Isn't a contractual issue? In other words, the customers were warned of the risks in the signed contract?
This customer protection proposal incorporates these NFA rules into the Commissionâs regulations so that the CFTC can directly enforce these important rules. Under this proposal, FCMs would be required to:
⢠Hold sufficient funds in Part 30 secured accounts (funds held for U.S. foreign futures and options customers trading on foreign contract markets) to meet their total obligations to customers trading on foreign markets computed under the net liquidating equity method. FCMs would no longer be allowed to use the alternative method, which had allowed them to hold a lower amount of funds representing the margin on their foreign futures;
⢠Maintain written policies and procedures governing the maintenance of excess funds in customer segregated and Part 30 secured accounts. Withdrawals of 25 percent or more would necessitate pre-approval in writing by senior management and must be reported to the designated SRO and the CFTC; and
⢠Make additional reports available to the SRO and the CFTC, including daily computations of segregated and Part 30 secured amounts.
Beyond the NFA rules, additional reforms in this proposal benefited from the CFTCâs broad outreach and consultation with the SROs and market participants, as well as substantial feedback from CFTC Commissioners. They include:
⢠First, bringing the regulatorsâ view of customer accounts into the 21st century by giving the SROs and the CFTC direct electronic access to FCMsâ bank and custodial accounts for customer funds, without asking the FCMsâ permission. Further, acknowledgement letters and confirmation letters must come directly to regulators from banks and custodians.
⢠Second, increasing disclosures to customers regarding the risks associated with futures trading and using FCMs to invest their funds. Futures customers, if they wish, should have access to information about how their assets are held, similar to that which is available to mutual fund and securities customers. FCMs would be required to provide current and potential customers with specific information about the FCMâs risks.
⢠Third, enhancing controls at FCMs regarding how customer accounts are handled, including policies and procedures on supervision and risk management of customer funds.
⢠Fourth, setting standards for the SROsâ examinations and the annual certified financial statement audits, including raising minimum standards for independent public accountants who audit FCMs.
⢠Fifth, requiring FCMs to ensure they back up segregated customer accounts with funds to cover potential margin deficits.
⢠Sixth, implementing a more effective early warning system for the Commission and the SROs that alerts them to certain problems, including a) when an FCMâs funds are insufficient to meet the targeted residual interest in customer accounts b) when there is a material adverse impact to the FCMâs creditworthiness and c) when there is a material change to the FCMâs clearing or financial arrangements.
⢠And seventh, instituting a liquidity requirement for FCMs, in addition to the existing capital requirement, to better detect FCMs that have become distressed and may put customer funds at risk.
Prior to this proposal, the Commission already made some important improvements to protections for customer funds. They include:
⢠The completed amendments to rule 1.25 regarding the investment of funds that bring customers back to protections they had prior to exemptions the Commission granted between 2000 and 2005. Importantly, this prevents use of customer funds for in-house lending through repurchase agreements;
⢠Clearinghouses will have to collect margin on a gross basis and FCMs will no longer be able to offset one customerâs collateral against another and then send only the net to the clearinghouse;
⢠The so-called âLSOC ruleâ (legal segregation with operational comingling) for swaps ensures customer money is protected individually all the way to the clearinghouse; and
⢠The Commission included customer protection enhancements in the final rule for designated contract markets. These provisions codify into rules staff guidance on minimum requirements for SROs regarding their financial surveillance of FCMs.
A red flag that has come up in several cases is inadequate auditing. A large futures broker or investment firm should have, if not one of the big four, an institutional level auditor. The Sam Israel Bayou Hedge Fund, Bernie Madoff and PFG scandals all used sole proprietor or inadequate auditors. While the big guys have messed up as well, a large firm managing hundreds of millions of dollars shouldnât be hiring someone working out of his (or her) garage. If they do, it is a blazing red flag.
Publicly traded companies like MF Global have numerous reports they must file with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and, as a registered FCM, MF Global had to submit monthly segregated account reports to the CFTC. These reports can reveal a lot of information, though many of them, especially SEC filings, can be dense and hard to interpret if you donât know what to look for. Find someone who does.
Using the new BASIC system, customers will be able to view
- An FCM Capital report, showing the most recent monthâs data on adjusted net capital, required net capitals and excess net capital
- An FCM customer segregated funds report, which will include information including the total funds held in segregated accounts, the funds required to be held in segregated accounts, excess segregated funds and the percentage of segregated funds that are held in cash
- An FCM customer secured amount funds report, which will show the same information as the segregated funds report for an FCMâs secured funds
Quote from StarDust9182:
Isn't this moot anyways?
Without enforcement of the laws, you can print anything in paper laws to increase confidence in government, however, it is not worth the paper it is printed on.
Has anyone been punished for breaking the old laws?