Quote from marketsurfer:
there is an unusual phenomena that surfaces in the financial markets, jack and t. murray of murray math, are prime examples. i find this fascinating.
i call it " the cult of plain talking jibberers"--- these individuals seem to attain guru like status by inventing a strange type of "pig" english when speaking about simple market truths. there are 6-7 of these people who have quite a following. is it the "mad genius" angle that their followers are drawn to ? i am really not sure yet, but am in the process of researching and discussing this with several others far more knowledgeable than i in the psychological aspect for a forthcoming published piece.
stay tuned,
surfer
Reminds me of people who gloss themselves, come up with mystical theories, and are evasive when asked directly to explain things.
Bottom line is track record, isn't it?
If Jack's published and documented track record is good, and with real money, and if he has demonstrated the ability to pass his technology of trading onto others at a rate of success that is more than just random luck, then there is something to him.
Reading Jack Hershey is difficult, because of the lack of flow and intelligibility of such simple concepts.
Reading Immanual Kant is difficult, because his level of thought was so precise and profound, and the material so deep and beyond the grasp of most commen men.
Kant dealt in the pure abstract nature of the mind and philosophy.
Jack is dealing with trading, which as we all know is not philophical, but just a method of extracting money from the markets.
People try to emulate real thinkers by their vagueness, non sequiturs, and unusual and unconventional ideas in an attempt to create the aura of sophistication and intelligence.
Having spent days reading just a page of Kant, and finally understanding the concepts he is putting forth, is much different than spending days trying to understand Hershey and coming to the conclusion that he is just a wacko. This aint theorhetical or ivory tower trading, this is the real deal we are participating in.
For those who are unfamiliar with Kant, here is an excerpt:
All trades, arts, and handiworks have gained by division of
labour, namely, when, instead of one man doing everything, each
confines himself to a certain kind of work distinct from others in the treatment it requires, so as to be able to perform it with greater facility and in the greatest perfection. Where the different kinds of work are not distinguished and divided, where everyone is a jack-of-all-trades, there manufactures remain still in the greatest barbarism. It might deserve to be considered whether pure philosophy in all its parts does not require a man specially devoted to it, and whether it would not be better for the whole business of science if those who, to please the tastes of the public, are wont to blend the rational and empirical elements together, mixed in all sorts of proportions unknown to themselves, and who call themselves independent thinkers, giving the name of minute philosophers to those who apply themselves to the rational part only- if these, I say, were warned not to carry on two employments together which differ widely in the treatment they demand, for each of which perhaps a special talent is required, and the combination of which in one person only produces bunglers. But I only ask here whether the nature of science does not require that we should always carefully separate the empirical from the rational part, and prefix to Physics proper (or empirical physics) a metaphysic of nature, and to practical anthropology a metaphysic of morals, which must be carefully cleared of everything empirical, so that we may know how much can be accomplished by pure reason in both cases, and from what sources it draws this its a priori teaching, and that whether the latter inquiry is conducted by all moralists (whose name is legion), or only by some who feel a calling thereto. As my concern here is with moral philosophy, I limit the question
suggested to this: Whether it is not of the utmost necessity to
construct a pure thing which is only empirical and which belongs to anthropology? for that such a philosophy must be possible is evident from the common idea of duty and of the moral laws.
Everyone must admit that if a law is to have moral force, i.e., to be the basis of an obligation, it must carry with it absolute necessity; that, for example, the precept, "Thou shalt not lie," is not valid for men alone, as if other rational beings had no need to observe it; and so with all the other moral laws properly so called; that, therefore, the basis of obligation must not be sought in the nature of man, or in the circumstances in the world in which he is placed, but a priori simply in the conception of pure reason; and although any other precept which is founded on principles of mere experience may be in certain respects universal, yet in as far as it rests even in the least degree on an empirical basis, perhaps only as to a motive, such a precept, while it may be a practical rule, can never be called a moral law.
