Quote from tomcole:
Michael-
Risk capital attempts to reflect risk that occurs, based upon some arbitrary mark to mkt concepts. The ability of traders during the course of a day to exceed limits, capital requirements etc is well-documented. Risk capital also does not reflect the risk of dealing with lower credit quality counterparties versus higher quality.
Thats what should scare the hell out of senior managers but doesnt - keep in mind JPM has a history of losses in these products, eg, a few years ago their mortgage head was creating his own mark to mkt number which resulted in a $50MM loss, but he did get fired.
Its also curious to note when a spec has a bad trade and gets blown out, its his fault, when a house trader does it, its called a bad market etc.
I dont have any sympathy for JPM traders and dont believe they have any superior trading skills, only more house money to play with, and they get to run customer orders to make money.
I'd bet there are 20-30 lot traders here who routinely make more each year than desk traders who run 10,000 lot positions.
Quote from wilburbear:
Johnself:
I've always wondered how the big institutions could have a bad trading quarter with 842 million in profits, and we, supposedly, can trade all the same instruments and struggle to make a profit. You sound like you know what's taking place in this part of the industry. Would you mind answering 4 questions?
1)What exactly is the repeatable edge at some of these big institutions that allows these enormous trading profits?
2)Is it possible for a dedicated, well-capitalized individual to, in any way, capture a quarter of one percent of these profits?
3)Even if it's impossible for an individual to participate in the profits, why don't competing institutions go in to these high profit areas and compete for the profits in such a way that the edge disappears (similar to the average hedge fund, which is now actually a loser on the year)?
4)When the counterparties see that a financial institution made 842 million off them in one "bad" quarter, why don't they agitate for better fills, or attempt to get competitors involved to compete for the business? How do the counterparties react when they see these enormous numbers?
Thanks.
No, but you are forced to allocate a credit haircut for every counterparty trade. A few desks are using this to their advantage and are trading their swaps book as a CDS book.Quote from tomcole:
Risk capital also does not reflect the risk of dealing with lower credit quality counterparties versus higher quality.
Quote from tomcole:
I dont have any sympathy for JPM traders and dont believe they have any superior trading skills, only more house money to play with, and they get to run customer orders to make money.
Quote from polee2000:
my correlation P&L was a mess too.
you probably know what I shorted. haha
lot's of people got carted this year on that oneQuote from johnself11:
ok i think this discussion is getting a bit muddled with respect to the profitability of prop traders and market making desks... there is a very distinct difference between their contributions and risk parameters. prop traders are allocated a very specific amount of capital with which to wager in the markets. they have immutable daily, monthly and yearl drawdown limits and the overall size oftheir positions at any given time is imited by their allocated capital... generally, the more succesful a prop desk's track record, the higher the allocated capital. now jp chase's prop desk has had fantastic returns over the years so their allocated balance sheet has grown to mind-boggling proportions. so given an extrodinary amount of capital, large absolute rerturns such as 800mm USD may not be at all that impressive. consider the disaster that was Long Term Capital Management - the size of theit capital base including the leverage that they coerced made their returns seem huge on an absolute basis but their results were in actuality positively laughable when scaled against their carry base. It is a fact that givien LTCMs leverage, they would have done significantly better if they had taken no bets on swap spreads or merger arbitrage or whatever, and had simply put all their capital into relatively safe fannie mae discount notes and gone to lunch.... fnma debentures have a nominal yield pickup to government repo rates, and the mutiplier of their ignorant an irresponsible leverage levels would have given them better returns then their oh-so-clever "carry" trades. sorry for the wordiness but i hope this helps
Quote from MichaelJ:
It is not consistent. Some desks are stars one year and bad the next.
But define repeatable edge? How much money you expect to make every day/week/month?