Quote from Tsing Tao:
1. I posted it here because it was the political elements I wanted to discuss. Ie, the result of following Keynesian ideals in today's administration.
2.and 3 - cute bridge analogy, but it really doesn't have all that much to do with the blog article.
I will agree with you that those who practice Keynesian theory today do so in a bastardized form, and do not follow Keynes as he meant his ideas to be followed.
The bridge analogy had to do with the overly simplistic economic model followed by the Austrians & Monetarists, where debt doesn't figure: the Austrians consider it Original Sin and want to get rid of it, the Monetarists just ignore it.
In real life, debt is omnipresent. A product is delivered to a wholesaler; the invoice isn't COD, it's 30 or 60 days. The wholesaler delivers the same to the retailer, same deal. Everyone owes everyone else. Every businessman maintains a line of credit with some bank somewhere for working capital, and a lot of them do business with factors who take their receivables at a discount, so that in effect the businessman is paying someone a pretty high interest rate in order to get the goods he needs to do business.
Where there's debt, there's risk. Where there's risk, there's instability.
Hence the swings of the economic cycle.
Irving Fisher's debt/deflation screed, written in the early part of the Depression, was Keynes' launching point.
Keynes considers the risk that every businessman knows about: unlimited uncertainty. Not limited by some standard deviation in the head of some economist who could have been a physicist but decided the math was too hard. Actually unlimited risk.
Where risk can't be limited, and the worst happens, nothing will persuade that businessman to make an investment. Hence the idea that the only agent in the entire economic system that can kickstart an economy that has ground to a halt is the government. What Keynes understood, his central insight, was and is that there is no essential reason at all why an economy that has come to a dead stop should start up again; or at least restart in a timeframe less than that of a human lifetime.
His sayings have become worn out jokes, but if you look at each one they tell a defining truth about risk:
In the long run we're all dead: every invalid economic system says that in the long run their way is the right way. Mellon telling Hoover to liquidate everything, or every ETer who thinks if you just let things alone everything would be all right again. Hoover actually believed Mellon, mostly. By the time he was done, three and a half years after the Crash, the economy had come to a complete dead stop. So much for Mellon.
Do you care if you're dead when the solution proposed starts working?
Markets can stay irrational longer than you can stay solvent: that goes for everyone, not just speculators. The idea that markets will correct in time for everyone to be happy and party again is simply not true. There are times, and they happen more often than Austrians and Monetarists will admit, when the markets go nuts and stay nuts and will not be persuaded to become sane regardless of crashing commodity prices that should "clear markets" or anything else.
Keynesian solutions work because they take account of risk. Austerity in times like what we're going through now doesn't work because it doesn't take account of the obvious risk that it will start a self-reinforcing downward spiral.
The eurozone is finding that out again and again and again, and refuses to learn the lesson. It's kind of interesting to watch as they squirm around trying to figure out a way to get austerity to work. It won't. The only question is how long it takes them to figure it out and whether they succeed in destroying the world economy trying.