Quote from mind:
IMHO segregated accounts ARE backed by the other clearing members of the exchange, thus by the exchange, thus by the system itself.
Mind, your opinion is specifically contradicted by the CFTC and the CME. The exchanges and clearing members will only make good on uncovered customer losses, from trading or embezzlement, AFTER all deposits by other customers, in the same pool of segregated accounts, have been seized and exhausted to cover those losses. The exchanges and members have NO obligation to pay one red cent to these customers who have lost part or all of their funds and positions in such a broker bankruptcy. The exchanges and members only guarantee trades against the counterparty risk that a bankrupt clearing member might renege on a trade, thus injuring customers of other firms; but they provide no guarantee that a bankrupt clearing member will return customer funds or property to its own customers.
Quote from CFTC at http://www.cftc.gov/opa/brochures/opafutures.htm:
Are my funds protected?
In an individual account, funds that you have deposited with your commodity brokerage firm to trade on commodity exchanges located in the United States are required to be segregated (held separately) from any of the brokerage firm's own funds. The amount segregated will increase or diminish as you make or lose money from your trading. Also, even though your brokerage firm is required to segregate your funds, you may still not be able to recover the full amount of any funds in your account if the brokerage firm becomes insolvent and there are insufficient funds available to cover the obligations to all of its customers. Your account is not insured.
Quote from Chicago Mercanitle Exchange at http://www.cme.com/clearing/set/fs/finsafsys10241.html:
Although CME Clearing segregates customer performance bond deposits from the clearing memberâs proprietary performance bond deposits, the customer performance bond deposits for each clearing member are held in the aggregate, without identifying specific ownership of the deposits. If a default occurred in the clearing memberâs customer account, CME Clearing has the right to apply toward the default all customer performance bond deposits and positions in the defaulting clearing memberâs customer origin account at CME Clearing. Accordingly, positions and performance bonds deposited by customers not causing the default are potentially at risk if there is a default in the customer origin of their clearing member. Futures market customers face credit risk in doing business through any particular clearing member. Consequently, the selection process for a suitable clearing member is important. While the regulations dealing with segregation of customer monies are specifically designed to protect customers from the consequences of a clearing memberâs failure, they do not always provide complete protection should the default be caused by another customer at that firm. Protection against a customer-caused default rests primarily with the management of the clearing member and the importance placed on its internal risk management controls.
Quote from mind:
let us face it, refco was an excellent choice. do not try to avoid that "mistake" ... it is impossible. this business is not about avoiding mistakes but about winning in the end ... and mistakes (=loosing trades) are part of the game.
Mind,
Refco was not a wise choice, and this would have been obvious to anyone who performed the due diligence recommended by the CME and CFTC. Refco, in the 1990s, misused segregated customer funds as a means to pay its debts. Refco then returned those funds, after temporarily misusing them to keep Refco afloat. Refco did this over and over again, on a routine, almost daily basis. The CFTC made these findings, and Refco consented to them without admitting or denying wrongdoing, and paid a $1.25 million fine.
If Refco had gone bankrupt, before it could return the embezzled customer funds, then those customers would lost have the entire amount of the embezzled funds, which was well in excess of $100 million. If the bankruptcy had been triggered by large customer losses, in a black swan market event, then the losses to customers would have been far greater. It appears that the financial crisis of the late 1990s did in fact cause a huge uncovered loss, but that Refco again avoided bankruptcy by concealing that loss and transferring it to the parent holding company; and the present scandal erupted because that cover-up collapsed, revealing the huge loss.
If the CFTC were an effective regulator, it would have shut down Refco in 1994, rather than fining it. If Jim Rogers had performed due diligence, he would have recognized Refco's history of embezzling segregated customer funds, and he could have avoided his current situation, of not being able to get back hundreds of millions of dollars of client funds which he deposited into Refco's segregated customer funds, but which Refco effectively embezzled by parking those funds in non-segregated accounts.
It is not prudent to clear through a clearing futures broker having a history of embezzling from segregated customer funds.
Nature gave us brains so that we could use them to avoid at least some mistakes. It is impossible to avoid all mistakes, but many mistakes are avoidable.