There can be no doubt that the reason why money rates remained low in Austria was that, as a result of the Central Bank's tactics, the transfer of short-term funds to London or Berlin, whether through covered or uncovered arbitrage, was checked. It may be asked, however, whether the overvaluation of the forward krone and the depreciation of the spot krone were really the result of deliberate policy, or whether they resulted merely from the higher bank rates in London or Berlin, and from speculative forward buying of kronen, stimulated by the fact that the spot krone was at gold export point. Federn staked his whole reputation on his assertion in his various articles that official policy was the cause. On the other hand, his formidable antagonist, Mises, was equally emphatic in denying that any special devices had been applied to the Austro-Hungarian bank, in 1907 or at any other time, for the purpose of discouraging an outflow of funds. Federn goes into minute details in describing how the policy was carried out, showing how the Austo-Hungarian bank discriminated between the demand for foreign currencies for commercial purposes and for the purpose of interest arbitrage, by refusing to sell spot currencies while selling freely for forward delivery, on the assumption that in the then existing circumstances those who bought Forward Exchange could not possibly use the funds for interest arbitrage. Being in close contact with the market as the leading financial Editor of his day he was in an excellent position to ascertain the facts, and his facts were never called into question by anyone apart from Mises.
Although Mises had a well-deserved international reputation as a theoretical economist, he had no first-hand contact with the markets, nor even, it seems, an adequate knowledge of its essential technical details. He appeared to confuse long bills with Forward Exchange, which, for an Austrian economist specialising in monetary questions, was surprising even for pre-1914 days. The only evidence he quoted in support of his argument was a statement by Dr. von Bilinski, then governor of the Austro-Hungarian bank, according to whom official policy at times of pressure due to international causes was to send gold freely to foreign markets in order to 'prevent there a further increase of interest rates which would otherwise lead to an artificial efflux of gold from the Monarchy, and consequently to an increase of interest rates'. On the basis of this statement Mises claimed that the Austria-Hungary had pursued, in fact if not in law, a policy identical with that of gold standard countries, and that she had not sought to avoid parting with gold when higher interest rates abroad caused a pressure on the krone.
This assertion was contradicted four years later by Bilinski himself. He had meanwhile become Finance Minister, and, having ceased to be a Central Banker, presumably no longer felt the same need for paying lip-service to monetary orthodoxy. In a speech before the Austrian parliament on December 1, 1910, and in a subsequent speech, he opposed the adoption of the full gold standard on the ground that under the existing system the Austro-Hungarian bank had possessed a very effective weapon at its disposal in defending the exchange, in that it could differentiate between those demanding Foreign Exchange for commercial purposes and those who wanted it for arbitrage or speculation.