Misthos, that Economist article confuses issues considered in insolvency law, the law of bankruptcy with the issues that a sovereign would consider with regard to its obligations. The U.S. cannot subject itself to a bankruptcy proceeding, nor can any creditor of the U.S. demand any bankruptcy proceeding. The U.S. as sovereign will either pay its debts when due or it will not, and the result will be sovereign default but not bankruptcy (which is a legal process that take place in the federal court of the sovereign). Instead, the U.S. will consider its debt priorities not by the standards of bankruptcy priority and creditorâs rights, but by the severity of real world effects that will result in response to each potential event of default, and whether such potential default will necessarily be transparent or whether it can be made opaque. Here we really see the difference between Treasury Securities and intergovernmental accounting transfer, âfaux securities.â
Because bankruptcy and insolvency priorities do not apply, the financially challenged Government will not use those non-sovereign guidelines to set its priorities. The Government understands that no real default will occur on the âfaux securityâ ledger entries as it can simply change the terms of that debt so that there is no default, since it is all internal, one pocket to the other so to speak. These are not transactions with the public. With regard to its non-public ledger debt entries the Government can change the amount of the âfaux securityâ balance at its discretion; it can play accounting tricks on its accounting tricks. It can simply reduce the ledger entry and say that it borrowed the moneyâ¦this in turn would reduce the calculation of deficit or borrowing on the Feds unified books and it would let the government increase its public debt (by selling real Treasury Securities to the public under the ceiling; made possible by the arbitrary reduction on the intergovernmental ledger) with no effect on the accumulated deficitâ¦it can get around a debt ceiling in this wayâ¦when it writes up the âfaux securitiesâ in the future, it will say that is has paid them backâ¦but no real money would move one way or the other. So, you see there is no reason to consider these internal obligations as having any priority. These fake funds will be sacrificed long before any Treasury Security is even downgraded in the open market by fear of potential default.
The real issue for a functioning government is whether there is a market for its Treasury Securities, whether the public outside the Government itself will continue to buy Government Debt. If a Treasury Security auction fails, it will cause the public market to consider the question of the viability of the Government Debt; all the way through the yield curve, starting with its currency and going all the way out to the longest yield bonds. This is the stuff of âhyperinflationâ (which is currency collapse and not to be confused with âinflation,â which is an insidious form of default that can progress only so long as currency remains viable). If Government continues to print money when there is no market for its Treasury Securities, it will initiate a hyperinflation, or stated differently, it will destroy its currency. Assuming the Government Political and Banking Class understand this, you can be sure that the Government will not default on its Treasury Securities in order to honor its entitlement promises.
The Government can change the terms of the entitlement promises, a kind of an insidious default passed off as fiscal accommodation policy, without destroying its currency. It cannot default on its Treasury Securities without destroying its currency. That should set out the priority for you.