resinate, as one of the resident 'right wing thugs' of ET, I hope I can ease your mind a little by saying that I agree that the use of the atomic bombs in Japan is very difficult to justify, perhaps unjustifiable. And that yes, the US -- as virtually all nations -- has 'blood on its hands'. So, if like ART, the standard which you judge against is absolute perfection, then, hooray for you, the US comes up short yet again.
Pat Tillman and Mohammad Atta: Ethical Equals?
- Thread starter Rearden Metal
- Start date
resinate, as one of the resident 'right wing thugs' of ET, I hope I can ease your mind a little by saying that I agree that the use of the atomic bombs in Japan is very difficult to justify, perhaps unjustifiable. And that yes, the US -- as virtually all nations -- has 'blood on its hands'. So, if like ART, the standard which you judge against is absolute perfection, then, hooray for you, the US comes up short yet again.
I would like to see ART's sources and those of others who believe Japan was on the verge of surrender and that the use of Little Boy and Fat Man were unnecessary.
My understanding is that an invasion of Japan would have cost 1 million US casualties, many times more on the Japanese side, and taken years. The geography of Japan is mostly mountainous. Imagine trying to pacify a nation the size of California in terrain that favors the guerilla fighter.
Having lived in Japan, and discussed this with Japanese teachers and history professors, my belief is that the Japanese populace had been so thoroughly convinced that the American soldiers would be barbaric murder/rapists, that the resistance would have been formidable. Back then the Emperor was considered a living God, and centuries of feudalism and a strict social hierarchy had instilled in the populace an almost blind devotion and obedience to authority. Look at what happened in Saipan and Okinawa; the Japanese civilians preferred mass suicide over being taken prisoner by US soldiers. Furthermore, the Japanese soldiers very rarely surrendered. To them doing so was dishonorable to the core.
Nothing I have read indicates to me that Hirohito, whether by personal choice or pressured by the Tojo regime, was prepared to surrender prior to the atomic bombs being dropped.
-----------------
As for the subject of this thread, I agree with ART that whether or not you are right or wrong depends wholly on what side you are on. To most Americans, Tillman was a hero and Atta a terrorist. To millions of Muslims, it is the reverse.
I fully accept that Atta and his ilk believe they are "right." Frankly, it doesn't matter to me. All I know is they want to kill me, my family, and my fellow Americans, and they will stop at nothing to do so. As such, it is simply a matter of us killing them before they kill us.
No doubt millions of would-be Attas feel the same way towards us.
My understanding is that an invasion of Japan would have cost 1 million US casualties, many times more on the Japanese side, and taken years. The geography of Japan is mostly mountainous. Imagine trying to pacify a nation the size of California in terrain that favors the guerilla fighter.
Having lived in Japan, and discussed this with Japanese teachers and history professors, my belief is that the Japanese populace had been so thoroughly convinced that the American soldiers would be barbaric murder/rapists, that the resistance would have been formidable. Back then the Emperor was considered a living God, and centuries of feudalism and a strict social hierarchy had instilled in the populace an almost blind devotion and obedience to authority. Look at what happened in Saipan and Okinawa; the Japanese civilians preferred mass suicide over being taken prisoner by US soldiers. Furthermore, the Japanese soldiers very rarely surrendered. To them doing so was dishonorable to the core.
Nothing I have read indicates to me that Hirohito, whether by personal choice or pressured by the Tojo regime, was prepared to surrender prior to the atomic bombs being dropped.
-----------------
As for the subject of this thread, I agree with ART that whether or not you are right or wrong depends wholly on what side you are on. To most Americans, Tillman was a hero and Atta a terrorist. To millions of Muslims, it is the reverse.
I fully accept that Atta and his ilk believe they are "right." Frankly, it doesn't matter to me. All I know is they want to kill me, my family, and my fellow Americans, and they will stop at nothing to do so. As such, it is simply a matter of us killing them before they kill us.
No doubt millions of would-be Attas feel the same way towards us.
Hapa, you have it exactly right once again. Unfortunately, ART has no interest in fact or history. Rather, he prefers to regurgitate whatever revisionist nonsense has been spoon fed to him by the whacky fringe pseudo-intellectuals he so adores.
But, as I said to the wickless Candle, it may unfortunately take a suicide bombing outside ART's door to get him to understand the "ethical distinction" between good and evil. Let's of course hope it never comes to that, and that, together with the free and civilized peoples of the world, under the leadership of this Great and Good land, we can erase this evil scourge from the face of the Earth before it does the same to us.
(Oh, just to clarify, by "evil scourge" I was referring to Militant Islam, not ART.)
Why the atom bomb wasn't necessary to end the war
By Janet Bloomfield, Chair of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament
I believe that the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, when considered in a historical perspective, were undoubtedly unnecessary and barbarous acts. Those who support this view include Prime Minister Winston Churchill, Field Marshall Bernard Montgomery and General Dwight Eisenhower. I would ask the following questions of those who still support the bombings:
Why was there no demonstration explosion in an uninhabited area to convince the Japanese of the awesome power of the bomb?
Why was it necessary to bomb two cities?
During the pause for thought that these questions invoke I will use the words of others, involved at the time, as well as evidence that has come to light since, which prove that:
"Japan was at that very moment seeking some way to surrender with a minimum loss of 'face'... It wasn't necessary to hit them with that awful thing." (General Eisenhower).
First, let us stop for a minute and remember the impact of the atomic bombs.
The uranium bomb exploded over Hiroshima on 6 August 1945 and the plutonium bomb used on Nagasaki on 9 August killed tens of thousands instantly and had claimed 350,000 lives by 1950. Those not killed or vaporised immediately by the blast were horribly burned by the intense heat of the explosion. Eye-witness accounts describe traumatised people wandering with their skin trailing from their bodies 'like walking ghosts'. All recorded pregnancies within a two-mile radius of the centre of the blast resulted in miscarriage or stillbirth. Even today, survivors live with the fear that they may be struck down by a radiation-related disease.
We now know that the allies were aware by May 1945 that the Japanese were attempting to make contact in order to negotiate a surrender and that Japan was being overcome by conventional might. According to Admiral William D. Leahy, Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and President Truman's Chief of Staff:
"The Japanese were already defeated and ready to surrender because of the effective sea blockade and the successful bombing with conventional weapons... In being the first to use it [the atomic bomb], we had adopted an ethical standard common to the barbarians of the Dark Ages."
April: General Curtis le May (US Air Force) expressed a belief that the war could be ended by September or October without an invasion.
May 12: William Donovan, Director of the Office of Strategic Studies, reported to President Truman that Shuichi Kate, Japan's Minister to Switzerland, wished to "help arrange for a cessation of hostilities."
Mid-June: "A surrender of Japan can be arranged with terms that can be accepted by Japan and that will make fully satisfactory provision for America's defense against future trans-Pacific aggression." Admiral W.D. Leahy, President's Chief of Staff.
July 16: The US exploded a nuclear bomb secrety in the New Mexico desert to prove to themselves that it would work.
July 18: Stalin told Truman that he had had a telegram from the Japanese Emperor himself asking for peace. Code-breakers were already aware of this. The Soviet Union was still officially neutral at that time.
August 10: The Japanese publicly broadcast an offer of surrender. Truman ordered conventional military operations to continue full force.
August 14: The Japanese surrender was accepted.
"It would be a mistake to suppose that the fate of Japan was settled by the atomic bomb. Her defeat was certain before the first bomb fell." (UK Prime Minister Winston Churchill.)
"Certainly prior to 31 December 1945... Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated." (US Strategic Bombing Survey, 1946.)
If Japan was ready to surrender, there must have been another reason for the atom bombs to have been used. This, unbelievable as it might seem, was to make a point to the Soviet Union.
Vannevar Bush (Chief Aide for atomic matters to Stimson, the Secretary of State for War) confirmed this when he said that the bomb was: "delivered on time so there was no necessity for any concessions to Russia at the end of the war."
The US did not want the Soviet Union to be involved in the anticipated 'last push' land invasion of Northern China, since this would put it in a good position to exert influence in the area once hostilities ceased. The US therefore attempted to end the fighting before the Red Army entered Chinese territory but did not accept Japanese moves to surrender, leaving President Truman confident about finishing the war in the Far East with as little help from Russia as possible.
Truman postponed meeting Churchill and Stalin to discuss post-war territorial control until after July 16, when the first ever atomic explosion took place as the US tested its new weapon in New Mexico. Truman went to Potsdam, Germany, the very next day buoyed by the conviction that he had a weapon which would, as predicted by his Secretary of State, James Byrnes, "make Russia more manageable in Europe."
The Hiroshima bomb was dropped on 6 August. The message to the Japanese must have been unmistakable and it is difficult to imagine why a second one should have been used on August 9. Except that the Soviet Union was due to enter the war in that week and the US wanted to demonstrate to the Soviets the awesome power that they would be dealing with once the war was over.
In part because he wanted to wait until the bomb was ready, President Truman ignored advice in May 1945 from Acting Secretary of State Grew that changing the surrender terms might well halt the fighting. Some came to believe that this actually cost lives. Stimson, Secretary of State for War, said: "History might find that the US, by its delay in stating its position, had prolonged the war."
It is clear that 50 years on, the existing mythology must be questioned and a more sober assessment of the facts is needed. The need for this has been brought sharply into focus by the latest twist in the Arms Trade race.
For the past few years there has been a general impression that there is no longer a nuclear threat. This, alas, is far from the truth. Whilst the US and Russia take tentative steps towards a build-down, France, China and the UK are increasing their arsenals. The British Government has stated that the new Trident nuclear warheads will be used for targeting non-nuclear states. The French decision to resume nuclear testing in the South Pacific in September threatens to unleash a new wave of nuclear proliferation, since the only reason to test is to develop new nuclear weapons. It may cause the breakdown of talks in Geneva towards a complete nuclear test ban, an important step on the road to disarmament.
By Janet Bloomfield, Chair of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament
I believe that the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, when considered in a historical perspective, were undoubtedly unnecessary and barbarous acts. Those who support this view include Prime Minister Winston Churchill, Field Marshall Bernard Montgomery and General Dwight Eisenhower. I would ask the following questions of those who still support the bombings:
Why was there no demonstration explosion in an uninhabited area to convince the Japanese of the awesome power of the bomb?
Why was it necessary to bomb two cities?
During the pause for thought that these questions invoke I will use the words of others, involved at the time, as well as evidence that has come to light since, which prove that:
"Japan was at that very moment seeking some way to surrender with a minimum loss of 'face'... It wasn't necessary to hit them with that awful thing." (General Eisenhower).
First, let us stop for a minute and remember the impact of the atomic bombs.
The uranium bomb exploded over Hiroshima on 6 August 1945 and the plutonium bomb used on Nagasaki on 9 August killed tens of thousands instantly and had claimed 350,000 lives by 1950. Those not killed or vaporised immediately by the blast were horribly burned by the intense heat of the explosion. Eye-witness accounts describe traumatised people wandering with their skin trailing from their bodies 'like walking ghosts'. All recorded pregnancies within a two-mile radius of the centre of the blast resulted in miscarriage or stillbirth. Even today, survivors live with the fear that they may be struck down by a radiation-related disease.
We now know that the allies were aware by May 1945 that the Japanese were attempting to make contact in order to negotiate a surrender and that Japan was being overcome by conventional might. According to Admiral William D. Leahy, Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and President Truman's Chief of Staff:
"The Japanese were already defeated and ready to surrender because of the effective sea blockade and the successful bombing with conventional weapons... In being the first to use it [the atomic bomb], we had adopted an ethical standard common to the barbarians of the Dark Ages."
April: General Curtis le May (US Air Force) expressed a belief that the war could be ended by September or October without an invasion.
May 12: William Donovan, Director of the Office of Strategic Studies, reported to President Truman that Shuichi Kate, Japan's Minister to Switzerland, wished to "help arrange for a cessation of hostilities."
Mid-June: "A surrender of Japan can be arranged with terms that can be accepted by Japan and that will make fully satisfactory provision for America's defense against future trans-Pacific aggression." Admiral W.D. Leahy, President's Chief of Staff.
July 16: The US exploded a nuclear bomb secrety in the New Mexico desert to prove to themselves that it would work.
July 18: Stalin told Truman that he had had a telegram from the Japanese Emperor himself asking for peace. Code-breakers were already aware of this. The Soviet Union was still officially neutral at that time.
August 10: The Japanese publicly broadcast an offer of surrender. Truman ordered conventional military operations to continue full force.
August 14: The Japanese surrender was accepted.
"It would be a mistake to suppose that the fate of Japan was settled by the atomic bomb. Her defeat was certain before the first bomb fell." (UK Prime Minister Winston Churchill.)
"Certainly prior to 31 December 1945... Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated." (US Strategic Bombing Survey, 1946.)
If Japan was ready to surrender, there must have been another reason for the atom bombs to have been used. This, unbelievable as it might seem, was to make a point to the Soviet Union.
Vannevar Bush (Chief Aide for atomic matters to Stimson, the Secretary of State for War) confirmed this when he said that the bomb was: "delivered on time so there was no necessity for any concessions to Russia at the end of the war."
The US did not want the Soviet Union to be involved in the anticipated 'last push' land invasion of Northern China, since this would put it in a good position to exert influence in the area once hostilities ceased. The US therefore attempted to end the fighting before the Red Army entered Chinese territory but did not accept Japanese moves to surrender, leaving President Truman confident about finishing the war in the Far East with as little help from Russia as possible.
Truman postponed meeting Churchill and Stalin to discuss post-war territorial control until after July 16, when the first ever atomic explosion took place as the US tested its new weapon in New Mexico. Truman went to Potsdam, Germany, the very next day buoyed by the conviction that he had a weapon which would, as predicted by his Secretary of State, James Byrnes, "make Russia more manageable in Europe."
The Hiroshima bomb was dropped on 6 August. The message to the Japanese must have been unmistakable and it is difficult to imagine why a second one should have been used on August 9. Except that the Soviet Union was due to enter the war in that week and the US wanted to demonstrate to the Soviets the awesome power that they would be dealing with once the war was over.
In part because he wanted to wait until the bomb was ready, President Truman ignored advice in May 1945 from Acting Secretary of State Grew that changing the surrender terms might well halt the fighting. Some came to believe that this actually cost lives. Stimson, Secretary of State for War, said: "History might find that the US, by its delay in stating its position, had prolonged the war."
It is clear that 50 years on, the existing mythology must be questioned and a more sober assessment of the facts is needed. The need for this has been brought sharply into focus by the latest twist in the Arms Trade race.
For the past few years there has been a general impression that there is no longer a nuclear threat. This, alas, is far from the truth. Whilst the US and Russia take tentative steps towards a build-down, France, China and the UK are increasing their arsenals. The British Government has stated that the new Trident nuclear warheads will be used for targeting non-nuclear states. The French decision to resume nuclear testing in the South Pacific in September threatens to unleash a new wave of nuclear proliferation, since the only reason to test is to develop new nuclear weapons. It may cause the breakdown of talks in Geneva towards a complete nuclear test ban, an important step on the road to disarmament.
The following is from Peacewire
WAS HIROSHIMA NECESSARY TO END THE WAR?
"It is my opinion that the use of this barbarous weapon at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war against Japan. The Japanese were almost defeated and ready to surrender...in being the first to use it, we...adopted an ethical standard common to the barbarians of the Dark Ages."
---Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy,
Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during World War II
There is a widespread belief among Americans, particularly soldiers who were serving in the Pacific Theatre in the summer of 1945, that an invasion of Japan would cost as many as a million American lives, and the use of the atomic bomb at Hiroshima and Nagasaki brought the war to an end, with enormous saving of lives, both Japanese and American.
The reality is that in the months just prior to the August bombings, most of Japanese shipping, rail transport, and industrial production had been wiped out by an extraordinary series of air attacks. (More people died in one night in the fire bombing of Tokyo than died in the bombing of Hiroshima.) Millions were homeless. By July of 1945 both the Japanese and American military knew the war was lost.
Yet the myth persists that the use of nuclear weapons was necessary-- Ted Koppel repeated it in a Nightline broadcast--that "What happened over Japan...was a human tragedy...But what was planned to take place in the war between Japan and the United States would almost certainly have been an even greater tragedy."
The question of whether use of the bomb was necessary haunts us because if the bombs were not necessary they were war crimes, something painful for Americans to consider. It is true that by the end of World War II the lines between waging war and simply killing people in large numbers had been largely erased. The earlier strategy of air attacks had been to pinpoint strategic targets, but in Europe, by early 1945 the air attacks had assumed a different character--as if whatever sense of moral restraint had existed when the war began had vanished. The bombing of Dresden was not a military target. The fire bombing of that city created a fire storm resulting in a terrible loss of civilian life.
What was the real situation regarding Japan? The Japanese were concerned about whether the Emperor would be able to remain on his throne if they surrendered. As a result of the air attacks, and their steady isolation by U.S. sea power, the Japanese military were aware the war could not be won. In 1946 the official U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey concluded:
Certainly prior to 31 December 1945, and in all probability prior to 1 November 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated.
Not known to the general public until after the war, Japan had begun to put out feelers about surrender by May of 1945. On May 12, 1945, William Donovan, Director of the Office of Strategic Services (which later became the CIA) reported to President Truman that Shinichi Kase, Japanâs minister to Switzerland, wished "to help arrange for a cessation of hostilities." He believed one of the few provisions the Japanese would "insist upon would be the retention of the Emperor." A similar report reached Truman from Masutaro Inoue, a Japanese official in Portugal. In mid-June Admiral William D. Leahy concluded that "a surrender of Japan can be arranged with terms that can be accepted by Japan and that will make fully satisfactory provision for Americaâs defense against future trans-Pacific aggression."
Meanwhile, the U.S. learned through intercepted diplomatic cables (the U.S. had broken Japanese codes early in the war) that the emperor of Japan wished to send Prince Konoye to Moscow as his personal representative to "ask the Soviet Government to take part in mediation to end the present war and to transmit the complete Japanese case in this respect." In President Trumanâs handwritten journal, only released in 1979, he noted in July of 1945 that Stalin had reported "a telegram from Jap Emperor asking for peace."
Why then proceed with using the atomic bomb?
The most generous explanation would be that Truman did not fully understand what the atomic bomb would do, that he saw it as simply "another weapon". However, his military advisers knew it was in a different category. Even those favouring its use urged that it be used against a clearly military target with advance warning to civilians to leave the area. It is also possible that, being a politician, Truman wanted to justify the huge expense of the special crash program to develop the bomb--using it would prove to taxpayers that their funds had been well spent.
Historians now tend to believe that there was another explanation, which was that Hiroshima and Nagasaki were the opening shots fired in the Cold War. The Soviet Union did not fully convey to Truman the Japanese interest in surrender--because the Soviets wanted to enter the war and secure a place at the bargaining table. (Keep in mind that technically the Soviet Union remained an ally of Japan throughout World War II, and no state of war existed between them. The Soviets actually declared war on Japan August 8th, two days after the first atomic bomb was exploded.)
The United States, acting on the advice of conservative political advisers--not on the advice of its military leaders--dropped the first atomic bomb without responding to any of the Japanese peace feelers. Then, three days later, and after the Soviet entry in the war had made immediate Japanese surrender inevitable, the second bomb was dropped on Nagasaki. The first bomb was dropped after Japan had already begun the process of seeking the terms of surrender. The second bomb was dropped when it was clear no U.S. invasion of the Japanese home islands was needed. Are crimes of war only those actions committed by the nation which committed aggression? Was it not a crime to use the nuclear bomb without exploring the Japanese peace feelers? Fifty years will have passed this August 6, 1995, and the question remains why anyone still believes the use of the nuclear bomb was necessary. Opposing evidence is overwhelming. It is as if, to shield ourselves from knowledge of what we did, we refuse to examine the history of that period.
In closing it must be noted that neither the U.S. Congress nor the general public was even aware that a nuclear weapon was being developed, let alone that it would be used. As happens in war, morality vanished, secrecy prevailed, and great crimes were committed without consultation.
From "50 Years Since the Bomb: A Packet for Local Organizers." Published by the War Resisters League.
Compiled from articles by Gar Alperovitz, author of Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam, that appeared in the New York Times Op-ed page (August 3, 1989); Technology Review (August-September, 1990); and The Christian Science Monitor, written with Kai Bird (August 6, 1992).
Readers are urged to get Alperovitzâ book for a full account. Gar Alperovitz is president of the National Center for Economic Alternatives and a fellow of the Institute for Policy Studies in Washington.
WAS HIROSHIMA NECESSARY TO END THE WAR?
"It is my opinion that the use of this barbarous weapon at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war against Japan. The Japanese were almost defeated and ready to surrender...in being the first to use it, we...adopted an ethical standard common to the barbarians of the Dark Ages."
---Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy,
Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during World War II
There is a widespread belief among Americans, particularly soldiers who were serving in the Pacific Theatre in the summer of 1945, that an invasion of Japan would cost as many as a million American lives, and the use of the atomic bomb at Hiroshima and Nagasaki brought the war to an end, with enormous saving of lives, both Japanese and American.
The reality is that in the months just prior to the August bombings, most of Japanese shipping, rail transport, and industrial production had been wiped out by an extraordinary series of air attacks. (More people died in one night in the fire bombing of Tokyo than died in the bombing of Hiroshima.) Millions were homeless. By July of 1945 both the Japanese and American military knew the war was lost.
Yet the myth persists that the use of nuclear weapons was necessary-- Ted Koppel repeated it in a Nightline broadcast--that "What happened over Japan...was a human tragedy...But what was planned to take place in the war between Japan and the United States would almost certainly have been an even greater tragedy."
The question of whether use of the bomb was necessary haunts us because if the bombs were not necessary they were war crimes, something painful for Americans to consider. It is true that by the end of World War II the lines between waging war and simply killing people in large numbers had been largely erased. The earlier strategy of air attacks had been to pinpoint strategic targets, but in Europe, by early 1945 the air attacks had assumed a different character--as if whatever sense of moral restraint had existed when the war began had vanished. The bombing of Dresden was not a military target. The fire bombing of that city created a fire storm resulting in a terrible loss of civilian life.
What was the real situation regarding Japan? The Japanese were concerned about whether the Emperor would be able to remain on his throne if they surrendered. As a result of the air attacks, and their steady isolation by U.S. sea power, the Japanese military were aware the war could not be won. In 1946 the official U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey concluded:
Certainly prior to 31 December 1945, and in all probability prior to 1 November 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated.
Not known to the general public until after the war, Japan had begun to put out feelers about surrender by May of 1945. On May 12, 1945, William Donovan, Director of the Office of Strategic Services (which later became the CIA) reported to President Truman that Shinichi Kase, Japanâs minister to Switzerland, wished "to help arrange for a cessation of hostilities." He believed one of the few provisions the Japanese would "insist upon would be the retention of the Emperor." A similar report reached Truman from Masutaro Inoue, a Japanese official in Portugal. In mid-June Admiral William D. Leahy concluded that "a surrender of Japan can be arranged with terms that can be accepted by Japan and that will make fully satisfactory provision for Americaâs defense against future trans-Pacific aggression."
Meanwhile, the U.S. learned through intercepted diplomatic cables (the U.S. had broken Japanese codes early in the war) that the emperor of Japan wished to send Prince Konoye to Moscow as his personal representative to "ask the Soviet Government to take part in mediation to end the present war and to transmit the complete Japanese case in this respect." In President Trumanâs handwritten journal, only released in 1979, he noted in July of 1945 that Stalin had reported "a telegram from Jap Emperor asking for peace."
Why then proceed with using the atomic bomb?
The most generous explanation would be that Truman did not fully understand what the atomic bomb would do, that he saw it as simply "another weapon". However, his military advisers knew it was in a different category. Even those favouring its use urged that it be used against a clearly military target with advance warning to civilians to leave the area. It is also possible that, being a politician, Truman wanted to justify the huge expense of the special crash program to develop the bomb--using it would prove to taxpayers that their funds had been well spent.
Historians now tend to believe that there was another explanation, which was that Hiroshima and Nagasaki were the opening shots fired in the Cold War. The Soviet Union did not fully convey to Truman the Japanese interest in surrender--because the Soviets wanted to enter the war and secure a place at the bargaining table. (Keep in mind that technically the Soviet Union remained an ally of Japan throughout World War II, and no state of war existed between them. The Soviets actually declared war on Japan August 8th, two days after the first atomic bomb was exploded.)
The United States, acting on the advice of conservative political advisers--not on the advice of its military leaders--dropped the first atomic bomb without responding to any of the Japanese peace feelers. Then, three days later, and after the Soviet entry in the war had made immediate Japanese surrender inevitable, the second bomb was dropped on Nagasaki. The first bomb was dropped after Japan had already begun the process of seeking the terms of surrender. The second bomb was dropped when it was clear no U.S. invasion of the Japanese home islands was needed. Are crimes of war only those actions committed by the nation which committed aggression? Was it not a crime to use the nuclear bomb without exploring the Japanese peace feelers? Fifty years will have passed this August 6, 1995, and the question remains why anyone still believes the use of the nuclear bomb was necessary. Opposing evidence is overwhelming. It is as if, to shield ourselves from knowledge of what we did, we refuse to examine the history of that period.
In closing it must be noted that neither the U.S. Congress nor the general public was even aware that a nuclear weapon was being developed, let alone that it would be used. As happens in war, morality vanished, secrecy prevailed, and great crimes were committed without consultation.
From "50 Years Since the Bomb: A Packet for Local Organizers." Published by the War Resisters League.
Compiled from articles by Gar Alperovitz, author of Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam, that appeared in the New York Times Op-ed page (August 3, 1989); Technology Review (August-September, 1990); and The Christian Science Monitor, written with Kai Bird (August 6, 1992).
Readers are urged to get Alperovitzâ book for a full account. Gar Alperovitz is president of the National Center for Economic Alternatives and a fellow of the Institute for Policy Studies in Washington.
H_D, I don't believe ART is the ignoramus you would like to believe he is. My sense is that he is well-read and quite astute on the subject of history. Having said that, I do think he enjoys arguing for the sake of it, especially on subjects which the majority believe are very black and white. ART likes to push buttons.
As for the "ethical distinction" between good and evil, it very much depends on which side you are on, doesn't it? Al-Qaeda et al very much believe that we are the evil ones. Just like beauty, good and evil are very much in the eye of the beholder.
H
p.s. "wickless candle." LOL!
What are you like 15? You are now officially the first (and only) ET member that isn't worthy of any further responses. And considering the kind of threads I've been involved in, that's really saying something.
Art, I feel sorry for you. Really...
You feel sorry for me?
Too funny.
Thanks.
Too funny.
Thanks.