Penn Judge: Muslims Allowed to Attack People for Insulting Mohammad
- Thread starter Banjo
- Start date
Here is the latest news article on the trial, which continues on Monday.
http://www.wral.com/news/state/story/10774596/
Here is a link to the Twisted Truth series of articles in the Raleigh News & Observer which outlines how this DA, Tracey Cline, totally abused the justice system.
http://www.newsobserver.com/twistedtruth/
The First Amendment is there to protect controversial speech or expression. Popular and widely accepted ideas need no protection. So the idea that an expression can be banned because it offends someone is suspect from the beginning.
Courts have carved out a narrow exception for so-called fighting words. They can be banned and their use is at least a mitigating factor in an ensuing physical encounter.
The question is who decides what are fighting words? Clearly, fundamentalist muslims consider the slightest criticism of their religion to warrant a beating if not death. A wilfull mockery is beyond the pale. Most african americans would deem the "N" word to be fighting words. As we get more and more PC, more and more groups are ready to riot at the drop of a hat over some perceived insult. The end result is that we give a veto power over expression to the most violent among us. I can't see that as a good thing.
Courts have carved out a narrow exception for so-called fighting words. They can be banned and their use is at least a mitigating factor in an ensuing physical encounter.
The question is who decides what are fighting words? Clearly, fundamentalist muslims consider the slightest criticism of their religion to warrant a beating if not death. A wilfull mockery is beyond the pale. Most african americans would deem the "N" word to be fighting words. As we get more and more PC, more and more groups are ready to riot at the drop of a hat over some perceived insult. The end result is that we give a veto power over expression to the most violent among us. I can't see that as a good thing.
There is a good page in Wikipedia on this. thanks for the heads up.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fighting_words
The fighting words doctrine, in United States constitutional law, is a limitation to freedom of speech as protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. In its 9-0 decision, Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire (1942), the U.S. Supreme Court established the doctrine and held that "insulting or 'fighting words,' those that by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace" are among the "well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech the prevention and punishment of [which] ... have never been thought to raise any constitutional problem."
[edit]Chaplinsky decision
Chaplinsky, a Jehovah's Witness, had purportedly told a New Hampshire town marshal who was attempting to prevent him from preaching that he was "a God-damned racketeer" and "a damned fascist" and was arrested. The court upheld the arrest and wrote in its decision that
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or "fighting words" those that by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.
â Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 1942
[edit]Post-Chaplinsky
The court has continued to uphold the doctrine but also steadily narrowed the grounds on which fighting words are held to apply. In Street v. New York (1969),[2] the court overturned a statute prohibiting flag-burning and verbally abusing the flag, holding that mere offensiveness does not qualify as "fighting words". In similar manner, in Cohen v. California (1971), Cohen's wearing a jacket that said "fuck the draft" did not constitute uttering fighting words since there had been no "personally abusive epithets"; the Court held the phrase to be protected speech. In later decisionsâGooding v. Wilson (1972) and Lewis v. New Orleans (1974)âthe Court invalidated convictions of individuals who cursed police officers, finding that the ordinances in question were unconstitutionally overbroad.
In R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul (1992), the Court overturned a statute prohibiting cross burning on the grounds that the specific statute was content-based, and viewpoint-based, i.e., that the statute limited its proscription only to race, religion, creed, etc. The Court, however, made it repeatedly clear that the City could have pursued "any number" of other avenues, and reaffirmed the notion that "fighting words" could be properly regulated by municipal or state governments.
In Snyder v. Phelps (2011), dissenting Justice Samuel Alito likened the protests of the Westboro Baptist Church members to fighting words and of a personal character, and thus not protected speech. The majority disagreed and stated that the protester's speech was not personal but public, and that local laws which can shield funeral attendees from protesters are adequate for protecting those in times of emotional distress.
[edit]Incitement vs. fighting words
Incitement is a related doctrine, allowing the government to prohibit advocacy of unlawful actions if the advocacy is both intended to and likely to cause immediate breach of the peace. The modern standard was defined in Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969), where the Court reversed the conviction of a Ku Klux Klan leader accused of advocating violence against racial minorities and the national government. The Ohio statute under which the conviction occurred was overturned as unconstitutional because "the mere abstract teaching of the moral propriety or even moral necessity for a resort to force and violence, is not the same as preparing a group for violent action and steeling it to such action." [3]
The difference between incitement and fighting words is subtle, focusing on the intent of the speaker. Inciting speech is characterized by the speaker's intent to make someone else the instrument of his or her unlawful will. Fighting words, by contrast, are intended to cause the hearer to react to the speaker.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fighting_words
The fighting words doctrine, in United States constitutional law, is a limitation to freedom of speech as protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. In its 9-0 decision, Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire (1942), the U.S. Supreme Court established the doctrine and held that "insulting or 'fighting words,' those that by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace" are among the "well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech the prevention and punishment of [which] ... have never been thought to raise any constitutional problem."
[edit]Chaplinsky decision
Chaplinsky, a Jehovah's Witness, had purportedly told a New Hampshire town marshal who was attempting to prevent him from preaching that he was "a God-damned racketeer" and "a damned fascist" and was arrested. The court upheld the arrest and wrote in its decision that
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or "fighting words" those that by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.
â Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 1942
[edit]Post-Chaplinsky
The court has continued to uphold the doctrine but also steadily narrowed the grounds on which fighting words are held to apply. In Street v. New York (1969),[2] the court overturned a statute prohibiting flag-burning and verbally abusing the flag, holding that mere offensiveness does not qualify as "fighting words". In similar manner, in Cohen v. California (1971), Cohen's wearing a jacket that said "fuck the draft" did not constitute uttering fighting words since there had been no "personally abusive epithets"; the Court held the phrase to be protected speech. In later decisionsâGooding v. Wilson (1972) and Lewis v. New Orleans (1974)âthe Court invalidated convictions of individuals who cursed police officers, finding that the ordinances in question were unconstitutionally overbroad.
In R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul (1992), the Court overturned a statute prohibiting cross burning on the grounds that the specific statute was content-based, and viewpoint-based, i.e., that the statute limited its proscription only to race, religion, creed, etc. The Court, however, made it repeatedly clear that the City could have pursued "any number" of other avenues, and reaffirmed the notion that "fighting words" could be properly regulated by municipal or state governments.
In Snyder v. Phelps (2011), dissenting Justice Samuel Alito likened the protests of the Westboro Baptist Church members to fighting words and of a personal character, and thus not protected speech. The majority disagreed and stated that the protester's speech was not personal but public, and that local laws which can shield funeral attendees from protesters are adequate for protecting those in times of emotional distress.
[edit]Incitement vs. fighting words
Incitement is a related doctrine, allowing the government to prohibit advocacy of unlawful actions if the advocacy is both intended to and likely to cause immediate breach of the peace. The modern standard was defined in Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969), where the Court reversed the conviction of a Ku Klux Klan leader accused of advocating violence against racial minorities and the national government. The Ohio statute under which the conviction occurred was overturned as unconstitutional because "the mere abstract teaching of the moral propriety or even moral necessity for a resort to force and violence, is not the same as preparing a group for violent action and steeling it to such action." [3]
The difference between incitement and fighting words is subtle, focusing on the intent of the speaker. Inciting speech is characterized by the speaker's intent to make someone else the instrument of his or her unlawful will. Fighting words, by contrast, are intended to cause the hearer to react to the speaker.
So tradingjournals posts are amazingly the same in spirit and thinking as the views of unanimous decisions by judges as far back back as 1942, in addition to holmes. Notice the key role of injury as the deciding element!
Judges:
"
In its 9-0 decision, Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire (1942), the U.S. Supreme Court established the doctrine and held that "insulting or 'fighting words,' those that by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace" are among the "well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech the prevention and punishment of [which] ... have never been thought to raise any constitutional problem."
TradjingJournals:
Judges:
"
In its 9-0 decision, Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire (1942), the U.S. Supreme Court established the doctrine and held that "insulting or 'fighting words,' those that by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace" are among the "well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech the prevention and punishment of [which] ... have never been thought to raise any constitutional problem."
TradjingJournals:
Tradingjournals post on the word "fire" was amazingly the same as Holmes opinion. Even the scenario turned out to be an actual case, and the decision the same as tradingjournals'. 
Holmes (cut and paste from trefoil's input):
"Falsely shouting "Fire!" in a crowded theater, i.e. shouting "Fire!" when one believes there to be no fire in order to cause panic, was interpreted not to be protected by the First Amendment."
Holmes (cut and paste from trefoil's input):
"Falsely shouting "Fire!" in a crowded theater, i.e. shouting "Fire!" when one believes there to be no fire in order to cause panic, was interpreted not to be protected by the First Amendment."
I think that the only material the citizens of Pennsylvania need to be paying attention to right now is information on the legal procedures required to remove a judge in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. An overview is provided at the following link:
http://www.cjdpa.org/geninfo.html
http://www.cjdpa.org/geninfo.html