First, Hitler was the leader of a country, a clearly defined enemy who could be localised. Terrorism on the other hand is anonymous and mostly highly defragmented, as in zealot terrorism will not disappear just because, say, Bin Laden has.
Anyway, we're all agreed that we want to stop terrorism, we just have to find the most effective way of doing that without aggravating the situation in the process, in order to do that we need to get the leaders and bring them to justice WITHOUT making martyrs out of them in the process, plus, probably more important, we need to get at the roots of the problem.
The A#1 problem espoused by radical fanatics is that they see us as the main funders of their "enemy" Israel, and therefore by association we are also the enemy.
The only way we'll get that out of the way is by not only having SHARON AND ARAFAT SHAKE HANDS FOR NICE TV COVERAGE, but by getting the peace accords through and allowing the peoples of both denominations to find a way of coexistence, AND us being seen as a NEUTRAL HONEST BROKER, interested in lasting EQUITABLE SOLUTIONS, and NOT seen as taking sides.
And to all the naysayers, NOBODY was willing to accept a mere 12 years ago that the Iron Curtain or Berlin Wall were ever going to come down in our lifetimes, or think Apartheid in South Africa, ditto about the peace process in Northern Ireland. Ok, it's not perfect in N. Ireland, but hey, compare that with the situation just a couple of years ago, and any incremental improvement is loads better than everything they had before, and relapses are just a normal part of the process of moving forward. Hey, we're only human, right?
Problem A#2 is our troops in Saudia Arabia, that being the custodian land of their holiest sites, and us being "infidels", ok ok, but, let's face it, some Americans would probably have a severe problem with the idea of, say, Japan, massively stationing troops here, heck, loads of Americans already have problems with the UN being in New York and see "Black UN helicopter gunships" threatening our freedom. People, definitely including us, just aren't always that rational, right?
Let's deal with A#2 when A#1 is underway.
London's Guardian Newspaper warns that a harsh response to the terror could be inefective and, worse, create "enemies not just among governments but their citizens as well. ... Right now America needs a statesman, but wants a cowboy. Bush must steel himself to lead, not allow himself to follow."www.slate.com
OK, who helped create Osama Bin Laden and the evil Taliban regime anyway, just to keep some perspective here?
A bitter harvest
Sep 13th 2001 | LAHORE
From The Economist print edition
The sufferings of Afghanistan come to New York
IN ITS understandable rage for justice, America may be tempted to overlook one uncomfortable fact. Its own policies in Afghanistan a decade and more ago helped to create both Osama bin Laden and the fundamentalist Taliban regime that shelters him.
The notion of jihad, or holy war, had almost ceased to exist in the Muslim world after the tenth century until it was revived, with American encouragement, to fire an international pan-Islamic movement after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. For the next ten years, the CIA and Saudi intelligence together pumped in billions of dollarsâ worth of arms and ammunition through Pakistanâs Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI) to the many mujahideen groups fighting in Afghanistan.
The policy worked, but after withdrawal of Soviet forces in 1989, a terrible legacy remained: Afghanistan was left awash with weapons, warlords and extreme religious zealotry.
For the past ten years that deadly brew has spread its ill-effects widely. Pakistan has suffered terrible destabilisation. But the afghanis, the name given to the young Muslim men who fought the infidel in Afghanistan, have carried their jihad far beyond: to the corrupt kingdoms of the Gulf, to the repressive states of the southern Mediterranean, and now, perhaps, to New York and Washington, DC.
Chief among the afghanis was Mr bin Laden, a scion of one of Saudi Arabiaâs richest business families. Recruited by the Saudi intelligence chief, Prince Turki al Faisal, to help raise funds for the jihad, he became central to the recruitment and training of mujahideen from across the Muslim world. Mr bin Laden fought against the Russians on the side of the ISIâs favourite Afghan, Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, whose Hezb-e-Islami party became the largest recipient of CIA money.
After the Russians withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, the Americans quickly lost interest in the country and a struggle for power erupted among the mujahideen. But since no group was strong enough to capture and hold Kabul, the capital, Afghanistan slumped into anarchy. In 1995-96, a movement of Pathan studentsâTalibanâfrom religious schools in the border regions of Afghanistan and Pakistan swept the country, promising a restoration of order. They enjoyed Pakistani backing, and almost certainly the approval of the Americans.
Meanwhile, Mr bin Laden had become a self-avowed enemy of America, appalled at the presence of American troops on holy Saudi soil during the Gulf war. Exiled to Sudan, he was soon forced to leave. He secretly returned to Afghanistan, becoming a guest of the Taliban, whose interpretation of Islam and hostility to the West he shares. After attacks on two American embassies in 1998, America tried to persuade the Taliban to surrender him. When the regime refused, the Americans retaliated by raining cruise missiles on guerrilla camps in Afghanistan. The Taliban have steadfastly refused to hand Mr bin Laden over. As their guest he remains.
The Economist
And, how do you EFFECTIVELY deal with terrorism, FORCE or GOING AFTER THE ROOTS OF THE PROBLEMS?
Coping with Terrorism
Should a state respond to terrorist attacks with force or seek to address root causes through political dialogue?
Rescue workers carry a woman over the rubble of a building destroyed during the terrorist bombing at the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, in August. (AP/Wide World)
Some experts view terrorism as the antithesis of politics, as a profoundly threatening assault on the state that demands a forceful military response. Others argue that terrorism is a form of political communication, one that seeks to discredit a particular political system through violent means and warrants a political response if the response is to be effective.
According to the latter view, politically marginalized groups or individuals use terrorism to engage the state apparatus in some form of âdialogue,â whether the state likes it or not. An act of terrorism says, âYou cannot ignore us,â explains Paul Arthur, a former senior fellow at the U.S. Institute of Peace and professor of politics at the University of Ulster in Northern Ireland.
In the case of Northern Ireland, the governmentâs shift away from a military response to terrorism to a political responseâits willingness to engage in political dialogue, to examine the roots of the problem, and to search for political solutionsâfinally led to the recent peace agreement there, Arthur says. A military response to terrorism is the easiest for a state to undertake. âHowever, the consequences of a military response cannot always be, and only rarely are, anticipated,â Arthur says. Such a response mostly simply galvanizes terrorist movements or drives sympathetic elements of a society to support it.
Author: Robert Oakely of the National Defense University, former Director of the Office of Combating Terrorism at the State Department and former U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan, Somalia, and Zaire.
United States Institute of Peace, Washington, DC