Karen the Supertrader speaking at tastytrade ‘s Geeks on Parade
- Thread starter Sweet Bobby
- Start date
Why would you say that and then this?
You do realize he is short ES from 2100 don't you?
Try to keep up. IF? Dude he featured her on his live in person show. Been there, done that.
2 Steps.
1. Close losing trade.
2. Open a new trade, success unknown.
Continue to claim high win rate, as if anyone gives a shit.
.
Yes.
Because of what I said IMMEDIATELY after I said the second statement.
Which was: The idea is sound. Trading, as I call it "Big Book" is obviously profitable. In other words, you make scores of positions. Your edge does not come from any entrance or one overlaying assumption on the market, but you end up being long and short many positions in differing periodicities with differing strategies. It's pure Game Theory. By definition, it allows you to score through Iterations of trades insanely quickly. In 8 days? You've almost gone through one iteration. You're going to have big losers. Big winners. And hopefully, within one iteration, the middle will skew you towards positive return. That's what's going on mathematically. And if it doesn't skew you towards profitability? Since you have some many positions on, you can get to your next iteration, again, very quickly. He's basically 'cultivating' his alpha and beta among a large "field" of positions.
Wonder why he got "Portfolio Beta" into his platform so quickly?
Concept and idea is what is important. As I said in another thread: I don't believe there is any such thing as "clout" on a Trading Forum ... of all places. No one should believe anyone. About anything. Myself included. I don't believe in Guru's. Do believe Tom's profitability. Or don't. It really doesn't matter. The concept matters. But not what any one individual does. Heck, for all you know, someone could be pulling what I refer to as a "Francisco d'Anconia" on you. Don't believe anyne. At all. We're all one step away from disaster, or a Brain Stroke away from doing something idiotic. Again, that includes myself. The only thing that is worth anything are ideas that are conveyed by ...
1) Good teaching. There are no boring subjects. Only boring teachers
2) Concepts clearly conveyed in a progressive manner ... such that THE STUDENT can explain them. Not the teacher. The teacher should already know the concept. But if they student can't explain it (or the listener to the topic), because the teacher got too technical up front ... then we might as well be speaking to a wall. It's only after the beginning concepts ... LATER ... you can progress people to more advanced topics. How many times were we taught things in 7th Grade Math class, and the teacher said in 9th Grade: "Hey, remember how we said that you will NEVER SEE XYZ in Mathematics ... how we said that two years ago? Well, we knew then, that wasn't the case. But you could not handle it then. So now, let's explain that topic"
I remember learning about how the Proton and Neutron was the smallest part of the Atom in 5th grade. Then, in 9th Grade, them telling us: "Nah, when we were teaching you that we knew that wasn't the case. So let's progress now to Quantum Probability Fields ... leptons and gluons". It's just the nature of teaching ANY subject. You can't start off with the more advanced topics that yield better results. It's too advanced for beginners.
Again, I don't even understand the import of this question, given the very popular Portfolio process I outlined above. Which in a larger, more inefficient way of doing what I was doing.
In other words, someone could look at me and say:
You DO realize that raVar was long the 5 Year price over the last few days right?
As if to intonate that specifies anything about me, or my trading?
Because I was also DV01 equalized out, to be short the 2 year ... so .... doesn't really matter I was long the 5 year does it?
I already specified, what I refer to as a "Big Book" Portfolio Management / Game Theory approach to trading, wherein the volatility metrics of any binary position are diluted among scores of positions, and then positions are managed to 'cull' that particular iteration towards a positive expectancy.
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It is a high win rate over an iteration, but win on a binary event is completely unknown. And as I specified, that's not all there is to it, because if one is truly thinking about risk? As I said ... already ....
And?
All of Trading is placing capital at risk, on an unknown future outcome. If you have a problem with that? I don't really understand why you'd be on a trading forum in the first place.
And I could care less if you care.
All I care, is the import of the idea is soundly and clearly enunciated.
Try to keep up. The qualifier: AGAIN
again:
adverb
Definition of again: 1: in return : BACK
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I never thought I'll have to 'defend' Tom on here. I have great respect to what he has accomplished and has been doing for the past 30 years in the Option Trading arena, from TOS, to Dough, to TastyWork to TastyTrade to SmallExchange...etc. He has popularized this niche and made it accessible (think education..) to the ordinary Moms and Pops. I am sure that on the way he has collected some nice 'rewards' for his successes (TD etc....) as he has collected some hefty 'slaps' for his failures. I count the reemergence of Karen in the TT playing grounds as a likely failure (of his good judgment), but I surely believe that his overall success rate is still very high albeit that failure-- (and I don't mean his P/L, which I really don't care about)
Honestly ... that is a much better way to phrase it, then I probably phrased it.
And you are correct, it does not take away the fact that his previous gains, were that. Gains.
Probably a better way, that I could have phrased it would be something along the lines of: "If he gets anywhere near someone that has been involved in fraud? Eeesh, that is one steep, steep "Draw-down" from said previous gains ..."
Read the f*cking complaint. She didn’t account for unrealized losses...
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2016/comp-pr2016-98.pdf
The “scheme” trades start at 67.
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2016/comp-pr2016-98.pdf
The “scheme” trades start at 67.
67.These Scheme Trades often involved (1) selling call or put options on futures that would expire at the end of the current month (“first leg option”) and simultaneously (2) buying call or put options on futures for the same quantity at the same “strike price” that would expire early the next month (“second leg option”).
68.These options would typically be deep “in the money,” meaning they were very likely to be exercised or assigned.
69.The sale of the first leg options would result in significant proceeds (referred to as “premium”) being paid to the respective Fund, which was realized as a gain for the current month when the first leg option expired.
70.Bruton picked the size of the first leg option sale so that the premium collected would be sufficient to offset the losses realized for the month and enable the fund to report a net realized gain for the current month.
71.The expiration of the first leg options also resulted in the assignment of futures in the Fund’s account, which would carry a large “unrealized” loss at the current market price.
72.The expiration of the second leg option, typically at the end of the first week of the subsequent month, covered this open futures position, but also required the Fund to realize a large loss (the purchase price of the second leg option).
73.The net effect of the Scheme Trades was to allow Hope to defer indefinitely the Funds’ realization of trading losses while consistently reporting a realized gain in the Funds and collecting an incentive fee.
74.To illustrate with a specific example, the HI Fund began the month of February 2015 with a net unrealized loss of $44 million. Much of this loss became realized early in the month.
75.On February 24, 2015, Hope caused the HI Fund to sell 7,000 call options (i.e., first leg options) on S&P 500 E-mini futures with a strike price of $2,000, for a sales price of $39,228,812.50. These first leg options expired on Friday, February 27 (i.e., 3 days later).
76.That same day, Hope caused the HI Fund to buy 7,000 call options (i.e., second leg options) on S&P 500 E-mini futures with the same strike price as the first leg options. The total purchase price was $39,556,075. These second-leg options expired on Friday, March 6 (i.e., 10 days later).
77.On February 24, 2015, the closing market price for the underlying futures was $2,113.75, meaning that the first and second leg options were deep in the money.
78.Because the first and second leg options were deep in the money on February 24, and because the options expired in such a short period of time, the HI Fund had almost no exposure to market movements in the futures underlying the options. In other words, the HI Fund stood almost no chance of making or losing money on this paired Scheme Trade regardless of which direction the futures market moved.
79.On February 27, the first leg options that Hope had sold expired, and Hope realized a gain from the sale of those options in the amount of $39,228,812.50 (i.e. the sales price of those options).
80.Because those options expired in the money, the underlying futures were assigned, such that the HI Fund’s account was treated as being “short” 7,000 S&P 500 E-mini futures as of that day. Hope did not record any realized loss from that assignment, however, even though, as a result of the assignment, Hope had essentially sold short the futures at a price below the current market price and would eventually need to cover the position in some manner. Instead, the open futures position was treated as an unrealized loss.
81.In account statements sent to investors at the end of February, 2015, Hope reported that the HI Fund had net realized gains of $1,729,670 for the month.
82.Hope charged the HI Fund a fee of $345,934 (i.e., 20% of the reported realized gain), half of which was sent to the Hope Foundation.
83.On March 6th, the second leg options expired in the money, the options were exercised, and the Fund was “delivered” 7,000 futures.
84.The futures delivered as a result of the expiration of the second leg options covered the HI Fund’s short futures position that had resulted from the expiration of the first leg options. Because the positions in the underlying futures cancelled each other out, the HI Fund did not realize any gain or loss on those futures.
85. At that point, consistent with the fund’s accounting policies, the HI Fund realized a loss of $39,556,075, i.e., the purchase price of the second leg options.
86. Hope then entered into similar Scheme Trades in March to avoid having realized losses at the end of that month, and so on.
87.The Scheme Trades were not in the best interest of the Funds.
88.The HI Fund has not had a month with a net realized loss since August 2011, just after it was opened.
89.Between November 2014 and March 2016, Hope collected over $6 million in incentive fees from the HI Fund.
90.Most of the incentive fees would not have been paid in the absence of the Scheme Trades.
91.Of the 10% incentive fee paid to Hope by the HI Fund, Bruton divided the fee nearly equally among herself and two other Hope employees, after paying salaries of other employees and expenses for Hope.
68.These options would typically be deep “in the money,” meaning they were very likely to be exercised or assigned.
69.The sale of the first leg options would result in significant proceeds (referred to as “premium”) being paid to the respective Fund, which was realized as a gain for the current month when the first leg option expired.
70.Bruton picked the size of the first leg option sale so that the premium collected would be sufficient to offset the losses realized for the month and enable the fund to report a net realized gain for the current month.
71.The expiration of the first leg options also resulted in the assignment of futures in the Fund’s account, which would carry a large “unrealized” loss at the current market price.
72.The expiration of the second leg option, typically at the end of the first week of the subsequent month, covered this open futures position, but also required the Fund to realize a large loss (the purchase price of the second leg option).
73.The net effect of the Scheme Trades was to allow Hope to defer indefinitely the Funds’ realization of trading losses while consistently reporting a realized gain in the Funds and collecting an incentive fee.
74.To illustrate with a specific example, the HI Fund began the month of February 2015 with a net unrealized loss of $44 million. Much of this loss became realized early in the month.
75.On February 24, 2015, Hope caused the HI Fund to sell 7,000 call options (i.e., first leg options) on S&P 500 E-mini futures with a strike price of $2,000, for a sales price of $39,228,812.50. These first leg options expired on Friday, February 27 (i.e., 3 days later).
76.That same day, Hope caused the HI Fund to buy 7,000 call options (i.e., second leg options) on S&P 500 E-mini futures with the same strike price as the first leg options. The total purchase price was $39,556,075. These second-leg options expired on Friday, March 6 (i.e., 10 days later).
77.On February 24, 2015, the closing market price for the underlying futures was $2,113.75, meaning that the first and second leg options were deep in the money.
78.Because the first and second leg options were deep in the money on February 24, and because the options expired in such a short period of time, the HI Fund had almost no exposure to market movements in the futures underlying the options. In other words, the HI Fund stood almost no chance of making or losing money on this paired Scheme Trade regardless of which direction the futures market moved.
79.On February 27, the first leg options that Hope had sold expired, and Hope realized a gain from the sale of those options in the amount of $39,228,812.50 (i.e. the sales price of those options).
80.Because those options expired in the money, the underlying futures were assigned, such that the HI Fund’s account was treated as being “short” 7,000 S&P 500 E-mini futures as of that day. Hope did not record any realized loss from that assignment, however, even though, as a result of the assignment, Hope had essentially sold short the futures at a price below the current market price and would eventually need to cover the position in some manner. Instead, the open futures position was treated as an unrealized loss.
81.In account statements sent to investors at the end of February, 2015, Hope reported that the HI Fund had net realized gains of $1,729,670 for the month.
82.Hope charged the HI Fund a fee of $345,934 (i.e., 20% of the reported realized gain), half of which was sent to the Hope Foundation.
83.On March 6th, the second leg options expired in the money, the options were exercised, and the Fund was “delivered” 7,000 futures.
84.The futures delivered as a result of the expiration of the second leg options covered the HI Fund’s short futures position that had resulted from the expiration of the first leg options. Because the positions in the underlying futures cancelled each other out, the HI Fund did not realize any gain or loss on those futures.
85. At that point, consistent with the fund’s accounting policies, the HI Fund realized a loss of $39,556,075, i.e., the purchase price of the second leg options.
86. Hope then entered into similar Scheme Trades in March to avoid having realized losses at the end of that month, and so on.
87.The Scheme Trades were not in the best interest of the Funds.
88.The HI Fund has not had a month with a net realized loss since August 2011, just after it was opened.
89.Between November 2014 and March 2016, Hope collected over $6 million in incentive fees from the HI Fund.
90.Most of the incentive fees would not have been paid in the absence of the Scheme Trades.
91.Of the 10% incentive fee paid to Hope by the HI Fund, Bruton divided the fee nearly equally among herself and two other Hope employees, after paying salaries of other employees and expenses for Hope.
97.For example, in October of 2014, Hope experienced massive trading losses as a result of volatility in the market. The HI Fund and the HDB Fund collectively ended the month with unrealized losses of approximately $100 million, most of which resulted from the October trading losses. Nevertheless, Hope reported to investors that the Funds had millions of dollars’ worth of “realized” gains in October and collected incentive fees of more than $600,000.
"Karen Bruton" was going long a 3-day 2000-strike call calendar <to open> that was >100 points ITM on ES. F*cking please. HTF is that anything but a scam to roll unrealized losses indefinitely?
Let's hear from the IC-Brigade how she was massively bearish on ES every month with three days to expiration!
Let's ignore the microstructure impact and slippage involved in trading deep ITM calendars on ES. Nobody would trade the thing as a spec as the Feb 27 2000P is at cab. It's no more than a nickel bid. Even if you were moronic enough to use the calendar as a bear-spec, you'd buy the put cal.
The only purpose of such trading -- going long that 100-point ITM calendar -- is fraud.
75.On February 24, 2015, Hope caused the HI Fund to sell 7,000 call options (i.e., first leg options) on S&P 500 E-mini futures with a strike price of $2,000, for a sales price of $39,228,812.50. These first leg options expired on Friday, February 27 (i.e., 3 days later).
76.That same day, Hope caused the HI Fund to buy 7,000 call options (i.e., second leg options) on S&P 500 E-mini futures with the same strike price as the first leg options. The total purchase price was $39,556,075. These second-leg options expired on Friday, March 6 (i.e., 10 days later).
77.On February 24, 2015, the closing market price for the underlying futures was $2,113.75, meaning that the first and second leg options were deep in the money.
78.Because the first and second leg options were deep in the money on February 24, and because the options expired in such a short period of time, the HI Fund had almost no exposure to market movements in the futures underlying the options. In other words, the HI Fund stood almost no chance of making or losing money on this paired Scheme Trade regardless of which direction the futures market moved.
79.On February 27, the first leg options that Hope had sold expired, and Hope realized a gain from the sale of those options in the amount of $39,228,812.50 (i.e. the sales price of those options).
Let's hear from the IC-Brigade how she was massively bearish on ES every month with three days to expiration!
Let's ignore the microstructure impact and slippage involved in trading deep ITM calendars on ES. Nobody would trade the thing as a spec as the Feb 27 2000P is at cab. It's no more than a nickel bid. Even if you were moronic enough to use the calendar as a bear-spec, you'd buy the put cal.
The only purpose of such trading -- going long that 100-point ITM calendar -- is fraud.
75.On February 24, 2015, Hope caused the HI Fund to sell 7,000 call options (i.e., first leg options) on S&P 500 E-mini futures with a strike price of $2,000, for a sales price of $39,228,812.50. These first leg options expired on Friday, February 27 (i.e., 3 days later).
76.That same day, Hope caused the HI Fund to buy 7,000 call options (i.e., second leg options) on S&P 500 E-mini futures with the same strike price as the first leg options. The total purchase price was $39,556,075. These second-leg options expired on Friday, March 6 (i.e., 10 days later).
77.On February 24, 2015, the closing market price for the underlying futures was $2,113.75, meaning that the first and second leg options were deep in the money.
78.Because the first and second leg options were deep in the money on February 24, and because the options expired in such a short period of time, the HI Fund had almost no exposure to market movements in the futures underlying the options. In other words, the HI Fund stood almost no chance of making or losing money on this paired Scheme Trade regardless of which direction the futures market moved.
79.On February 27, the first leg options that Hope had sold expired, and Hope realized a gain from the sale of those options in the amount of $39,228,812.50 (i.e. the sales price of those options).
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