Regarding the Existence or Absence of God
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Actually, even to the extent we can comprehend the possibilities, our true logic systems (not stupid semantic games) do not rule out the possibility of free will and God knowing the future co-existing. Do you understand that as things approach the speed of light, time slows down. That means that time is not linear, it does not stay static in all places under all circumstances. If you go further and realize that a God could and would exist everywhere at once, and hence would exist outside the limits of space and time, and you ought to realize that describing a God the way you have erroneously brings God to our finite level, and worse yet, brings God into the level of our semantical games (which are our lowest level of logic, far more limited than what we can figure out with math/logic and science).
I won't "admit" something that is not true. You can tell me what I believe all you want, if you're wrong I won't acknowledge it. I think I've made very clear, multiple times, that I am a permanent agnostic, about the existence of God and whether, if a God exists, it created the universe.
How is a "God always being there" any less reasonable than the "Universe always being here." And if the universe wasn't always here, what was? In other words, no one can answer ANY OF THESE questions, people can only hold opinions or, as I do, accept permanent uncertainty.
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look around you. we have ample evidence for the materials of the universe. we have no evidence for the existance of god (shit, we can't even talk about god, he in incomprehensible, let alone find evidence for him). make your own mind which it is more reasonable to believe always existed.
Nice dodge of the question. I infer from what you say that you are actaully saying god in fact made my decision for me. By some unknown mechanism or other he controlled me, he forced me to act in the "right way" because if I didn't act in the right way he would cease to exist. Do you really believe this absurd extension of logic?
I contend that there is a basic flaw in the whole stream of logic in saying that because god has foreknowledge then we must act in a certain way. The flaw is the term "must". The whole argument that free will can't exist with an omniscient god rests upon the word "must". If "must" is transformed to "will" then the argument that free will and omniscience cannot coexist falls apart.
To those who subscribe to the view that free will cannot coexist with omniscience, do you agree that if the basic argument regarding an omniscient god:
1) If god knows that you are going to do [some action] A, then you must do A.
is changed to the following argument:
2) If god knows that you are going to do [some action] A, then you will do A.
then in there is no conflict between free will and omniscience? What do you say? Is the word "must" in fact a requirement to show that omniscience and free will cannot coexist?
look around you. we have ample evidence for the materials of the universe. we have no evidence for the existance of god (shit, we can't even talk about god, he in incomprehensible, let alone find evidence for him). make your own mind which it is more reasonable to believe always existed. [/B][/QUOTE]
yes, we have evidence of the materials that make up the universe now. What do we know about whether the universe has always existed, or what, if anything, existed before the universe? We really have no good answers as far as I'm aware.
re (2)
the "must" is implicit. if you did anything else but A, god would've been wrong.
which one of us is doing the artful dodging tripack? answer this:
god knows John X is gonna die at 80. god cannot be wrong.
john X has divine protection. there is no way john X could die any sooner than 80, otherwise god is wrong.
EDIT.
tripack, i don't expect you to come to your senses anytime soon. it is pointless discussing this with you. like all other stubborn christians, you will never ever ever let reality contradict the doctrines of your religion. why you even bother trying to use reason to help your cause is beyond me. you DID NOT choose to believe in your religion because it was REASONABLE to, so there's no point you using reason to justify its tenets. just focus on your faith, and leave reason to those of mature enough to come to grips with its implications.
Originally posted by daniel_m
see that is exactly where the illusion part comes into it. because if you had chosen anything but X, god wouldn've been wrong. and that is not allowed.
It isn't that it is not allowed, just that it is logically impossible for an omniscient being to be wrong.
let me use that Neil armstrong example again. god KNEW armstrong would be an astronaut.
ok? again, imagine i asked god and he told me that armstrong would be an astronaut.
we don't even have to discuss the choices armstrong made, we can just automatically KNOW that there never existed at any time the possibility that any kind of disaster, natural or otherwise, could have incapacitated armstrong. there was never the possibility of this. god KNEW that armstrong would be an astronaut, so to fulfill this "prophecy")) there is no way anything bad could've happened to armstrong that would have prevented him from being an atronaut.
to armstrong, it will have seemed exactly as though he made all his choices. but that would obviously have been an illusion. he was merely acting out a prewritten script.
Just as you say god had foreknowledge, which he shared with you. Armstrong actually did make all those decisions, but in no way was he forced to make those decisions. He freely chose each one, just as god had seen beforehand. The choices Armstrong made were real choices, not bogus choices where there was no alternative available so he had the opportunity for free choice. He made his free choice and lo and behold it was exactly the same choices that god had seen Armstrong do in the future.
Note: the full text of the article below may be found at the following site:
http://www.sfu.ca/philosophy/swartz/freewill2.htm
Epistemic Determinism (or, The Problem of Foreknowledge)
The following is the standard argument for Epistemic Determinism. It alleges to show that foreknowledge is incompatible with free will.
If x knows that you are going to do (some action) A, then you must do A. But if you must do A, then you have no choice in the matter. Thus if x knows (beforehand) what you are going to do, then you have no free choice. Put another way: foreknowledge is incompatible with free will.
We will call this version of the Problem of Foreknowledge, the 'secular' version.
Often the argument is presented in its 'religious' version. In this second version, what is of primary interest to us is the relationship between omniscience and free will. For our purposes, I/we are neither assuming that God does exist nor assuming that God does not exist. We are simply examining the logical relationship between two concepts. (The puzzle occurs whether one is a theist or an atheist: Does foreknowledge preclude free will?)
God is omniscient, i.e. God knows everything (that is true) about the past, the present, and the future. In addition (it has been claimed), God has given human beings free will so that human beings can choose between good and evil.
But if God knows beforehand what you are going to choose, then you must choose what God knows you are going to choose. If you must choose what God knows you are going to choose, then you are not truly choosing; you may deliberate, but eventually you are going to choose exactly as God knew you would. There is only one possible upshot of your deliberating.
Thus if God has foreknowledge, then you do not have free will; or, equivalently, if you have free will, then God does not have foreknowledge.
The religious version of the argument for Epistemic Determinism is more than just a theoretical curiosity. A number of Christians have accepted the argument, and in doing so, have proceeded to live their lives in a different manner than many others, including the majority of Christians. Philosophical arguments can, and sometimes do, have profound effects on persons' lives. When they do, we owe it to ourselves to assure ourselves that the arguments are genuinely sound.
Both versions of the argument -- the secular and the religious -- are valid (i.e. the premises logically guarantee the conclusion). But are the premises true? As we might suspect, they are not. But what, then, is the error? Where does the falsity lie? To answer these latter questions, we will need to make a detour to examine some logical concepts, those having to do with possibility, actuality, and necessity.
http://www.sfu.ca/philosophy/swartz/freewill2.htm
Epistemic Determinism (or, The Problem of Foreknowledge)
The following is the standard argument for Epistemic Determinism. It alleges to show that foreknowledge is incompatible with free will.
If x knows that you are going to do (some action) A, then you must do A. But if you must do A, then you have no choice in the matter. Thus if x knows (beforehand) what you are going to do, then you have no free choice. Put another way: foreknowledge is incompatible with free will.
We will call this version of the Problem of Foreknowledge, the 'secular' version.
Often the argument is presented in its 'religious' version. In this second version, what is of primary interest to us is the relationship between omniscience and free will. For our purposes, I/we are neither assuming that God does exist nor assuming that God does not exist. We are simply examining the logical relationship between two concepts. (The puzzle occurs whether one is a theist or an atheist: Does foreknowledge preclude free will?)
God is omniscient, i.e. God knows everything (that is true) about the past, the present, and the future. In addition (it has been claimed), God has given human beings free will so that human beings can choose between good and evil.
But if God knows beforehand what you are going to choose, then you must choose what God knows you are going to choose. If you must choose what God knows you are going to choose, then you are not truly choosing; you may deliberate, but eventually you are going to choose exactly as God knew you would. There is only one possible upshot of your deliberating.
Thus if God has foreknowledge, then you do not have free will; or, equivalently, if you have free will, then God does not have foreknowledge.
The religious version of the argument for Epistemic Determinism is more than just a theoretical curiosity. A number of Christians have accepted the argument, and in doing so, have proceeded to live their lives in a different manner than many others, including the majority of Christians. Philosophical arguments can, and sometimes do, have profound effects on persons' lives. When they do, we owe it to ourselves to assure ourselves that the arguments are genuinely sound.
Both versions of the argument -- the secular and the religious -- are valid (i.e. the premises logically guarantee the conclusion). But are the premises true? As we might suspect, they are not. But what, then, is the error? Where does the falsity lie? To answer these latter questions, we will need to make a detour to examine some logical concepts, those having to do with possibility, actuality, and necessity.
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