A new Stanford University study estimates that 18 of President Trump’s campaign rallies from June 20 through September 22 have led to at least 30,000 coronavirus cases and more than 700 deaths.
A new Stanford University study estimates that 18 of President Trump’s campaign rallies from June 20 through September 22 have led to at least 30,000 coronavirus cases and more than 700 deaths.
Imagine how many more will fall from ruining confidence in mail-in ballots and forcing people to the polls during a pandemic?
We find that online voter registration systems in some states have vulnerabilities that allow adversaries to alter oreffectively prevent a voter’s registration.We additionally find that ballot tracking systems raise serious privacy questions surrounding ease of access to voter data.While the vulnerabilities discussed here are unlikely to enable an adversary to modify votes, several could have the effect of disenfranchising voters and re-ducing voter confidence in U.S. elections infrastructure, thereby undermining thevery purpose of these systems.
Paper ballot voting with its fully-verifiable paper-trail is usu-ally considered as more secure than their e-voting counterparts, given the large number of recent incidents. In this work, we explore the security of paper voting and show that paper voting, as it is implemented today, is surprisingly vulnerable to cyber-attacks. In particular, the aggregation methods of preliminary voting results of various countries rely on insecure communication channels like telephone, fax or non-secure e-mail. Furthermore, regulations typically do not mandate the use of secure channels for the transmission of preliminary results. We illustrate that preliminary results, despite their temporary nature, may have a severe impact on real-world decisions during the 3 to 30 days window until the final results are declared. An attacker exploiting this discrepancy can,e.g., benefit from stock market manipulation or call into question the le-gitimacy of the elections. This work investigates the cyber-risks in papervoting in a systematic manner by reviewing procedures in several coun-tries (Estonia, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America) and through a comprehensive case-study of Switzerland. We examine the transmission systems currently in use through inquires from election officials. Moreover, we illustrate the feasibility of attacks by analyzing the frequent historical discrepancies between preliminary and final results. Considering our results and recent reports about easily modifiable preliminary results in Germany and the Nether-lands, we conjecture similar weaknesses in other countries as well.
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2005.08427.pdf
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1906.07532.pdf
There are several real security concerns with vote by mail. Not the least of which include ballot harvesting which was almost universally illegal until the coof gave the government unilateral power. While still insecure, in-person voting at least guarantees a malicious actor present in the booth area cannot alter votes, cancel mailed ballots, and other things. Though the systems themselves can be altered as has been demonstrated for several years at DEFCON. Though, no one seems to care enough to change anything.
The left is typically the party of the over-educated. Science, in particular cryptography, has been concerned with this for a long time. The non-existence of fraud (allegedly) this time is not evidence the system is secure and the thing about highly insecure systems is you can't even detect when they fail. Any accusation of voter fraud by ballot harvesters is just as valid as Stelter getting on his CNN bully pulpit and saying people "afraid of voter fraud are idiots".