its broadly formulated 12 points during his tour around Europe and in Moscow (Forbes.ru, February 27). Putin is certainly in no position to object to any initiative launched by Beijing, but the official promise to give the plan due attention was remarkably curt, and commentaries in the central media were strictly abbreviated (Rossiiskaya gazeta, February 27). Only a few pundits insinuated that China’s profile in the global arena had become so prominent that it felt compelled to formulate a position, which amounted to a list of general and well-known principles (Russiancouncil.ru, March 1).

Beijing is indeed treading far more carefully in the Ukrainian war zone than in the Middle East, where it has engaged in pro-active peacemaking. Starting with Xi’s visit to Saudi Arabia in December 2022 and continuing with Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi’s visit to Beijing in February 2023 (Izvestiya, February 24), Moscow had excelled at exploiting the traditional tensions in the Gulf region. Thus, the Kremlin was surprised to find its space for maneuvering start to contract due to the announcement on restoring official diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, as facilitated by China (Kommersant, March 10). Besides stabilizing oil prices, which is set to further curtail Russia’s petro revenues already undercut by Western sanctions, this rapprochement will make Iran a bit more circumspect in supplying those arms to Russia, including ballistic missiles, needed for sustaining the sequence of strikes on Ukrainian energy infrastructure (The Moscow Times, March 6).

The plain fact that China’s diplomatic success in the Middle East signifies a setback for the habitual Russian policy of conflict manipulation shows that the strategic partnership is far less harmonious than the two officialdoms are eager to claim (Rossiiskaya gazeta, March 7). Some “patriotic” experts in Moscow, taking a second look at the Chinese peace plan for Ukraine, dare to suggest that it goes directly against the Russian strategy for prevailing in the long war of attrition (Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, March 9). More moderate voices argue that Russia can pick those Chinese points that suit its interests while ignoring others and find political advantage in the resolute rejection of Beijing’s initiative by Washington (Russiancouncil.ru, March 6).

The first proposition in the Chinese initiative—the unequivocal respect of territorial integrity—is difficult for Russia to circumvent, but the imperative has strong support in the Global South (Carnegie Politika, February 27). One possible way around this principle is to claim that Russia’s territory now includes four regions that used to belong to Ukraine, as well as Crimea, and that peace talks can proceed if Kyiv acknowledges this “new reality” (Meduza, February 24). The problem with such self-serving misinterpretation of the offer is not only that Beijing firmly refuses to recognize Russia’s annexations (Novayagazeta.eu, February 28) but also that, by laying claim to the territories that it does not control and clearly cannot conquer, Moscow has severely compromised the foundation of Russia’s own territorial integrity. Furthermore, the retreat from Kherson has aggravated this chasm between the constitutionally legitimized fantasy and the reality of military setbacks, which are set to continue yet further.

An implicit but crucial message in the Chinese stance on Ukraine concerns Taiwan, and while any analogies between the two confrontations are resolutely denied in Beijing, warnings on external support for the island’s drift toward independence are being articulated with increasing menace (Izvestiya, March 10). Every contact between the United States and Taiwan is condemned fiercely, but the key issue is the export of US weapons, with the added disapproval of massive supplies of North Atlantic Treaty Organization offensive weapon systems to Ukraine (Kommersant, March 8). Beijing has issued a number of hints on a possible change in its position regarding the self-imposed ban on the export of lethal arms to Russia, at the same time scorning Western threats of severe consequences from such a blatant violation of the West’s sanctions regime (Novye izvestiya, March 6). The Russian military is keen to use every bit of dual-use exports coming from China, from quadcopters to boots. But what Russian forces need most are artillery shells and big gun barrels, and deliveries of such bulky goods are impossible to hide (Republic.ru, March 3).

The Chinese leadership clearly does not want Putin to lose his war, ill-conceived as it was. But General Li Shangfu, China’s newly appointed defense minister despite being under US sanctions, does not want to rush Xi, who usually prefers to prolong the decision-making process. The difference in dynamics of Western arms supply to Ukraine, which have massively increased since the start of 2023, and Chinese procrastinations has become seriously detrimental for Russia. The two strategic partners are operating on different timetables, with China’s focus on influencing the elections in Taiwan in early 2024 and Russia bracing for a Ukrainian spring offensive led by trained armored brigades and Western main battle tanks. Putin may have set his mind on the long war perspective and signaled his resolve to Xi, who finds this option quite agreeable as US attention and resource-allocation would remain centered on the European theater. Therefore, it is up to Ukraine to prove these two mutually mistrustful autocrats wrong again, and unwavering Western support is the key to making China contemplate the consequences of Russia’s defeat

Xi is going to meet Putin as soon as next week, China’s new foreign minister just called Ukraine’s counterpart. All I can interpret is that all want a ceasefire agreement as soon as possible, a two Korean solution.

Xi and Putin are on the same table, and not going to bend over for Biden.
 
Xi and Putin are on the same table, and not going to bend over for Biden.


Putin can survive Biden sanctions because they are an exporter of energy and food.China would be crushed by the Biden sanctions that are on Russia.
 
So Russia finally sentences a soldier who admitted to war crimes. BUT NOT for the war crimes, he was sentenced for 'spreading so-called “fake news” about the Russian military’s activities in Ukraine'.

He filmed a video admitting to the war crimes, and this was deemed fake news. He only received a 5.5 year suspended sentence and surely will be sent back to the front shortly. Welcome to military "justice" in Russia.


Russia Sentences Soldier Who Admitted to War Crimes in Ukraine
https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2023...-who-admitted-to-war-crimes-in-ukraine-a80494

A Russian court has sentenced a soldier who admitted to committing war crimes in Ukraine to a 5.5-year suspended sentence, the Sibir.Realii news website reported Thursday.

The Khabarovsk Garrison Court Martial in Russia's Far East found Daniil Frolkin, 21, guilty of spreading so-called “fake news” about the Russian military’s activities in Ukraine.

Prosecutors had requested a six-year prison sentence.

Frolkin is one of four Russian servicemen suspected of robberies, looting and murder of civilians in the Ukrainian village of Andriivka who iStories identified last year by using photos the soldiers took on a phone stolen from a resident.

When contacted by iStories, Frolkin confessed to the murder of a male resident of Andriivka who was identified as 47-year-old Ruslan Yaremchuk.

“I…Frolkin Daniil Andreevich, confess to all the crimes that I committed in Andriivka. [I confess] to shooting civilians, robbing civilians, confiscating their phones and [confess] that our command does not give a f*** about our fighters, about the entirety of the infantry that fights on the front line,” Frolkin told iStories reporters in a video call in August.


“I killed one. But I wanted to save as many people [as I could],” Frolkin said, adding that he decided to confess in order to save other fellow soldiers who are being sent to the “slaughter” in Ukraine.

“[I will be jailed] not for what I did in Ukraine, but for all the information I will give you. I just want to confess to everything and explain what is happening in our country. I think that it would be better if the war never started,” Frolkin told iStories in the video interview.


In Ukraine, Frolkin is wanted on criminal charges of violating the laws and customs of war, and faces up to a life sentence in prison if arrested there.

Located about 60 kilometers west of Kyiv, Andriivka was occupied by Russian forces in the first days of the invasion in February.

At least 40 of Andriivka's roughly 1,000 residents were killed during the Russian occupation that lasted until April, according to the BBC.

Russia’s Defense Ministry had claimed that “the civilian population is not in danger” as its troops invaded Ukraine.

Shortly after the start of the war, Russia passed laws that punish sharing information that contradicts the Kremlin’s narrative of its “special military operation” in Ukraine with up to 15 years in prison.
 
Putin can survive Biden sanctions because they are an exporter of energy and food.China would be crushed by the Biden sanctions that are on Russia.

i doubt it. China sells its UST holding to the lowest, has the highest trade surplus with us and other regions, and has Russian on the back on energy and food, albeit not cost free. de-dollars has begun. Until Taiwan is solved, no more talking.
 
i doubt it. China sells its UST holding to the lowest, has the highest trade surplus with us and other regions, and has Russian on the back on energy and food, albeit not cost free. de-dollars has begun. Until Taiwan is solved, no more talking.


Russia,Iran and N Korea would be Chinas only major trading partners under harsh US sanctions,their economy would be crushed.

Thats why they are letting Russian troops fight with sticks and rusty ammo rather than give them military aid.
 
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Putin can survive Biden sanctions because they are an exporter of energy and food.China would be crushed by the Biden sanctions that are on Russia.
i doubt it. China sells its UST holding to the lowest, has the highest trade surplus with us and other regions, and has Russian on the back on energy and food, albeit not cost free. de-dollars has begun. Until Taiwan is solved, no more talking.
Russia,Iran and N Korea would be Chinas only major trading partners under harsh US sanctions,their economy would be crushed.

Thats why they are letting Russian troops fight with sticks and rusty ammo rather than give them military aid.

We'd all be crushed by a Russia-like sanctioning of China. The world's traded MAD (mutually assured destruction) policy for a more civilized MAED (mutually assured economic destruction) policy. While I've advocated for decoupling from totalitarian regimes (we've never really had codependency with Russia), having a coupled economy keeps nations on friendly terms as well.
 
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