I am not an advocate for the banks. If you have read my comments, you would know this.Quote from ralph00:
I'm not concerned with bank shareholders or their creditors (other than depositors). You, as board spokesman for the banker-centric regime in place here and across the pond are.
In the 30s, commerce stopped. Businesses and individuals lost the ability to pay for anything overnight as the money in their accounts disappeared. That was never at risk here. Bank deposits - guaranteed. Money markets - guaranteed.
I'm not saying there wouldn't have been a painful credit squeeze and near-depression, because there would have been (and should have been). Now we're out of it, but have transferred the price to those who can least afford it, by sending the price of necessity items through the roof and not letting asset prices clear to where folks can afford them on their newly reduced incomes.
My point is that in the '08 crisis, deposits (and depositor insurance) didn't matter and commerce was going to stop. Modern businesses and individuals rely on short-term credit mechanisms (e.g. commercial paper, letters of credit, etc) and, once that system freezes, it's EXACTLY equivalent to money disappearing from your account. And that was precisely the risk that the various Fed programs were supposed to address (btw, the money mkt guarantee, MMIFF, was only put in place once the sh1t hit the fan).
As to your last point, you seem to be awfully cavalier about it. How can you be certain that the "painful credit squeeze and near-depression" doesn't turn into a depression right and proper? What gives you the magical power to draw the line between what "should have been" and the worse outcome that you believe was worth preventing? I am also quite confused about the transfer of the cost onto people who can ill afford it. Did the various crisis measures transfer these costs or are you referring to later policies? Also, who are these people who can least afford the costs?