. COUNT III: DUE PROCESS 140. Plaintiff State repeats and re-alleges the allegations above, as if fully set forth herein. 141. When election practices reach “the point of patent and fundamental unfairness,” the integrity of the election itself violates substantive due process. Griffin v. Burns, 570 F.2d 1065, 1077 (1st Cir. 1978); Duncan v. Poythress, 657 F.2d 691, 702 (5th Cir. 1981); Florida State Conference of N.A.A.C.P. v. Browning, 522 F.3d 1153, 1183-84 (11th Cir. 2008); Roe v. State of Ala. By & Through Evans, 43 F.3d 574, 580-82 (11th Cir. 1995); Roe v. State of Ala., 68 F.3d 404, 407 (11th Cir. 1995); Marks v. Stinson, 19 F. 3d 873, 878 (3rd Cir. 1994). 142. Under this Court’s precedents on procedural due process, not only intentional failure to follow election law as enacted by a State’s legislature but also random and unauthorized acts by state election officials and their designees in local government can violate the Due Process Clause. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 537-41 (1981), overruled in part on other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1986); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 532 (1984). 39 The difference between intentional acts and random and unauthorized acts is the degree of pre-deprivation review. 143. Defendant States acted unconstitutionally to lower their election standards— including to allow invalid ballots to be counted and valid ballots to not be counted—with the express intent to favor their candidate for President and to alter the outcome of the 2020 election. In many instances these actions occurred in areas having a history of election fraud. 144. The actions set out in Paragraphs 66-73 (Georgia), 80-93 (Michigan), 44-55 (Pennsylvania), and 106-24 (Wisconsin) constitute intentional violations of State election law by State election officials and their designees in Defendant States Pennsylvania, Georgia, Michigan, and Wisconsin, in violation of the Due Process Clause.