They Tried to Warn Us: Foreign Intelligence Warnings Before 9/11
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First, General Warnings
# In late 2000, British investigators teamed up with their counterparts in the Cayman Islands and began a yearlong probe of three Afghan men who had entered the Cayman Islands illegally. [Miami Herald, 9/20/01, Los Angeles Times, 9/20/01] In June 2001, the Afghan men were overheard discussing hijacking attacks in New York City, and were promptly taken into custody. This information was forwarded to US intelligence [Fox News, 5/17/02]. In late August 2001, shortly before the attacks, an anonymous letter to a Cayman radio station alleged these same men were al-Qaeda agents âorganizing a major terrorist act against the US via an airline or airlines.â [Miami Herald, 9/20/01, Los Angeles Times, 9/20/01, MSNBC, 9/23/01]
1. In late July 2001, Afghanistanâs Foreign Minister Wakil Ahmed Muttawakil learned that Osama bin Laden was planning a âhuge attackâ on targets inside America. The attack was imminent, and would kill thousands, he learned from the leader of the rebel Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, which was closely allied with al-Qaeda at the time. Muttawakil sent an emissary to pass this information on to the US Consul General, and another US official, âpossibly from the intelligence services.â Sources confirmed that this message was received, but supposedly not taken very seriously, because of âwarning fatigueâ arising from too many terror warnings. [Independent, 9/7/02, Reuters, 9/7/02]
2. Also in late July 2001, the US was given a âconcrete warningâ from Argentinaâs Jewish community. âAn attack of major proportionsâ was planned against either the US, Argentina, or France. The information came from an unidentified intelligence agency. [Forward, 5/31/02]
3. An undercover agent from Morocco successfully penetrated al-Qaeda. He learned that bin Laden was âvery disappointedâ that the 1993 bombing had not toppled the World Trade Center, and was planning âlarge scale operations in New York in the summer or fall of 2001.â He provided this information to the US in August 2001. [Agence France Presse, 11/22/01, International Herald Tribune, 5/21/02, London Times, 6/12/02]
4. Hasni Mubarak, President of Egypt, maintains that in the beginning of September 2001 Egyptian intelligence warned American officials that al-Qaeda was in the advanced stages of executing a significant operation against an American target, probably within the US. [AP, 12/7/01, New York Times, 6/4/02] He learned this information from an agent working inside al-Qaeda. [ABC News, 6/4/02]
Warnings the Attack Will Come from the Air
Many warnings specifically mentioned a threat coming from the air.
1. In 1999, British intelligence gave a secret report to the US embassy. The report stated that al-Qaeda had plans to use âcommercial aircraftâ in âunconventional ways,ââpossibly as flying bombs.â [Sunday Times, 6/9/02] On July 16, 2001, British intelligence passed a message to the US that al-Qaeda was in âthe final stagesâ of preparing a terrorist attack in Western countries. [London Times, 6/14/02] In early August, the British gave another warning, telling the US to expect multiple airline hijackings from al-Qaeda. This warning was included in Bushâs briefing on August 6, 2001. [Sunday Herald, 5/19/02]
2. In June 2001, German intelligence warned the US, Britain, and Israel that Middle Eastern terrorists were planning to hijack commercial aircraft and use them as weapons to attack âAmerican and Israeli symbols which stand out.â Within the American intelligence community, âthe warnings were taken seriously and surveillance intensifiedâ but âthere was disagreement on how such terrorist attacks could be prevented.â This warning came from Echelon, a spy satellite network that is partly based in Germany. [Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 9/11/01, Washington Post, 9/14/01]
3. In late July 2001, Egyptian intelligence received a report from an undercover agent in Afghanistan that â20 al-Qaeda members had slipped into the US and four of them had received flight training on Cessnas.â To the Egyptians, pilots of small planes didnât sound terribly alarming, but they passed on the message to the CIA anyway, fully expecting Washington to request information. âThe request never came.â [CBS, 10/9/02] Given that there were 19 hijackers and four pilots (who trained on Cessnas) in the 9/11 plot, one might think this would now be a big news item. But in fact, the information has only appeared as an aside in a CBS â60 Minutesâ show about a different topic.
4. In late summer 2001, Jordan intelligence intercepted a message stating that a major attack was being planned inside the US and that aircraft would be used. The code name of the operation was Big Wedding, which did in fact turn out to be the codename of the 9/11 plot. The message was passed to US intelligence through several channels. [International Herald Tribune, 5/21/02, Christian Science Monitor, 5/23/02]
5. Russian President Vladimir Putin publicly stated that he ordered his intelligence agencies to alert the US in the summer of 2001 that suicide pilots were training for attacks on US targets. [Fox News, 5/17/02] The head of Russian intelligence also stated, âWe had clearly warned themâ on several occasions, but they âdid not pay the necessary attention.â [Agence France-Presse, 9/16/01] The Russian newspaper Izvestia claimed that Russian intelligence agents knew the participants in the attacks, and: âMore than that, Moscow warned Washington about preparation for these actions a couple of weeks before they happened.â [Izvestia, 9/12/02]
6. Five days before 9/11, the priest Jean-Marie Benjamin was told by a Muslim at an Italian wedding of a plot to attack the US and Britain using hijacked airplanes as weapons. He wasnât told time or place specifics. He immediately passed what he knew on to a judge and several politicians in Italy. Presumably this Muslim confided in him because Benjamin has done considerable charity work in Muslim countries and is considered âone of the Westâs most knowledgeable experts on the Muslim world.â [Zenit, 9/16/01] Benjamin has not revealed who told him this information, but it could have come from a member of the al-Qaeda cell in Milan, Italy. This cell supplied forged documents for other al-Qaeda operations, and wiretaps show members of the cell were aware of the 9/11 plot. [Los Angeles Times, 5/29/02, Guardian, 5/30/02, Boston Globe, 8/4/02] For instance, in August 2000, one terrorist in Milan was recorded saying to another: âIâm studying airplanes. I hope, God willing, that I can bring you a window or a piece of an airplane the next time we see each other.â The comment was followed by laughter [Washington Post, 5/31/02]. In another case in January 2001, a terrorist asked if certain forged documents were for âthe brothers going to the United States,â and was angrily rebuked by another who told him not to talk about that âvery, very secretâ plan. [Los Angeles Times, 5/29/02] In March 2001, the Italian government gave the US a warning based on these wiretaps. [Fox News, 5/17/02]